P. v. Hanafi
Filed 1/25/13 P. v. Hanafi
CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MOHAMMAD
NASEEM HANAFI et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
B235210
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA068628)
APPEALS
from judgments of the Superior Court of
County, James R. Dabney and Scott T. Millington,
Judges. Hanafi’s judgment affirmed. Liggins’s judgment affirmed as modified.
John
Steinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant Mohammad Naseem Hanafi.
Eric
R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant Kisasi Liggins.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and
Pamela C. Hamanaka, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
A
jury convicted defendant Mohammad Naseem Hanafi of
Code, § 209, subd. (a)),
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] kidnapping (count 3) (§ 207, subd. (a)),
criminal threats (count 5) (§ 422), and corporal injury to a spouse (count 6)
(§ 273.5, subd. (a)). The jury failed to
reach a verdict on one count of grand
theft of personal property (count 4) (§ 487, subd. (a)). The jury found Hanafi not guilty of torture
(count 2) (§ 206), and attempted willful, deliberate, premeditated murder
(count 14) (§§ 664 & 187, subd. (a)).
The jury convicted defendant Kisasi Liggins of counts 1 and 3, and found
him not guilty of all other counts.
dismissed as to Liggins pursuant to section 1385. As to counts 1 and 3, the trial court found
true allegations that Liggins had suffered a prior strike conviction for
robbery (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)); served three
prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)); and suffered a prior conviction of a
serious felony, robbery (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
The
trial court sentenced Hanafi to life imprisonment with the possibility of
parole for kidnapping for extortion (count 1); the upper term of eight years
for kidnapping (count 3), to run concurrently to the sentence on count 1; the
upper term of three years for criminal threats (count 5), which sentence was
stayed pursuant to section 654; and the upper term of four years for corporal
injury to a spouse (count 6), which sentence was also stayed pursuant to
section 654.
The
trial court sentenced Liggins to life imprisonment with the possibility of
parole for kidnapping for extortion
(count 1), plus a second term of life with the possibility of parole because of
his strike prior; the middle term of five years, doubled to 10 years as a
second strike sentence for kidnapping (count 3); and five years for his serious
felony prior conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
The determinate term of 15 years was ordered to be served first, before
the indeterminate terms of life with the possibility of parole. On the court’s motion, the prior prison term
(§ 667.5, subd. (b)) findings were stricken.
Hanafi
contends on appeal that (1) he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel
when his attorney conceded to the jury during
kidnapping; (2) the trial court prejudicially erred by denying Hanafi’s motion
for a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge to
exclude the sole male Pakistani from the jury; (3) the trial court
prejudicially erred by denying his motion for a mistrial based on the
interpreter’s crying during the victim’s testimony; (4) there was insufficient
evidence to sustain his conviction of kidnapping for extortion; and (5) the
kidnapping was an indivisible course of conduct with a single criminal
objective, and therefore the prosecution should not have been allowed to split
the offense into separate kidnapping offenses, requiring either reversal of
count 3 or a stay of the sentence on count 3.
Liggins
contends on appeal that his sentence on count 3 must be reversed and the case
remanded for resentencing because the trial court erroneously believed it did
not have discretion to impose a concurrent sentence for Liggins’s conviction on
count 3 under the “Three Strikes†law.
Liggins also joins in the arguments made by Hanafi on appeal.
We
are not persuaded by any of the contentions raised by defendants. Hanafi’s judgment is affirmed. However, we observe that the court erred in sentencing
Liggins to a second life term on count 1 because of his prior strike. We will modify the sentence to reflect that
his minimum term of confinement on count 1 is 14 calendar years. As modified, Liggins’s judgment is affirmed.
factual
background
Case
Nature of the Marital Relationship Between the Victim and Hanafi
The
victim, Raisa Begum Hanafi, was 48 years old at the time of trial.
was afraid of defendants. Raisa had
lived in Pakistan up until the
time she married Hanafi in November 1999.
Their marriage was arranged by her family. Hanafi had been living in the
States, and about one month after the marriage, Hanafi left Pakistan and returned to
the United States.
In
April 2001, Raisa came to California and began living
with Hanafi in his home in Hawthorne. Raisa felt loving toward Hanafi and hopeful
about the prospect of having a happy marriage.
However, immediately upon her arrival Hanafi instructed her to clean the
bathroom and kitchen. Within two to
three months of her arrival, Hanafi struck Raisa for the first time. He continued to hit her periodically, on her
suitcase and say she was returning to Pakistan.
Hanafi would say he would not hit her again. They argued frequently, and Hanafi called her
ugly, dark, and short. Hanafi threatened
to kill her and asked where the knives were kept. Because Raisa was afraid of him she kept the
knives hidden. Hanafi once showed her a
saw and told her he would slit her throat and saw her head off. She was often afraid when she went to sleep.
From
2001 to 2006, Hanafi expected Raisa to stay at home, clean, cook, do laundry,
and massage him. She generally was not
allowed to go out, although she begged him to be allowed to study English and
he allowed her to attend school for one month.
Raisa did not have friends. Raisa
had to buy her clothes at the flea market because Hanafi gave her little or no
money for her personal expenses. Hanafi
sometimes left Raisa alone for weeks at a time while he traveled out of the
United States. He did not leave money
for food or utilities, and she did not have a car or a driver’s license. However, she would take walks by herself
during the times he was gone.
Sometime
during 2006, Hanafi and Raisa began talking about getting divorced. During that year, Hanafi prepared a
typewritten document and told her to sign it and go back to Pakistan, or he
would kill her. He also presented her
with a handwritten document and told her to sign it, but she refused.
In
December 2006, Raisa opened a safe deposit box at Washington Mutual Bank
(WAMU), without Hanafi’s knowledge, under the name Raisa Begum. She also had a bank account there in her
name. She placed her separate property
and personal documents in the safe deposit box at WAMU, including her Social
Security information, jewelry, money, traveler’s checks, marriage and birth
certificates, bank statement, and her educational degree. Raisa was the sole signatory on the safe
deposit box so she was the only one with access to it. Anyone else would have to present a notarized
power of attorney to the bank in order to access it. She arranged for any correspondence regarding
the safe deposit box to be sent to a post office box rather than her home
address. Raisa told Ariana Tzec, an
employee at WAMU, that her husband was a horrible person and she did not want
him to find out about what she had in the bank.
