CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant William Gregory Mordick appeals from the judgment entered in 2010 after a jury found him guilty of first degree murder of his wife, Katherine Mordick,[1] in 1983. We affirm. For the reasons we will explain, we hold (1) the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the case for precharging delay; (2) substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict; and (3) the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, challenged by defendant, did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

N.M. (mother) seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court’s orders terminating her reunification services at a contested dispositional hearing on a supplemental petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 387)[1] and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to her three-year-old daughter, Angelica, and two-year-old son, Eduardo. She contends the juvenile court erred in finding that she was provided reasonable services. We disagree and deny the petition.

Mollie Norma Melchor pleaded no contest to first degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)[1], first degree burglary (§ 459), two counts of grand theft of a firearm (§ 487, subd. (d)(2)), and elder or dependant adult abuse (§ 368, subd. (b)(1)), and admitted a prior conviction allegation. The trial court sentenced her to eight years in state prison.
On appeal, Melchor contends that the trial court prejudicially erred when it denied her pre-plea motion to dismiss the information based on violations of her Fifth Amendment rights. Melchor contends that the error requires her convictions be reversed and the case dismissed with prejudice. We disagree and affirm.

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Derek Jermaine Hotterknight was convicted of crimes arising out of a hit-and-run accident. Hotterknight’s sole contention on appeal is that the court erred in denying his pretrial Trombetta-Youngblood[1] motion based on the police’s failure to preserve the vehicle he was allegedly driving at the time of the accident. We affirm the judgment.

Appellant Eugene Hayden, Sr., appeals from a judgment of conviction of false imprisonment by violence or menace (Pen. Code,[1] § 236) with three prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (c)-(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(3)). We will affirm.

Pamela J. Walls, County Counsel, and Prabhath D. Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
D.H. (hereafter mother) and E.O. (hereafter father) purport to appeal from the trial court’s order on a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition terminating their parental rights with respect to their two young children, B.O. and E.O.[1] Specifically, mother and father contend that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the section 388 petitions filed by G.H., the maternal grandfather of B.O. and E.O., in which he sought an order placing the two children with him. G.H. also appeals from the trial court’s order denying his section 388 petitions. In a separate appeal (E055555), mother challenges the trial court’s disposition order denying her reunification services with her oldest child, A.C., who was living with his father pursuant to a family law custody order at the time the section 300 petition was filed in this case. We conclude the claims are all meritless, and therefore we will affirm.

Defendant and appellant Jonathan Ricardo Hempe is serving 33 years in prison after pleading guilty to robbery, extortion and burglary, and admitting a gun use enhancement. As discussed below, we affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff and appellant Dennis Scharf sued defendants and respondents Calvary Chapel of Temecula Valley (Calvary), Donald Coop,[1] and Gary Nelson for damages after he was injured while performing work at Calvary.[2] The present appeal flows from the trial court’s granting of defendants’ motions for summary judgment. We affirm the judgment as to Coop. We reverse the judgment entered in favor of Calvary and Nelson (the Church defendants).
Scharf was a parishioner of Calvary. Nelson was Calvary’s pastor. Calvary leased the premises for the church from Coop, trustee of the Coop Family Trust. In January 2005, Calvary was retrofitting audio/visual technology on its premises. Scharf, an audio/visual technician, volunteered “as part of his ministry” to install the necessary cables and wiring. In the process of doing so, he fell off the top of an unfinished wall.

Romero was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 26 years to life in prison.
Romero appeals contending the trial court erred in excluding certain character evidence regarding the victim which was offered to demonstrate the victim was the aggressor in this case. We find the trial court acted well within its discretion under Evidence Code[1] section 352 to exclude the offered evidence. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.

In December 2006 and May 2007, Betty Clemens executed amendments to the Coyle and Betty Clemens Trust (the Trust) that gave Charles Pickett, Betty's companion and caregiver, a 6 percent remainder interest in her trust and the home they shared. After Betty's death in April 2009, petitioner Linda Lancaster, in her capacity as successor trustee of the Trust, filed a petition to invalidate these amendments. After a lengthy trial, the court issued a statement of decision denying the petition. Lancaster moved for a new trial and the court denied the motion and filed a modified statement of decision. Lancaster timely appealed. On appeal, Lancaster appears to contend (1) the evidence cannot support the judgment, (2) the court applied the incorrect legal standard to determine whether to invalidate the amendments, and (3) the court abused its discretion by denying the new trial motion.

