CA Unpub Decisions

John Thomas Piani appeals from the judgment of conviction by jury of first degree burglary. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a).)[1] In bifurcated proceedings, the trial court found true the allegations that appellant had one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subd. (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (b) & (c)(1)). It sentenced him to nine years in state prison (a 2-year low term for burglary, doubled, under the Three Strikes law, and a 5-year prior serious felony enhancement). Appellant's sole contention on appeal is that the court violated his due process rights and abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by admitting evidence of a prior offense. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) We disagree and affirm.

Appellant Thomas Duby was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of possession of marijuana for sale in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11359 and one count of transportation of marijuana in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11360, subdivision (a). The jury found true the allegation that appellant had served a prior prison term within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced appellant to the low term of two years for the possession for sale conviction, stayed sentence on the transportation conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 654 and struck the section 667.5 enhancement.
Appellant appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his prior uncharged conduct and text messages on his cell phone, and erred in failing to instruct the jury on his burden of proof under the Compassionate Use Act ("CUA") and failing to modify CALJIC No. 12.21 and CALCRIM No. 2361. Appellant further contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

Defendant and appellant Kai Edwards (defendant) appeals from his murder conviction. He contends that a telephone call he made from jail consisted of inadmissible hearsay admitted in violation of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. He also contends that portions of the gang expert’s testimony should have been stricken due to insufficient foundation. As we find no merit to defendant’s contentions, we affirm the judgment.

Reginald Mark Candler appeals from a judgment entered following a jury verdict finding him guilty of possessing ammunition and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He contends the judgment should be vacated because the trial court erred in declaring a mistrial after excusing two jurors for cause, and the retrial violated the double jeopardy provisions of the federal and California constitutions. He also contends the judgment should be reversed because the court erred in denying his Batson/Wheeler motion,[1] brought after the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to excuse three prospective African-American jurors. Finding no error, we affirm.

Plaintiffs in this case are Grease Monkey Racing, Inc. (Grease Monkey), doing business as Sigalsport, a sports car racing team, and Grease Monkey’s owner and president, Gene Sigal. The trial court imposed terminating sanctions on defendants and appellants Fortune Market Media, Inc., Fortune Market Financial Network, Inc., BZCOM Marketing, Inc., Galinda Vaynter, Vadim Vaynter, Arthur Kats, and Ryan Tomlinson (collectively defendants). The court found that defendants engaged in a pattern of willful discovery abuse. It entered a default judgment against defendants. The court also dismissed with prejudice defendants’ cross-complaint, which was brought against plaintiffs and several other cross-defendants not parties to the discovery, Trista Sigal, Emmanuel Lupe, and ELO, Inc. (collectively the nonpropounding cross-defendants). Defendants contend the imposition of terminating sanctions was an abuse of discretion, the trial court erred in allowing the nonpropounding cross-defendants to benefit from the sanctions, and it failed to follow proper procedures in setting the monetary amount of the default judgment. Because we conclude the court’s orders were not an abuse of discretion and the default judgment was properly entered, we shall affirm the judgment and orders under review.

In July 2011, the probate court removed Ann Priess Fiedler from her position as conservator of the person of Alfred W. Priess, her father, after concluding she had shown a continued failure to perform the duties of conservator. The court also concluded Alfred should be returned to Mississippi to live with George Priess, Alfred’s son and Ann’s brother, with whom Alfred had been living since 2008.[1] On appeal, Ann contends: (1) the probate court abused its discretion by applying irrelevant or incorrect legal standards to the question of where Alfred should live; (2) the evidence did not support the court’s finding that Ann failed to adequately perform her conservator duties; and (3) the court improperly failed to consider a report issued by an expert pursuant to Evidence Code section 730. We find no error and affirm the probate court’s order.