Again
in September 2007, Hanafi gave Raisa a document entitled “Raisa Proposal of
Marriage Settlement Agreement.†She did
not sign it. Raisa was acquainted with a
neighbor named Tom, who had done some construction work at the Hanafi
home. Tom frequently saw Raisa crying,
and suggested she talk to his wife, Christine.
Raisa had an opportunity to see Christine when Hanafi went to pray, and
Raisa told Christine that Hanafi hit her.
Christine and Tom advised Raisa not to sign the documents Hanafi had
prepared.
Christine
accompanied Raisa to an attorney’s office sometime in 2007. Raisa showed the attorney, Russell Behjatnia,
the documents regarding the division of assets.
Behjatnia advised her not to sign them, indicating they appeared to call
for an unequal division of assets, although he did not have sufficient
information about Hanafi’s assets to know.
He told her to try to obtain information about all of the marital
assets, explaining that after filing for divorce she could get additional
information. He told her that divorce in
the United States did not require the consent of both spouses. In Islamic tradition, the husband has to
consent to a divorce. Behjatnia did not
believe that divorce was a sin or to be avoided according to the Muslim
religion, but he said Muslim women avoided divorce because it created a
“negative point of view for that individual in [his] society.†Raisa appeared to Behjatnia to be hesitant
and upset during their meeting.
During
2008, Raisa saw an email on Hanafi’s computer that he had written to his
attorney, dated June 12, 2008. In it, he
listed various properties, indicated he was married, and asked, “Must I live
separately and not with her after filing the divorce?†She printed out the email and gave it to the
district attorney’s office.
Raisa
wrote down details about Hanafi, herself, and their finances, and also listed
questions she had about divorce law in California. She wanted to have a record of these things
in case Hanafi killed her. She twice
sought advice from the South Asian Network during 2007 or 2008. They advised her to obtain a divorce through
the court system and not to sign anything Hanafi presented to her. They told her they could provide a place for
her to live while she filed for divorce, but Raisa was afraid that Hanafi would
kill her if she left without his permission.
She did, however, move to a different bedroom in the house than Hanafi
for about an eight-month period.
Raisa
called the police on March 29, 2008, when Hanafi began throwing objects from
her room out the window and wanted her to leave. He told her to call the police or anyone else
because no one was going to help her.
Raisa had not called the police before because she thought a good wife
should tolerate whatever her husband said or did, and she had hoped things
would get better. She believed that a
woman whose husband divorced her would not be respected in society, and in her
culture it was considered a sin to divorce.
Raisa dialed 911 at about 6:30 p.m. and told the 911 operator her
husband was in her room, but she was frightened and hung up. She called again moments later and said,
“[M]y husband is going to crazy,†and she feared he would kill her. When the police arrived at their home, Raisa
said Hanafi had tried to push her down the stairs earlier in the day, but she
fell only a few steps and caught herself.
Raisa told the police Hanafi had thrown her things out of the house and
that she wanted her things returned to her room. The police spoke to Hanafi and left.
In
June or July 2008, Hanafi told Raisa he wanted to send her to Pakistan on
August 15, 2008. He wanted her to sign a
divorce paper and leave. Hanafi had the
paper notarized. Raisa overheard
appellant telling her sister on the telephone, as he had told Raisa in person,
that he was a very bad man and would treat Raisa very badly if she did not
leave.
Fearing
that Hanafi would kill her, Raisa prepared a handwritten will on June 26, 2008,
leaving her separate property to her siblings in Pakistan. She placed the will in her safe deposit
box. Hanafi had been searching for items
she kept in her box, including her passport and Social Security information.
About
one week prior to July 31, 2008 (when the crimes at issue here began to occur),
Hanafi told her to forget everything that had happened and return to their
shared bedroom, and she complied.
Crimes
On
the morning of July 31, 2008, using his debit card and while being recorded on
a store surveillance tape, Hanafi purchased 100 feet of cloth rope, blue and
yellow masking tape, coated cloth duct tape, regular duct tape, and five small
locks.
Raisa
had met Liggins in 2006 or 2007. Hanafi
hired Liggins to do repair work at the Hawthorne residence, as well as at
apartments Hanafi owned and at the mosque.
Liggins and Hanafi were friends.
Liggins came to Raisa and Hanafi’s home many times and ate meals
prepared by Raisa.
On
July 31, 2008, Liggins and his father took Shareefa Kendrick to a mutual
friend’s home. Kendrick, who is a
certified notary, had known Liggins’s father her whole life and therefore
agreed to notarize a power of attorney for Liggins on behalf of his friend,
Hanafi. Liggins said Hanafi could not be
present and gave Kendrick Hanafi’s driver’s license number. The power of attorney form did not have any
signatures on it, and Raisa’s identification was not presented. Nonetheless, Kendrick notarized the blank
document and permitted Liggins to sign her journal of notary book as being the
person who had the document notarized.
He paid Kendrick $20 and she provided him with a receipt.
Around
7:00 p.m. on July 31, 2008, Raisa returned home from a walk. Hanafi insisted she take some sleeping pills
and go to sleep, but she declined. He
continued to insist and said he would get some for her. After taking the battery out of the house
telephone, saying the telephone would disturb her, he left the house for 15 to
20 minutes. When he returned he gave her
one pink and one purple pill, forcing them into her mouth when she tried to
refuse them. He told her to lie on the
bed, facing the wall, and she complied.
Seconds
later, Hanafi and Liggins jumped on top of her and covered her face with a pillow. She could not breathe and was choking, her
eyes bulged, and she urinated. Hanafi
sat on the pillow on the back of her head and told Liggins he needed to use the
stun gun because she was too strong.
Liggins used a stun gun on the middle and lower portions of her back,
her stomach, the back of her thighs, and just below her groin area. Raisa felt pain throughout her body when
Liggins touched her with the stun gun.
Both defendants cursed at her, and Hanafi said, “Bitch, tie this
bitch.†Raisa said she would go back to
Pakistan. She kicked and flailed,
managing to shove them off to one side.
They used a green rope to tie her hands behind her back, and tied her
legs together, turning her over onto her back.
They retied her hands in front of her.
