CA Unpub Decisions

Appointed counsel for defendant James Russell Foreman II asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Stephen H. Bennett, an accountant acting without counsel, believes defendant State Board of Equalization (BOE) has misinterpreted statutes implementing Proposition 13, regarding when real property may be reassessed. After filing objections to various BOE publications, Bennett filed a mandamus petition to compel BOE to change its interpretation. The trial court sustained without leave to amend BOE’s demurrer, based on lack of standing, and Bennett timely appeals from the judgment. We agree with the trial court, and therefore shall affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Rodolfo Madrigal Martinez, Jr., asked this court to review the record to determine if there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

While serving an indeterminate sentence in state prison, guards stopped defendant Richard Munoz, Jr., as he pushed a cart of his belongings while moving between cells. After guards found a green leafy substance in defendant’s belongings, defendant gave a urine sample that tested positive for a metabolite of marijuana. An information charged defendant with knowingly possessing marijuana while incarcerated. (Pen. Code, § 4573.6.)[1] A jury found defendant guilty, and the court sentenced him to two years in state prison and imposed a restitution fine. On appeal, defendant challenges the admissibility of the urinalysis evidence. We shall affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Dezmaighne Yharson McClain of second degree robbery and assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury. The jury also found, as to each count, that defendant inflicted great bodily injury. The trial court sentenced him to eight years in state prison.
Defendant now contends (1) the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting evidence of defendant’s gang affiliation, and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the great bodily injury enhancements. Disagreeing with defendant’s contentions, we will affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND

Convicted of the first degree murder of his son, defendant Gerardo Valencia Villa appeals. He contends: (1) a search of his home violated his Fourth Amendment rights; (2) the trial court erred by excluding some of the evidence of the victim’s propensity for violence; (3) the court erred by excluding some photographs of defendant and the victim; (4) the jurors may have misunderstood the law supporting the defense’s heat-of-passion theory; (5) the court did not sufficiently instruct the jury on subjective heat of passion;
(6) the evidence was insufficient to support the first degree murder verdict; (7) the court improperly instructed the jury on consciousness of guilt; and (8) the alleged errors were cumulatively prejudicial. Finding no prejudicial error, we affirm.

Defendants appeal from a final judgment partitioning real property. They contend substantial evidence does not support various valuation determinations made by the trial court in determining the amount of equalization payment owed. We disagree and affirm the judgment in its entirety.

A jury convicted defendant, Thai Yang, of second degree burglary of a vehicle. (Pen. Code, § 459.) Defendant admitted that three section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior separate prison term allegations (case Nos. NA052264, NA033117, NA069839) were true. He also admitted that one sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12 prior serious felony conviction allegation (case No. NA03317) was true. Defendant was sentenced to nine years in state prison. (§ 1170, subd. (h)(3).) The trial court imposed the high term for the burglary. In doing so, the trial court stated, “The record should reflect that the court is imposing the high term on count one based on the fact that the defendant was and has been multiple convicted felon, went to prison three separate times, last time being 2006 for a term of 32 months.”

Defendant and appellant Raymond Japaul Wade was convicted by jury of possession of cocaine in violation of Health & Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a), a lesser but necessarily included offense of possession of cocaine base for the purpose of sale. The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for the low term of 16 months, to be served in the county jail, after finding defendant unsuitable for Proposition 36 probation.

On January 17, 2012, the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) found that petitioner Stewart Espinoza, while an inmate of the Los Angeles County Men's Central Jail, was not an employee of the County of Los Angeles (County) at the time that he was injured while working as a cook in the jail, and that he was therefore not eligible for workers' compensation benefits. Espinoza filed a petition for review which we denied on May 17, 2012. The Supreme Court granted Espinoza's petition for review on August 29, 2012 and transferred the matter to this court with directions to vacate the order denying the petition for a writ of review. We issued a writ of review on September 20, 2012 pursuant to the Supreme Court's direction.
Having afforded the parties an opportunity to file briefs, and following oral argument, we conclude once again that the WCAB's decision should stand.
Whether Espinoza was County's employee depends in this case on whether he performed the work he was doing voluntarily or whether he was required to work as a condition of his incarceration. So formulated, the issue at hand is primarily a problem of proof. The solution to this problem was the enactment in 1970 by the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors of an order, referred to hereafter as Order #91, which provides that persons confined in the county jail may be compelled to perform labor under the direction of a county official. Order #91 goes on to state that "[n]o prisoner engaged in labor pursuant to this order shall be considered as an employee of, or to be employed by the County or any department thereof, nor shall any such prisoner come within any of the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Insurance and Safety Act of 1917 . . . ."
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Order #91 is proof of the fact that Espinoza was not performing work voluntarily but rather that, under Order #91, he was required to work as a condition of his incarceration.

In this case, appellant Merrill Lynch Professional Clearing Corp. (Merrill), challenges a judgment confirming an arbitration award against it. Appellant argues that the award must be vacated because the arbitrators failed to make necessary disclosures and because they exceeded their powers. Respondents are hedge funds Rosen Capital Partners, LP and Rosen Capital Institutional LP (the Funds). We affirm.

Jerome Hendricks was previously convicted of spousal rape (Pen. Code,[1] § 262, subd. (a)(1)). In an earlier appeal, this court concluded that the trial court erred when it ordered him to register as a sex offender under the mandatory provisions of section 290. We remanded the matter to permit the trial court to assess whether Hendricks should be subjected to sex offender registration under section 290.006. The trial court ordered him to register as a sex offender under this provision, and Hendricks appeals. He asserts that the court’s order that he register as a sex offender, with its attendant residency restriction, violates his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because the judge, not a jury, made the factual findings upon which the registration order was based. We affirm.

Marcos Allan Ramos appeals a judgment following conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition, with findings that he suffered a prior serious felony strike conviction and served two prior prison terms. (Former Pen. Code, §§ 12021, subd. (a)(1), 12316, subd. (b)(1); Pen Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667.5, subd. (b).)[1] We decide that the trial court properly denied Ramos's motion to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5, and affirm.

David Frank, Kaveh Golshan, and Behzad Soofer appeal from the judgment entered against them and in favor of respondent First Citizens Bank, after respondent's motion for summary judgment was granted. We affirm.