Defendant and appellant Daniel Darnell Kirkpatrick (defendant) appeals his conviction of aggravated mayhem, challenging it as unsupported by substantial evidence of a specific intent to permanently disable or disfigure the victim. Defendant also contends that substantial evidence did not support his conviction as an actual perpetrator or as an aider and abettor; and that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding the natural and probable consequence theory of liability. Finding no merit to defendant’s contentions we affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Joel Martin (defendant) appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of murder in the second degree and a second jury found true the allegation that he had personally and intentionally used a firearm to commit the murder. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in the first trial by refusing to give a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter based upon heat of passion, and by denying a jury request for a readback of defense counsel’s closing argument. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in the second trial by precluding the jury from reconsidering defendant’s guilt on the underlying murder charge. Finding no merit to defendant’s contentions or that any error was harmless, we affirm the judgment.

After the court denied his motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5, defendant Pedro Valdovinos was convicted of felony possession of heroin with a previous conviction, falsely identifying himself to a police officer, and driving on a suspended license. This appeal challenges the ruling on the motion to suppress and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction for giving false identification to a police officer. We affirm.

A jury found defendant Francisco Jesus Serrano guilty of aggravated assault and active participation in a criminal street gang, and determined that related enhancement allegations were true. Defendant received a total sentence of 14 years and 8 months in state prison. Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to convict him. He also argues the trial court should have stayed the eight-month sentence he received for active participation in a criminal street gang. The People argue we should affirm the judgment, but agree that defendant’s eight-month sentence should have been stayed. We affirm the judgment, except that we order that his eight-month sentence is stayed.

Jordan Rosenberg (appellant) appeals from “judgments” of dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction against respondents. Appellant’s briefs present an unintelligible compilation of disjointed historical facts, accusations, and claims which fail to comply with many fundamental rules of appellate procedure. Those deficiencies include the failure to: (1) present legal analysis and relevant supporting authority for each point asserted, with appropriate citations to the record on appeal (Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856); (2) support references to the record with a citation to the volume and page number in the record where the matter appears; and (3) state the nature of the action, the relief sought in the trial court, the judgment or order appealed from, and summarize the significant facts, but limited to matters in the record (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C), (2)(A), (C)).
These are not mere technical requirements, but important rules of appellate procedure designed to alleviate the burden on the court by requiring litigants to present their cause systematically, so that the court “may be advised, as they read, of the exact question under consideration, instead of being compelled to extricate it from the mass.” (Landa v. Steinberg (1932) 126 Cal.App. 324, 325.)
Perhaps most importantly, the incomprehensible nature of appellant’s briefs makes it impossible for this court to discern what precise errors he is claiming were made by the trial judge, and how such errors were prejudicial. We are not required to search the record on our own seeking error. (Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)
We note that appellant appears before us in propria persona. While this may explain the deficiencies in his briefs, it in no way excuses them. (Burnete v. La Casa Dana Apartments (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1267 [“ ‘ “[T]he in propria persona litigant is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney” ’ ”].) Appellant’s self-represented status does not exempt him from the rules of appellate procedure or relieve him of his burden on appeal. Those representing themselves are afforded no additional leniency or immunity from the rules of appellate procedure simply because of their propria persona status. (See Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985; see also Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.)

Anthony Ray Castello appeals from an order extending his commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) in a conditional release program (CONREP) for another year pursuant to Penal Code sections 1606 and 2972.[1] Castello contends that no substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that he continued to represent a substantial danger of physical harm to others. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

B.D. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders concerning her daughter, E.A., who will be 18 years old in March 2013. Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s dependency finding taking custody of E.A. because mother could not keep E.A. safe from the dangerous, runaway lifestyle she chose to escape the volatile home environment mother provided. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 300, subds. (b) [failure to protect] & (g) [caretaker absence], 361, subd. (c) [removal from home]; all further undesignated statutory references are to this code.) As we explain, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s ruling, including mother’s admissions she could not control E.A., did not want E.A. to return home because of her behavior and accusations of abuse, that “it is best to let go since E[.A.] does not want to come back,” and her statements on the eve of trial reiterating she did not want E.A. returned to her care. We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s dependency and out-of-home placement orders.

A modification decision.