Hanafi
said, “She’s not dead. We’ll have to
take her somewhere else and kill her,†and Liggins agreed. Raisa was frightened and urinated onto the
bed again. Hanafi taunted her, throwing
the inoperable telephone at her and telling her to call the police to save
herself. Hanafi grabbed Raisa by the
hair and told her to tell him where her passport, jewelry, and money were. She claimed not to remember, then said they
were in the room where she kept some boxes.
Defendants left the room. After a
few minutes, they returned and said they found nothing. Raisa again said she did not remember, and
Hanafi replied, “Tell me the truth. We
have poison. We have poison
injection. Also, we have pistol,
also.†She told him the items were in a
“safe box,†the keys for which were buried outside the house. Hanafi left to search for the keys but could
not find them. He returned to the
bedroom and Liggins left to search for them.
He found them and returned to the bedroom. Hanafi cursed at Raisa and said he hated her. Defendants then prayed together, and later
they drank tea and smoked. Raisa was
lying on the bed, in pain because of the stun gun.
Hanafi
went into the computer room to sleep, while Liggins lay down on the floor next
to the bed where Raisa was lying. Around
2:00 a.m., Hanafi came into the bedroom and covered Raisa’s eyes with a towel;
Liggins was sleeping. Hanafi went to the
other room to sleep again. Raisa shook
off the towel and eventually was able to untie her hands, using her teeth, then
untied her feet. She went to the kitchen
and had opened the wooden door and the screen door when Liggins and Hanafi came
into the kitchen and grabbed her. She
yelled out, “Please help me, call 911.
Please help me, call 911.â€
Liggins and Hanafi threw her to the floor, and Hanafi sat on her
head. Liggins sat on her back and
covered her mouth with his hand. Liggins
applied the stun gun to her back and other parts of her body, then put
yellow-brown tape on her face, mouth, and neck, and bound her hands and feet
with tape.
Santos
Galvan, a neighbor of the Hanafis, heard a woman scream what sounded like
“help†in a strong voice, sometime between midnight and 4 a.m. on July 31,
2008. Galvan considered investigating
but instead went back to sleep. On
August 6, 2008, she told detectives from the Hawthorne Police Department about
what she had heard.
After
binding Raisa with tape, they dragged her back into the bedroom and deposited
her on the floor. Defendants said they
would have to take her elsewhere and kill her.
Liggins said they would tie a weight to her and throw her into the
ocean, and Hanafi said they would cut her flesh and feed it to the dogs. Hanafi said he knew someone who would pay
them $10,000 for her flesh and sell her organs.
Raisa prayed for forgiveness, pressing her palms together at her chest,
and Hanafi hit her on the thumb with a flower vase. Hanafi said if she raised her hands like that
again he would hit her where the blow would kill her, touching her temple. He repeated his threat that he had a poison
injection and a pistol.
Hanafi
typed out a durable power of attorney and asked Raisa to sign it. She asked him to remove the tape from her
mouth, hands, and eyes, and he did so.
She asked what the document was but he told her to keep quiet and sign
it. She signed the document halfway down
the page. Other signatures at the top
and bottom of the page and on the back were not hers. Raisa also signed a durable power of attorney
form dated August 1, 2008, after Liggins applied the stun gun to her neck. She did not use her customary signature in
the hope the bank would not honor the document.
Raisa
testified she did not sign a WAMU affidavit/declaration of attorney-in-fact or
a WAMU power of attorney form. Hanafi
signed both forms. Raisa stated that she
had never seen a different WAMU affidavit/declaration of attorney-in-fact form
that had been notarized. Hanafi also
signed a WAMU power of attorney and an affidavit/declaration of attorney-in-fact,
both dated August 1, 2008. Raisa did not
recognize still another notarized WAMU affidavit/declaration of
attorney-in-fact dated August 1, 2008.
Hanafi
gave the documents to Liggins. Hanafi
then forced large tablets into Raisa’s mouth but she spit them out. Liggins crushed twice the number of tablets
into water and shocked her on the neck, forcing the mixture into Raisa’s mouth,
but she spit that out as well.
Defendants again doubled the dose, crushing the tablets and mixing them
with water, Liggins shocked her again, and this time they succeeded in forcing
her to drink the mixture. They tied her
with dark yellow tape, bound her hands and feet with chains, and placed locks
on the chains. They tied dark yellow rope
onto the chains and with Raisa lying on her back, they tied her hands and feet
to each of the four posts of the bed.
Raisa began feeling drowsy.
Liggins left but Hanafi remained with her.
When
she awoke later, she saw defendants were gathering clothes and talking on their
phones. They forced her to take more
tablets dissolved into water, and she fell asleep again.
C.
Hanafi Empties Raisa’s Safe Deposit
Box
On
Friday, August 1, 2008, Hanafi went to WAMU and presented a power of attorney
form together with a safe deposit box key to Tzec, the WAMU employee.
Hanafi was not permitted to open Raisa’s box.
He returned to the bank the following day around noon and presented a
signed power of attorney form dated August 1, 2008. Tzec verified that the paperwork was in order
and retained the original paperwork. The
verification process took about one hour; Hanafi acted impatient as he
waited. Tzec received approval to let
Hanafi into the safe deposit box area, and he signed a log. Another employee, Adam Huesca, let him into
the safe deposit box. The bank’s
security camera captured Hanafi in the bank and entering the safe deposit box
area. Hanafi was carrying a clear
plastic bag containing papers as he departed.
Move Raisa to Another Location
Hanafi
returned home and defendants told Raisa they were taking her somewhere
else. She refused to go, begging them
not to take her, but Hanafi said it was not safe for him to keep her
there. Defendants gathered together
clothes and other things. Hanafi told
Raisa to be quiet or he would shoot her.
Liggins left to get a car. When
he returned, they forced her to drink more medicine and shocked her with the
stun gun. They removed the chains, taped
her hands, then bound her hands and feet behind her with white plastic ties, which
they stapled using a staple gun. Her lip
was cut and her mouth and face were swollen from being thrown onto the kitchen
floor, but they forced a ball gag into her mouth and put tape over it. They covered her eyes with a cloth, picked
her up, and took her downstairs. She
urinated as they did so. They took her
into the attached garage and put her into a car. Liggins drove and Hanafi placed his foot on
top of her. He said, “This is the last
time I’m lying down with her. This is
the last time.†She believed they were
going to kill her.
