CA Unpub Decisions

Minor Jerome D.[1] appeals from an April 2010 order of the juvenile court after a contested dispositional hearing. The minor argues the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; hereafter ICWA), failed to determine whether he had any special educational needs, and failed to calculate his custody credits properly. (The minor originally had also argued there was an abuse of discretion in committing him to an Iowa facility rather than the home of a relative in Ohio. In accordance with his subsequent request, we will disregard this claim.) We affirm.
We omit the jurisdictional facts relating to the minor’s offenses and violations of probation, because they are not relevant to the arguments on appeal. We will incorporate the facts pertinent to each of the minor’s claims in the Discussion, post.

R.B. (father) seeks writ review of jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders removing four-year-old S.P. from his custody, denying family reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) on February 20, 2012.[1] (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) We deny father’s petition.

Ricardo Kevin Ortiz appeals a judgment following his guilty plea to driving under the influence of alcohol with a prior felony conviction (Veh. Code, §§ 23550.5-23152, subd. (a)), a felony. He admitted he suffered a prior prison commitment. (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced him to a four-year state prison term.
We appointed counsel to represent him on this appeal. After examination of the record. counsel filed an opening brief in which no issues were raised.

Defendant and appellant Eddie Estrada appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to possession of concentrated cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (c)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Estrada on formal probation for a period of three years. We affirm.

A modification decision.

Plaintiffs and appellants Michelle Souch, Daniel Anderson, and Darren Wise appeal from a judgment following a trial court order granting defendant and respondent IOD Incorporated’s motion for summary judgment. Because plaintiffs failed to provide us with an adequate record on appeal, we affirm.

A modification decision.

Defendant and appellant Miguel Galicia was charged by information with three counts of forcible lewd act upon a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1)), one count of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), one count of corporal injury to cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), and one count of making criminal threats (§ 422). A jury convicted defendant of one count of forcible lewd act on a child, assault, and corporal injury to a cohabitant. Defendant was sentenced to seven years in state prison. Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that his conviction on count 3 (forcible lewd act on a child) must be reversed because the trial court improperly admitted prejudicial hearsay evidence under the “fresh-complaint” doctrine. We find no evidentiary error and affirm.

Brian K. Powell (Brian) appeals an order denying his motion to vacate a 1993 default judgment for child support in favor of respondent Department of Child Support Services (DCSS).[1] Brian also filed a motion to quash service of process claiming there was no valid service of the summons and complaint by substituted service. We conclude, among other things, that: 1) the trial court correctly ruled that his motion to vacate the default judgment was untimely, 2) the court did not abuse its discretion in denying equitable relief to vacate the default judgment, 3) the court did not err by denying his motion to quash service, and 4) Brian has not shown the court erred by finding that the substituted service at his mailing address was valid. We affirm.

A jury found defendant and appellant Pamela Ann Potter guilty of transporting methamphetamine, a controlled substance, and of possessing methamphetamine for sale. Her sole contention on appeal is that instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 362, consciousness of guilt, violated her due process rights. Being bound by California Supreme Court authority rejecting that contention, we affirm the judgment.

The City of Santa Barbara (City) issued a conditional coastal development permit for a mixed use residential/commercial project on two adjoining parcels of land. At the City's request, the California Coastal Commission (Commission) certified a local coastal plan (LCP) amendment rezoning one of the parcels from residential to commercial. The trial court rejected appellant's contention that the Commission had to assess the environmental impacts of the whole development project before certifying the amendment. We conclude the Commission appropriately limited its review to whether the amendment's zoning change conforms to and carries out the provisions of the City's existing, certified land use plan (LUP). (Pub. Resources Code, § 30513.)[1] We affirm.

A jury found defendant and appellant Amon Morrison guilty, under an aiding and abetting theory of liability, of two counts of attempted murder and one count of shooting from a motor vehicle. On appeal, Morrison contends there was insufficient evidence he aided and abetted the crimes. He also contends that the prosecutor failed to comply with disclosure requirements and that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Because Morrison was a juvenile when he committed the crimes, we agree, under recent United States and California Supreme Court authority, that his sentence, which makes him ineligible for probation until he is in his 80’s, is cruel and unusual. We reverse and remand for resentencing on that ground only and reject Morrison’s remaining contentions.

Richard Romero (Romero) appeals from the judgment of dismissal following the sustaining of the demurrer of respondent DirecTV, Inc. The trial court ruled that Romero’s wrongful termination complaint was federally preempted under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) (29 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) because the alleged conduct was “arguably” subject to the protections of the NLRA. We affirm.

Louis Daniel Leplat appeals the judgment following his conviction for second degree murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189.)[1] The jury found an allegation to be true that he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon in the murder. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) Leplat was sentenced to 15 years to life for the murder and a consecutive one-year term for the weapon enhancement. Leplat contends the trial court erred by failing to provide the jury with a written copy of the instruction for imperfect self-defense. He also claims the prosecutor improperly commented on his failure to testify at trial. We affirm.