A jury convicted Curtis Lorenzo Moore of five felonies: kidnapping for extortion (Pen. Code,[1] § 209, subd. (a); count 1), kidnapping during a carjacking (§ 209.5, subd. (a); count 2), robbery (§ 211; count 4), burglary (§ 459; count 6), and fraudulent conveyance of an access card (§ 484e, subd. (a); count 7). On counts 1 and 2, the court sentenced Moore to concurrent indeterminate life terms with the possibility of parole. On counts 4, 6 and 7, the court sentenced him to concurrent determinate terms of three years, 16 months, and 16 months, respectively. The court stayed the sentences on counts 2 and 7 under section 654.

Defendant Elisha Edwards pleaded no contest to possession of heroin and was placed on probation.
On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in ordering him to pay a $25 urinalysis fee without making any finding regarding his ability to pay as required by ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 27 s ASMXFR000001 l "Penal Code section 1203.1ab" Penal Code section 1203.1ab (undesignated statutory references are to the ADDIN BA xc <@ost> xl 10 s ASMXFR000008 xpl 1 l "Penal Code" Penal Code), and there is no substantial evidence to support a finding of his ability to pay. In the interest of judicial economy, we shall strike the fee and direct that the order of probation by modified accordingly. In all other respects the judgment shall be affirmed.
background
At sentencing, defense counsel objected to the imposition of “non-mandatory fines and fees,” the “laboratory fees and penalty assessments and DNA” and the $25 urinalysis fee, because they can properly be imposed only if defendant has an ability to pay; defendant does not have such ability, counsel asserted, because he “is on SSI” (Social Security’s Supplemental Security Income). The court declined to impose several fines “based upon inability to pay,” but imposed the $25 drug testing urinalysis fee.

A jury found defendant Darnell Raynard Loudd guilty of evading a pursuing police officer and misdemeanor driving on a suspended license. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on five years’ formal probation on various terms and conditions, including that he serve 270 days in jail. Because defendant had been represented by the public defender, the trial court also made the following statement regarding attorney fees at the sentencing hearing: “I’m required to order the defendant to pay an attorney fee, if he has the ability to pay. He must cooperate with the Department of Revenue Recovery in the determination of his ability to pay. Felony case through trial, the fee is set at $3,175.”
On appeal, defendant contends that the court erred in ordering him to pay $3,175 in attorney fees because: (1) the court did not give him an opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee reimbursement the court ordered; (2) there was insufficient evidence in the record supporting that amount; and (3) the court erroneously believed it was required to order fee reimbursement. Defendant also contends there was substantial evidence in the record that he did not have the present or future ability to pay the attorney fees the court ordered, and he further contends that the trial court improperly delegated its authority to make a determination of his ability to pay to the Department of Revenue Recovery (the department).
We conclude that all of defendant’s arguments are without merit primarily because, contrary to defendant’s foundational premise, the trial court did not actually order him to pay any amount in attorney fees. Instead, consistent with the governing statute, the court simply referred the matter to the department to inquire into defendant’s ability to pay, prefatory to a further determination by the court of whether defendant had the ability to pay for any or all of the cost of his legal representation. There was no error.

R.R., father of the minor, appeals from orders sustaining the supplemental petition, removing the minor from father’s custody, and returning to a permanent plan of long-term foster care. ( ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 31 s YCQJFO000001 xpl 1 l "Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 387, 395" Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 387, 395; statutory references that follow are to the ADDIN BA xc <@ost> xl 29 s YCQJFO000012 xpl 2 l "Welfare and Institutions Code" Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.) Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence to support both the jurisdictional findings of the supplemental petition and the order removing the minor from his custody. Appellant further asserts there was a failure to comply with the notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) ( ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 25 s YCQJFO000002 xpl 1 l "25 U.S.C. § 1901, et seq." 25 U.S.C. § 1901, et seq.). We conclude appellant is procedurally barred from raising the ICWA issue and that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings and orders and affirm the orders.
Facts and Proceedings
J.R., then one year old, was first detained in May 1999 in Los Angeles County. The parents had a history of violence and appellant is developmentally delayed and an Alta Regional Center client (Alta). After 12 months of services, mother’s services were terminated and the case was transferred to Sacramento County to facilitate services for appellant. By March 2001, the case was transferred back to Los Angeles County, the minor was placed with mother, and jurisdiction was terminated in October 2001.
Los Angeles County filed a new petition in September 2004 alleging mother caused the death of a sibling, thereby placing the minor at risk. The minor was detained and eventually placed with the paternal grandmother.
At the disposition hearing in December 2004, the court denied reunification services to mother and ordered services for appellant. The minor was in therapy with serious emotional and mental health issues. At the six-month review hearing, the court ordered further services for appellant.