They
drove for about 20 to 25 minutes. The
car drove inside someplace and stopped, and they took her out of the car and
put her on the ground. Hanafi asked if
everything was done, and Liggins replied, “Just wait.†After about five minutes, they carried her
inside a residence, removed the cloth from her eyes, and untied her hands and
feet. They chained her hands and feet
again. Raisa saw that they were in an
unfurnished room with three windows, which were covered with paper and
sheets. She saw clothing and sheets
taken from her house.
The
apartment she was taken to had recently been rented by Liggins’s sister,
Khadijha Liggins. It was located at 2710
West 54th Street. The apartment had two
bedrooms, a kitchen, a living room, and a bathroom. Upstairs from it was another apartment, with
the address 2710 1/2 West 54th Street, which was unoccupied.
Liggins
gave Raisa some pizza but she was unable to eat because her mouth was
swollen. She continued to doze off and
on because of the medicine. They moved
her to another room where there were metal bunk beds. They put her on the floor next to the beds
and locked the chain that bound her feet to the bed. It was dark outside, and Raisa fell asleep
again.
The
following day, Liggins continued to give her water with medicine in it, and she
felt drowsy. That evening, Hanafi said
they were going to take her somewhere else.
As before, they blindfolded her, tied her up, picked her up, and put her
in the car. They put a cloth in her
mouth and covered her body with a cloth.
They drove for five to eight minutes then stopped and carried her up
some stairs into an apartment. They
uncovered her eyes, and as they carried her through the apartment she could see
various photographs on the walls of the rooms and the hallway. They carried her into a bedroom and put her
on a mattress on the floor, and she saw they had brought the same pillows and
blankets they had been using. She also
saw photographs of African-American people on the wall of the bedroom. They kept the chains on her hands and legs,
and threatened that if she said anything they would kill her with a poison
injection. Raisa continued to doze on
and off. Liggins gave her more pills
mixed into water to make her sleep; she felt dizzy after drinking the water.
Raisa
heard a noise outside the window and asked to use the bathroom. She found a pen there and wrote on a paper
towel, “Please help me. I’m upstairs
near the window. Please help me.†She dropped the paper towel out the window.
Defendants
gave Raisa yogurt and after eating it she felt dizzy again. Raisa awoke during the night and heard
defendants talking. She felt pain in her
back from being dragged, her kidney, the left side of her face, and her left thumb. Raisa still felt dizzy when she woke up the
next morning.
That
evening, defendants put a cloth in her mouth again and blindfolded her. They walked her upstairs to the empty
apartment above the one they had been in.
She was taken to a room where they removed her blindfold. She saw her television and fan, her green
suitcase, and a sheet on the floor. Some
of Hanafi’s clothes were hanging in the closet.
Liggins
watched a “sex type movie†on the television that made Raisa feel very
uncomfortable. She was still tied up
with chains and ropes. She begged Hanafi
to let her go, saying she would leave and go to her brothers and sisters, and
not take anything from Hanafi. Liggins
said they could not let her go because they had gone too far. She awoke frequently during the night because
she was in pain and was frightened at what they might do to her.
The
next morning, Raisa asked for water and Liggins gave her something to drink
that made her entire body feel like it was on fire. She drank some water in the bathroom and it
helped her feel better. She fell asleep
again and when she awoke it was evening again.
She was still tied up, but they had used cloth to tie her up because she
had developed wounds from the chains.
Hanafi had put some cream on the wounds on her wrists and legs caused by
the chains and the stun gun. He cleaned
her with a towel. Defendants gave her
some carrot juice for breakfast that made her feel bad. Hanafi left the apartment. During the course of the day, Raisa asked
Liggins for water, and three times he gave her water with something mixed into
it; she felt very bad after drinking it each time.
Escapes
As
the sun was setting that evening, she crawled out of the bedroom and saw
Liggins sleeping in the hallway. She had
been able to remove the cloths used to tie her hands and legs. She crawled past Liggins, stood up, and went
down the steps. She opened the door,
went down more steps, and opened another door that led outside. She opened a large gate and ran out of
it. She tried to stop two cars to ask
them to call 911, but they did not stop.
The
date was August 5, 2008. Raisa went to a
nearby house belonging to Joy Young, who was at home with her children, and
asked for help. She told Young that her
husband and his friend were beating her and were going to kill her. They had moved her from place to place and
wanted her to sign things. Young called
911 and told the operator what Raisa had said, then handed the phone to
Raisa. Young could not understand everything
Raisa said because of her accent but heard her say that “he†was holding her
hostage.
Raisa
demonstrated to Young’s children how defendants had placed her on the ground
with her hands behind her back and how they used the stun gun on her. Raisa was frightened and tried to hide in the
Youngs’ hallway and behind their china cabinet.
Young saw marks on Raisa’s wrists, neck, and lip. It took about 15 or 20 minutes for the police
to arrive.
Los
Angeles Police Officer Mark Pravongviengkham and his partner went to Young’s
house. He observed that Raisa was very
frightened, and looked severely dehydrated; she had crust around her
mouth. Raisa begged the officers not to
take her back to her husband because she believed he would kill her. She was afraid to leave Young’s house with
the police officers.
As an
ambulance transported Raisa to California Hospital, she told Officer
Pravongviengkham that her husband wanted a divorce and she did not agree to
one. He beat her and brought her to the
apartment, tied her hands and ankles, and used a taser or other instrument to
burn her. The officer could see remnants
of tape around Raisa’s hands and ankles, and saw marks on her ankle. Raisa lifted her shirt several times to show
him marks or a burn around her waist.
Officer Pravongviengkham stayed with Raisa in the emergency room for 30
minutes to an hour. He tried speaking to
Raisa in English but eventually requested an Urdu interpreter. Raisa spoke to the interpreter on the phone,
and the interpreter then relayed to Officer Pravongviengkham’s partner, Officer
Wiley, that Raisa said defendants had beaten, tasered, and tortured her.
Dr.
Stephen Liu, the emergency room physician, treated Raisa on August 5,
2008. She told him she had been
kidnapped and assaulted by her husband.
After she returned from a walk, her husband had given her medication to
help her sleep, then he and his friend pushed a pillow to the back of her
head. Over several days, they tied her
up with wire and duct tape, moved her around in the trunk of the car, hit her,
and shocked her with some kind of instrument.
She felt pain all over her body.
She told him she had escaped that day and was brought into the emergency
room by police officers.
