CA Unpub Decisions

C.C. (mother) appeals an order of the juvenile court, following a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26,[1] terminating mother’s parental rights with respect to her infant daughter, H.B., and selecting adoption as the permanent plan. Mother contends the court erred in finding that adoption is not precluded by the parent-child relationship exception to the presumption favoring adoption. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the court’s finding and shall therefore affirm the judgment.

Defendant Zachary M. appeals from a dispositional order that he serve 365 to 540 days in juvenile hall or “any penal institution” after he admitted allegations of committing an assault for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 186.22, subd. (d)), and battery (Pen. Code, § 242). The main issues are whether the court abused its discretion when it ordered defendant removed from his mother’s custody, and whether it properly considered less restrictive placements. There was no error on either point. Defendant’s other arguments are either moot or conceded. We remand for specification of the maximum term of confinement, but otherwise affirm the dispositional order.

Fernando’s Auto Repair (Fernando)[1] appeals from the denial of its petition for a writ of mandate against the Bureau of Automotive Repair and Sherry Mehl as the chief of the Bureau (collectively, the Bureau). Having requested and received supplemental briefs from the parties concerning the potential mootness of the appeal, we shall now dismiss the appeal as moot.

After a jury trial, Fessha Taye, who is the conservator for 77-year-old Ida McQueen (collectively, respondent), prevailed in his action for financial elder abuse against attorney Carol Veres Reed (appellant). Respondent also prevailed in defending the judgment on appeal.[1] Appellant then paid the $402,000 judgment, including interest, in full. Thereafter, respondent moved for the recovery of an additional $57,681.90 in attorney fees and costs incurred for defending the judgment on appeal and in bringing a separate lawsuit to prevent appellant from transferring three parcels of real property to third parties in a purported attempt to avoid satisfaction of the judgment. The trial court granted respondent’s motion over appellant’s objection that the motion was untimely.
We agree with appellant that respondent’s motion was untimely, and reverse.

Appellant M. Alieu Iscandari appeals the order granting respondents’[1] motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction. We agree with the trial court that Iscandari failed to fulfill the “effects test” laid down in Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 U.S. 783, 789 (Calder), and therefore California courts could not properly exercise jurisdiction over respondents. Accordingly we affirm the order.

Following a bench trial, a judge pro tem awarded plaintiff Cecilia Vahedy damages of over $1.47 million for injuries she sustained in a motor vehicle accident while attending an “adventure camp” sponsored by defendant Jews for Jesus. Jews for Jesus and defendant Deborah Remigio, the driver of the van in which plaintiff was riding at the time of the accident, appeal from the judgment. Defendants contend: (1) the judge erred in failing to disqualify himself from the case; (2) the judgment is excessive and reflects the judge’s bias against them for seeking his removal; and (3) the judge erred in concluding plaintiff’s claims are not barred by a release agreement signed by her father before camp began. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant and appellant Amon Morrison guilty, under an aiding and abetting theory of liability, of two counts of attempted murder and one count of shooting from a motor vehicle. On appeal, Morrison contends there was insufficient evidence he aided and abetted the crimes. He also contends that the prosecutor failed to comply with disclosure requirements and that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Because Morrison was a juvenile when he committed the crimes, we agree, under recent United States and California Supreme Court authority, that his sentence, which makes him ineligible for probation until he is in his 80’s, is cruel and unusual. We reverse and remand for resentencing on that ground only and reject Morrison’s remaining contentions.

Richard Romero (Romero) appeals from the judgment of dismissal following the sustaining of the demurrer of respondent DirecTV, Inc. The trial court ruled that Romero’s wrongful termination complaint was federally preempted under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) (29 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) because the alleged conduct was “arguably” subject to the protections of the NLRA. We affirm.

Louis Daniel Leplat appeals the judgment following his conviction for second degree murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189.)[1] The jury found an allegation to be true that he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon in the murder. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) Leplat was sentenced to 15 years to life for the murder and a consecutive one-year term for the weapon enhancement. Leplat contends the trial court erred by failing to provide the jury with a written copy of the instruction for imperfect self-defense. He also claims the prosecutor improperly commented on his failure to testify at trial. We affirm.

C.C. (mother) appeals an order of the juvenile court, following a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26,[1] terminating mother’s parental rights with respect to her infant daughter, H.B., and selecting adoption as the permanent plan. Mother contends the court erred in finding that adoption is not precluded by the parent-child relationship exception to the presumption favoring adoption. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the court’s finding and shall therefore affirm the judgment.

Defendant Zachary M. appeals from a dispositional order that he serve 365 to 540 days in juvenile hall or “any penal institution” after he admitted allegations of committing an assault for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 186.22, subd. (d)), and battery (Pen. Code, § 242). The main issues are whether the court abused its discretion when it ordered defendant removed from his mother’s custody, and whether it properly considered less restrictive placements. There was no error on either point. Defendant’s other arguments are either moot or conceded. We remand for specification of the maximum term of confinement, but otherwise affirm the dispositional order.

Fernando’s Auto Repair (Fernando)[1] appeals from the denial of its petition for a writ of mandate against the Bureau of Automotive Repair and Sherry Mehl as the chief of the Bureau (collectively, the Bureau). Having requested and received supplemental briefs from the parties concerning the potential mootness of the appeal, we shall now dismiss the appeal as moot.
Fernando’s petition seeks to set aside the Bureau’s revocation of its Gold Shield certificate, a certification issued pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 44014.2 authorizing a licensed smog check station such as Fernando to perform additional repair work on vehicles failing an emissions test. Fernando alleges that the certificate was improperly revoked without a formal administrative hearing, although a formal hearing had previously been conducted sustaining the two citations for improper smog inspections upon which the revocation was based. Fernando prayed for a writ of mandate vacating the revocation order, thereby reinstating his Gold Shield certificate. The trial court order denying the petition was entered on February 15, 2012.

After a jury trial, Fessha Taye, who is the conservator for 77-year-old Ida McQueen (collectively, respondent), prevailed in his action for financial elder abuse against attorney Carol Veres Reed (appellant). Respondent also prevailed in defending the judgment on appeal.[1] Appellant then paid the $402,000 judgment, including interest, in full. Thereafter, respondent moved for the recovery of an additional $57,681.90 in attorney fees and costs incurred for defending the judgment on appeal and in bringing a separate lawsuit to prevent appellant from transferring three parcels of real property to third parties in a purported attempt to avoid satisfaction of the judgment. The trial court granted respondent’s motion over appellant’s objection that the motion was untimely.
We agree with appellant that respondent’s motion was untimely, and reverse.

Appellant M. Alieu Iscandari appeals the order granting respondents’[1] motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction. We agree with the trial court that Iscandari failed to fulfill the “effects test” laid down in Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 U.S. 783, 789 (Calder), and therefore California courts could not properly exercise jurisdiction over respondents. Accordingly we affirm the order.