Raisa’s
physical examination indicated she felt pain and tenderness when the back and
side of her neck was touched. She had a
two centimeter bruise on the left upper portion of her abdomen, and Dr. Liu
observed abrasions on her wrists and ankles consistent with having been tied
up. The color of her bruising indicated
it had occurred over the past few days.
Her abrasions did not require stitches, but they too appeared to have
been inflicted recently. Raisa was
distraught and frightened, wanted to be guarded by police officers and placed
in the rear of the emergency room.
Dr.
Liu stated that a stun gun is used to incapacitate a person by causing
pain. If applied for more than a second
or two, a stun gun can cause the muscles to contract very rapidly and lead to
loss of substrate of the muscle, rendering the muscle useless for a time. This can cause the muscle to break down and
can lead to seizures, trauma, loss of consciousness, or loss of bowel and
bladder control. The stun gun can cause
an electrical burn, bruising, or bleeding inside the skin or tissue and might
result in a visible injury. Repeatedly
being shocked by a stun gun could lead to kidney damage.
Some
of Raisa’s bruises and abrasions could have been caused by a stun gun. She had evidence of very early rhabdomyolysis
(breakdown of muscles), which releases some substances into the
bloodstream. Raisa did not allow Dr. Liu
to look under her clothes, although she showed him some bruising on her torso
and bruising and abrasions on her arms and legs.
Dr.
Liu treated Raisa for pain, early rhabdomyolysis, and mild dehydration. CAT scans of her head and neck were normal
and the other testing he conducted was essentially normal. He did not test her for the presence of
carbamazepine or trazodone in her system.
He stated her injuries were consistent with what Raisa said had
occurred. Photographs were taken of the
bruises, wounds, and marks all over her body.
She was released from the hospital the afternoon of August 6, 2008. There was no evidence of rhabdomyolysis when
she was discharged and she did not have any significant complaints requiring
further treatment.
F. The
Police Investigation of Khadijha Liggins’s Apartment and the Adjacent, Upstairs
Apartment
On
August 5, 2008, Los Angeles Police Sergeant Michael Glenn first responded to
the Youngs’ residence and then to Khadijha Liggins’s residence, i.e., the
downstairs apartment at 2710 54th Street.
The property manager was summoned to open the door to the upstairs
apartment, which was unoccupied. During
a brief sweep of the apartment, Sergeant Glenn saw in one of the bedrooms some
bedrolls or blankets, rope, and a blindfold or mask.
Prior
to midnight on August 5, 2008, Hawthorne Police Officer Gilbert Sanchez went to
the apartments to secure the location while other officers were obtaining a
search warrant. When Khadijha Liggins
left her apartment around 11:00 p.m., Officer Sanchez spoke to her. She said Liggins was her brother and that he
lived with her but was not home. Officer
Sanchez telephoned one of the detectives to relate that information. Using a tape recorder, Officer Sanchez
attempted to persuade Khadijha Liggins to consent to a search of her home, but
she did not agree. He asked her several
times because she was not adamant in her refusal. He asked her not to go back into the house
and she abided by his request. Khadijha
Liggins testified that Officer Sanchez threatened to take her children after he
turned off the tape recorder, but he denied making threats of any kind.
On
August 6, 2008, Hawthorne Police Detectives Keus and Barber obtained a search
warrant for the two apartments.
Accompanied by Crime Scene Investigator Linda Schuetze, they went to
2710 West 54th Street. Khadijha Liggins
told another officer that Liggins lived with his wife and children and not with
her. At trial she said the police told
her they knew Liggins lived with her and that if she did not agree she and her
mother would go to jail and her children would be placed in foster care.
Helen
Sidle (Liggins’s mother), his adult sister Sanaa Liggins, and Khadija Liggins’s
two children (ages 12 and newborn) were in the apartment, and were escorted out
by police officers. Liggins was not in
the apartment.
Officers
photographed the interior, including a mattress on the floor and photographs of
African-American women and children hanging on the walls. Officers found an envelope addressed to
Liggins in the apartment.
Officers
also searched the upstairs apartment and photographed the interior. The apartment was unoccupied and had no
furniture. They found in one of the
bedrooms dark yellow rope, green rope, a television sitting on the floor, torn
pieces of fabric that had been tied in knots, and bedding on the floor. In the closet, they found a blindfold on the
floor, men’s clothes hanging on the rack, and a bag of women’s clothing and
toiletry articles. They found Celebrex,
Unisom sleep gels, Tums, Gas-X, Aleve, Dulcolax, and Triaminic. In another bedroom they found a tied black
trash bag that contained clothing.
In
the living room there were boxes and bags and a large green suitcase. The suitcase contained men’s clothing,
naturalization paperwork for Hanafi, certificates for a real estate or broker’s
license, grant deeds with Hanafi’s name on them, quitclaim deeds bearing
Raisa’s name, and a WAMU power of attorney document giving Hanafi power of
attorney over Raisa’s account. There was
bedding, sheets, and two pillows on the floor in the hallway. A black “dickies†bag contained plastic zip
ties (some unused and some that had been closed then cut open), chains wrapped
with brown masking tape and secured by locks, a ball gag with a leather strap,
a white cord, red wrappers, a syringe, and needle-nose pliers. In a clear green bottle they found green and
gray capsules with “Carbatrol†printed on them.
They also found a piece of tinfoil containing white, triangular pills
with “pliva†printed on them. A milk
crate in the living room contained men’s clothing and a box for a “Dragon Fireâ€
stun gun, indicating it delivered 100,000 volts. The stun gun was discovered in a black cloth
bag with “Canada†printed on the side. A
trash can in the living room contained a cigar, water bottle, and four live
.45-caliber bullets. In the corner of
the living room, the detectives found a portable file folder containing
Liggins’s paperwork, including a birth certificate, letters, court documents,
and traffic citations.
The
apartment also contained a century lock box which held gold jewelry,
seventy-six $100 bills, $3,000 in Bank of America traveler’s cheques bearing
Raisa’s name, Hanafi’s and Raisa’s passports, First Federal Bank and Bank of
America checkbooks bearing Hanafi’s name, and a Visa debit card with Hanafi’s
name on it. Raisa identified the cash,
traveler’s cheques, and jewelry as belonging to her. Investigator Schuetze did not find any latent
prints in the bedrooms.
G. The Investigation at
the Hanafi Home
In
the upstairs bedroom of Hanafi and Raisa’s home detectives found a roll of
brownish-yellow tape. There were two
typewriters in the garage and a green trash can in the garage held cut zip
ties. Hanafi’s Honda contained an
itinerary indicating Hanafi and Raisa were to fly to Lahore, Pakistan, on
August 8, 2008, and return to the United States on December 8, 2008.
H. Analysis of Medications
Found During the Investigation
Detective
Keus had the capsules and pills recovered during the search tested. The capsules were carbamazepine and the pills
were trazodone. Dr. Rebecca Crandall, a
forensic psychiatrist, testified that carbamazepine (manufactured under the
brand name Tegretol) is used in psychiatry to treat aggressive behavior or
manic-depressive disorder. It is an
inhibitory medication that is sedating and calming and also causes drowsiness. It can cause ataxia, an inability to balance and
walk. Each pill is typically 200
milligrams, and a dosage can be up to 1,000 milligrams. It is recommended that the medication be
taken with food. If the recipient were
dehydrated, the medication could be more concentrated in the bloodstream,
resulting in increased side effects. It
would take an “astronomical†dose to result in complications such as coma or
overdose, but an overdose could be lethal.
Trazodone
is very sedating and is usually prescribed to treat insomnia. Its possible side effects include dizziness,
headache, nausea, and dizziness and faintness upon standing up quickly. The lowest available dose is 50 milligrams,
but Dr. Crandall would prescribe only 25 milligrams for insomnia because the
medicine is potent. Some people take up
to 200 milligrams, but those people must have had ample experience with
medication. The effects of Trazodone
last from six to eleven hours after ingestion.
Dehydration could cause its effects to be intensified. An “astronomical†dose could result in coma or
overdose.
If
carbamazepine and trazodone were taken together, this could augment the effects
of each. Dr. Crandall said a test was
available to measure the concentration of carbamazepine in the blood, but she
did not know whether there exists a specific test for trazodone.
I. Interviews
With Raisa
On
August 6, 2008, the police showed Raisa a photographic six-pack after giving
her the standard admonition, and she identified Liggins’s photograph as
depicting one of the assailants.
On
August 18, 2008, Raisa spoke with a Hawthorne police detective and a deputy
district attorney. She did not use an
Urdu interpreter and her English skills were limited. She was also taking medications that made her
feel foggy. She told them everything she
could remember about what had occurred.
At trial, she said she did not remember telling them that her hands had
been freed at the second location to which she was taken.
J. DNA
Evidence
In
August 2009, three items were submitted for testing to the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department Scientific Services Bureau, and in February 2010, an oral
reference sample from Raisa was obtained.
Taken together, the testing revealed the following: (1) a plastic bag adhered to duct tape
with possible hair and fibers, found at the 2710 1/2 West 54th Street
apartment, was found to have DNA consistent with Hanafi and Raisa as possible
contributors; Liggins could not conclusively be included or excluded as a
contributor. (2) A used roll of tape
with possible hair and fibers, found at the Hanafi home, contained the DNA
profile of two possible contributors, Hanafi and Raisa; Liggins was excluded as
a possible contributor. (3) A plastic
flex cuff found at the Hanafi home contained a mixture of DNA consistent with
two possible contributors, one of whom was Raisa; Hanafi and Liggins were
excluded as potential sources of the DNA.
II. Defense Evidence
Deborah
Baker met Hanafi in June 1985 and began dating him. At the time she had two sons, aged four and
six. Baker and Hanafi married in June
1986. Hanafi was loving to her and her
children. She worked in retail and
Hanafi never told her not to work outside the home. Baker converted to Hanafi’s religion,
Islam. They were married for three
years, during which time he was never physically abusive to her or her
sons. They had a joint bank account and
Baker had full access to the money in the account. They divorced in 1989, but continued to see
one another thereafter. In 1992, Baker
signed a quitclaim deed for some property in New Mexico because Hanafi had
given her money after their divorce.
They began dating again and in 1995 they began living together. They remarried in 1996, but after two years
Baker had an affair and Hanafi requested a divorce. He did not pressure her or force her to sign
divorce papers, and in fact he continued to help her financially. They remained friends until Hanafi married
Raisa in 2001. During all of their time
together, Hanafi was loving and treated her sons with respect.
B. Travel
Arrangements
Hanafi
spoke to Mahammed Khan, a travel agent, on July 31 or August 1, 2008, about
traveling to Pakistan as soon as possible.
Hanafi said his wife’s relative in Pakistan was ill. Khan told Hanafi there was no current
availability. On August 5, 2008, Hanafi
visited Khan’s travel agency and worked out a tentative itinerary for himself
and Raisa, leaving August 15, 2008, and returning December 10, 2008. Hanafi did not pay Khan any money at that time. He told Khan there was an emergency on his
wife’s side of the family and he wanted to go as soon as possible. In November 2008, Khan was questioned by a
detective about Hanafi’s travel arrangements.
He did not mention that Hanafi had said there was a death or illness in
the family.
March 29, 2008 Domestic Dispute
When
Raisa called 911 on March 29, 2008, Hawthorne Police Officers Michalczak and
Moulton went to the Hanafi home and found Hanafi at the bottom of the stairs
inside the rear unit on the property, and Raisa was at the top of the
stairs. She told them the dispute was
about his entering her bedroom. Officer
Michalczak did not recall her saying that her husband had pushed her down a
flight of stairs, or that he had threatened to kill her. He indicated there was a language barrier
present in communicating with her.
Raisa’s demeanor during the encounter was subdued. The police officers left without making any
arrests. If they had suspected any
they would have made an arrest.
and Stun Guns
Greg
Meyer, a retired captain with the Los Angeles Police Department, testified as
an expert on stun guns and tasers. Stun
guns are small, handheld “pain compliance†devices that require the user to
make physical contact with the person being stunned. The device at issue in this case would cause
some pain and sometimes leave marks, and would emit approximately 20,000 to
30,000 volts. Such a device does not
incapacitate a person, but instead causes localized pain that could range from
merely annoying to extremely painful. He
had not heard of a situation in which a stun gun such as the one at issue
caused someone to lose bladder or bowel control. If one were to place a stun gun on someone’s
neck for five to 10 seconds, he would expect to see very prominent marks,
identifiable by him as having been caused by a stun gun. He did not see any such marks in the pictures
taken of Raisa’s neck at the hospital.
Meyer did not believe a stun gun like the one used here would cause
rhabdomyolysis or have a significant impact on muscular makeup or
structure. He conceded that he was not a
forensic criminalist.
of the Medication
A
deputy district attorney interviewed Dr. Crandall a few days prior to her
testimony regarding the effects of trazodone and carbamazepine. Dr. Crandall stated that neither drug was
toxic, and that neither would have a detrimental impact on a person, even if
given over a five-day period in the amounts given in this case.
discussion
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Hanafi
contends he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel when his trial counsel conceded during closing argument, without
Hanafi’s knowledge or consent, that Hanafi was guilty of kidnapping. Hanafi asserts that reversal is required of
his convictions of kidnapping for extortion on count 1 and kidnapping on count
3. We disagree.
A. Background
During
closing argument, Hanafi’s defense counsel argued that the prosecution had
withheld evidence from the defense. He
extensively attacked Raisa’s credibility and attempted to discredit the stun
gun and medical evidence. Counsel
acknowledged, however, that there was considerable evidence against his client,
allowing that Hanafi had bound his wife and she was found to have duct tape on
her legs, and later admitting Hanafi committed forgery in order to obtain
access to Raisa’s safe deposit box.
When
addressing the jury regarding the events occurring at the apartment at
2710 1/2 West 54th Street pertaining to count 3, Hanafi’s counsel said,
“[N]o one is saying she wasn’t either forcibly detained at that location or
taken from her house forcibly to that location,†adding that Hanafi was willing
to accept responsibility for what he did, but not for what he did not do.
Hanafi’s
counsel said the People’s theory on count 1 was that Hanafi abducted her, tied
her up, tasered her, beat her, and forced her to sign documents. Counsel explained that in order to convict
someone of kidnapping for extortion—unlike with simple kidnapping as charged in
count 3—the evidence did not have to show there was an abduction, i.e., the
victim could be kept in the same place, but there had to be evidence that the
defendant obtained a person’s property with the person’s consent but obtained
that consent through the use of force or fear.
“What’s not an extortion is when you forge documents, is when you go to
the bank behind your wife’s back, and when you forge her signature to get the
stuff out of the bank, which is what occurred in this case. That’s not an extortion. That’s kidnapping for nothing. Because again, it’s just a detention.
. . . [I]f you don’t have the
extortion, you don’t have the crime.â€
Counsel continued, pointing out that count 1 had a lesser-included
offense: “If you find that she was
detained, and only detained, that’s false
imprisonment. . . . So
you have the choice. You can find him
not guilty, or you can find a lesser-included offense of false imprisonment.â€
Hanafi’s
counsel then discussed the torture count, arguing there was no showing of great
bodily injury, and then discussed count 3, kidnapping. “[H]e took, held, detained another person by
force, and using that force or fear, he moved the other person a substantial
distance, and the other person did not consent to the movement. As I’ve told you, you can fairly find my
client guilty of kidnapping or of the lesser charge of false imprisonment if
you believe that he just detained her at the second location. You may not.
You may say, hey, he took her away.
After she found out he stole her stuff, and she didn’t want to go to
Pakistan, he tied her up right there, and he drove her over to this other
location. That’s kidnapping. If you don’t believe that, because as I
showed you, there’s very little evidence to support the fact the kidnapping
occurred, or a detention occurred at this residence, then it’s a false
imprisonment.â€
Counsel
then argued that the evidence did not support a finding of theft (referring to
count 4) because the evidence showed that the possessions Hanafi took from the
safe deposit box were intact, indicating he took the property to bring it to
Raisa so they could go to Pakistan, not so he could keep her property for
himself. Counsel argued that Hanafi was
not guilty of making criminal threats (count 5), but conceded that he had
committed spousal abuse (count 6), saying “I mean, that’s clear. And again, I don’t condone that either.â€
In
conclusion, counsel stated, “[A]ll I’m asking you to do is look at the
evidence, to examine the evidence as opposed to the words of people who lied to
you continuously. And when you look at
the evidence, you will find my client guilty of kidnapping. You’ll find him guilty of spousal abuse. But you will acquit him of these other
charges that are not supported by the evidence.â€
Thereafter,
Liggins’s counsel stated during closing
argument that while he conceded that Raisa was present at 2710 or 2710 1/2
West 54th Street, and that she was kept there once she got there, “I do not
believe the evidence shows that she was kidnapped and brought there against her
will. And that’s where, with all due
respect, I take exception with [Hanafi’s counsel]. I think what you have is, she’s brought
there. She’s kept there by her husband.
That’s a false imprisonment.
That’s not a kidnapping. There’s
no extortion, and there’s no movement.â€
The
jury convicted Hanafi of kidnapping for extortion (count 1) (§ 209, subd. (a)),
kidnapping (count 3) (§ 207, subd. (a)), criminal threats (count 5) (§ 422),
and corporal injury to a spouse (count 6) (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). The jury failed to reach a verdict on one
count of grand theft of personal property (count 4) (§ 487, subd. (a)), and
found Hanafi not guilty of torture (count 2) (§ 206), and attempted willful,
deliberate, premeditated murder (count 14) (§§ 664 & 187, subd. (a)). The jury convicted Liggins of kidnapping for
extortion (count 1) and kidnapping (count 3).
After
the verdicts were announced, Hanafi changed counsel and brought a motion for a
new trial, contending he was denied a fair trial because his counsel had
admitted he was guilty of kidnapping.
Hanafi’s trial counsel, Steven Levine, stated in a declaration that his
strategy was to rebut the People’s theory of the case that kidnap for extortion
occurred because Hanafi detained Raisa and forced her to sign WAMU power of
attorney documents, and instead show the jury that Hanafi did not force her to
sign the power of attorney documents but rather forged them. As there was no extortion and no asportation,
count 1 should have been at most a false imprisonment. Yet, in closing argument, “I completely
misspoke when I ended my closing argument with the statement [that you will
find my client guilty of kidnapping].â€
Levine said he had spoken to a juror who “admitted to me that the jurors
indeed believed that Mr. Hanafi forged Mrs. Hanafi’s signature on the power of
attorney document and that Mrs. Hanafi was not credible; thus the only proper
legal verdict as to Count 1 should have been false imprisonment; but for my
remark in closing argument, I believe there is a reasonable probability a
different result would have occurred.â€
The
People opposed the motion for new trial.
Hanafi filed a reply, accompanied by additional declarations. Attorney Levine stated in his declaration
that he encountered one of the jurors in a store in April 2011, and the juror
told him that the jury “‘discussed the fact you said your client was guilty of
kidnapping, and it definitely influenced our deliberations.’†Levine stated that the juror had remarked
that counsel had given Raisa credibility when she really did not have any.
The
trial court held a hearing on the matter and ultimately rejected the claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The
court considered whether it was reasonable to conclude that the jurors thought
counsel was conceding guilt as to count 1, or as to count 3, and determined
based on the totality of the argument that the jury would have considered the
concession to be as to count 3.
Regarding it being a concession on count 1, the court said, “[I]s it
reasonable for me to conclude that the jurors are going to react to that in
such a way that they are — that he is conceding count 1 as opposed to count
3? And I don’t see that in light of the
argument that just preceded that, when he’s addressing the extortion itself,
and he says several times, this is a detention, nothing more, because there was
no extortion. So because we do have
count 3, whether [Levine] felt that was a misstatement or a mistake is
irrelevant. It’s the impact it could
have had or may have had in the process.â€
The court noted that count 1 bore a life sentence while count 3 carried
a far lesser consequence, albeit still quite serious.
The
court then reviewed the copious evidence as to count 3: the ball gag, the stun gun, duct tape, and
prescription medication found in the apartment above Liggins’s sister’s
apartment. The court concluded that it did
not see the result on count 3 would have been any different had Levine not
conceded it. “And so the fact that, even
if it was a misstatement, ultimately I don’t think that that misstatement would
have had any effect or any bearing on the jury’s verdict in this particular
case given the strength of the corroborating evidence that was introduced as to
that count.â€
Liggins
also brought a motion for new trial, arguing in part that Levine’s concession
of his client’s guilt of kidnapping prejudiced him. In denying Liggins’s motion for new trial,
the trial court noted that Liggins’s trial counsel specifically disavowed the
concession and argued there was no kidnapping.
The court reiterated “that because there was in fact a kidnapping for
extortion and a separate kidnapping count that involved separate acts and
conduct, the concession as to one did not amount to a concession as to the
other.†The court also noted that the
jurors were twice instructed that statements of counsel were not evidence.
“‘In
order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first
show counsel’s performance was “deficient†because his [or her] “representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . under
prevailing professional norms.â€
[Citations.] Second, he must also
show prejudice flowing from counsel’s performance or lack thereof. [Citations.]
Prejudice is shown when there is a “reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.†[Citations.]’†(In re
Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 721; see Strickland
v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-694; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1003.) However, the assessment of prejudice is not
“solely one of outcome determination.
Instead, the pertinent inquiry is ‘whether counsel’s deficient performance
renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally
unfair.’ [Citation.]†(Avena,
as a “demonstrable reality,†not simply speculation as to the effect of the
errors or omissions of counsel.’†(
766.) Where a defendant fails to show
prejudice, a reviewing court may reject a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel without reaching the issue of deficient performance. (Strickland,
concession was undoubtedly harmless considering the overwhelming evidence
against defendants.
We agree with the trial
court that the jury would not have reasonably understood defense counsel’s
concession to be as to count 1, kidnapping for extortion. Counsel made clear to the jury that his
position on count 1 was that the evidence proved nothing more than false
imprisonment because no extortion occurred.
In addition, there was no movement of the victim, and therefore simple
kidnapping did not apply to the circumstances alleged with regard to count
1. Thus, the jury would have interpreted
the concession of guilt to pertain to count 3.
With or without counsel’s concession of guilt, the evidence was
overwhelming that defendants were guilty of kidnapping based on their actions
at the apartments on West 54th Street.
They offered no rational explanation why Raisa would have gone there of
her own volition, rather than being forcibly moved there by defendants. The physical evidence abundantly supported
the conclusion that they held her there against her will. A finding of guilt on count 3 was all but
compelled by the evidence. Defendants
have not shown there is a reasonable probability that, but for Hanafi’s counsel’s
admission of guilt, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.
II. Wheeler/
Hanafi
contends that during voir dire the prosecution exercised its peremptory
challenges in a discriminatory manner to exclude the sole male Pakistani from
the jury. Hanafi asserts the court erred
in denying his Wheeler/
Applicable Law
When
a party makes a Wheeler/
must determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the
prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge based on race. Second, if the showing is made, the burden
shifts to the prosecutor to demonstrate that the challenges were exercised for
a race-neutral reason. Third, the court
determines whether the defendant has proven purposeful discrimination. The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding
racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the
strike. [Citation.]†(People
v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 612-613 (Lenix).) A defendant
establishes a prima facie case “by producing evidence sufficient to permit the
trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.†(Johnson
v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 170.)
“‘Jurors
may be excused based on “hunches†and even “arbitrary†exclusion is
permissible, so long as the reasons are not based on impermissible group
bias.’ [Citations.]†(People
v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 670.)
Counsel also may properly rely on a juror’s body language or manner of
answering questions in exercising a challenge.
(People v. Reynoso (2003) 31
Cal.4th 903, 917 (Reynoso).)
“Review
of a trial court’s denial of a Wheeler/Batson
motion is deferential, examining only whether
| Description | A jury convicted defendant Mohammad Naseem Hanafi of kidnapping for extortion (count 1) (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (a)),[1] kidnapping (count 3) (§ 207, subd. (a)), criminal threats (count 5) (§ 422), and corporal injury to a spouse (count 6) (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). The jury failed to reach a verdict on one count of grand theft of personal property (count 4) (§ 487, subd. (a)). The jury found Hanafi not guilty of torture (count 2) (§ 206), and attempted willful, deliberate, premeditated murder (count 14) (§§ 664 & 187, subd. (a)). The jury convicted defendant Kisasi Liggins of counts 1 and 3, and found him not guilty of all other counts.[2] On the court’s own motion, count 4 was dismissed as to Liggins pursuant to section 1385. As to counts 1 and 3, the trial court found true allegations that Liggins had suffered a prior strike conviction for robbery (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)); served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)); and suffered a prior conviction of a serious felony, robbery (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). |
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