CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant Ronnie Demone Crawford of possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5—count one)[1] and possession of heroin for sale (id., § 11351—count two). The jury found that defendant was not personally armed with a firearm in the commission of counts one and two and was unable to reach a verdict on counts three and four (felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, respectively). The trial court declared a mistrial on counts three and four, which were later dismissed on the People’s motion. In bifurcated proceedings, the trial court found that defendant had sustained two prior drug convictions (id., § 11370.2, subd. (a)) and four prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).

Appellant Fatima Katumbusi (mother) appeals from a court order sanctioning mother $3,000 under Family Code section 271. On appeal, mother claims she was denied the opportunity to make a record for appeal and denied the opportunity to be heard prior to sanctions being ordered. Mother also claims the trial court wrongly allowed father Frederick Whyte’s attorney to represent him beyond the scope of the attorney’s notice of limited representation, wrongly allowed father to file a modified billing statement hours before the hearing on sanctions, and failed to provide mother with a statement of decision regarding the order of sanctions. Finally, mother claims the order of sanctions imposes on her an unreasonable financial burden in contravention of Family Code section 271. Finding none of mother’s claims to have merit, we affirm.

Defendant Roman Carrillo Ibanez represented himself and his jury found him guilty of conspiracy to commit burglary (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a)(1);[1] count 1), as well as resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 2), and possession of burglary tools (§ 466; count 3). In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found that defendant had been convicted of a prior serious felony (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court granted a new trial as to the charge of possession of burglary tools and the prosecutor elected not to retry it. Defendant was sentenced to state prison for five years. The trial court also imposed a 60-day county jail sentence for the resisting arrest conviction, with credit for time served.

Appellant Felix Jose Rivera, along with codefendant Karen Derush, was charged with carjacking in violation of Penal Code[1] section 215, subdivision (a) and second-degree robbery in violation of section 211. As to both counts, it was alleged that appellant personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(2). The information further alleged that appellant had suffered a prior conviction that qualified as a serious felony under section 667, subdivision (a)(1) as well as a strike within the meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d). The information also alleged that appellant had served three prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
On May 31, 2012, appellant waived his constitutional rights, pled no contest to carjacking and admitted the strike allegation. The court imposed the agreed-upon sentence of 18 years by selecting the upper-term of nine years, doubled. The court awarded appellant presentence custody credits and imposed mandatory fines and fees. The court also ordered appellant to make full restitution to the victim in an amount to be determined at a hearing set for a later date.
On July 19, 2012, the parties stipulated to the restitution figure of $6,533, and the court ordered appellant to pay the victim that sum in restitution.

D.G. challenges juvenile court rulings denying his request for a continuance and terminating dependency jurisdiction with a guardianship in place. He also contends that the visitation order is impermissibly vague. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.

J.M. (minor), appeals from a March 8, 2012 order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 based on a finding that he committed an attempted first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code §§ 664, 459). He contends there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that he appreciated the wrongfulness of the charged conduct as required by Penal Code section 26 for persons under the age of 14. At the time of the charged conduct, minor was 13 years 3 months old. We affirm.

Appellant Ralph Garcia was charged with one count of second-degree robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211. The information alleged that appellant had suffered a prior conviction that qualified as a serious felony prior under section 667, subdivision (a)(1) as well as a strike within the meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d).

A modification decision.

Defendant Jonathan Pedraza appeals from a judgment sentencing him to prison for a determinate term of three years, followed by an indeterminate term of 27 years to life, after a jury convicted him of first degree murder (Pen. Code,[1] § 187, subd. (a)), felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)), and two misdemeanor counts of hit-and-run driving (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)). He contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter based upon heat of passion or provocation, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of premeditation and deliberation. We affirm the judgment.

Appellant Brandon Dashawn Hardman was charged and convicted of one count of attempted second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 664/211), arising out of an incident occurring on October 28, 2011.[1] The court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed appellant on probation for a period of three years. One condition of probation was that appellant serve 25 days in county jail. The court gave appellant credit for 25 days of custody, consisting of 22 days of actual custody and an additional 3 days of work time/good time credit (15 percent of 22).

Plaintiff Irving E. Simons (Simons) appeals the judgment entered following the successful demurrer of defendants Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) and its agent, Charles E. Stewart (Stewart), to the second amended complaint. Simons sought to recover from Aetna under a homeowner's insurance policy (the Policy) issued to Alexa Greenberg[1] (Greenberg) when artwork owned by Simons (the Artwork) was damaged in transit by movers, and from Stewart for his misrepresentations concerning coverage under the Policy. The trial court sustained defendants' demurrer, ruling that Simons was not an insured under the policy and that the complaint alleged no actionable misrepresentation by Stewart, and entered judgment for defendants. Finding no error, we affirm.

Defendant Garnik Sahakian appeals from the judgment following his convictions for assault with a deadly weapon and mayhem. He contends that, following his request for substitute appointed counsel, the trial court failed to inquire as to the bases for his claim of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Because we find that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm the judgment.

In this case, the appellant Morse Mehrban (Mehrban) seeks reversal of the trial court’s order denying his motion to strike the cross-complaint of respondent Eunice Y. Cho (Cho). Mehrban’s motion was based on Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16 (hereafter, § 425.16[1]; also known as the anti-SLAPP statute[2]). He argued that the claims asserted in the cross-complaint arose from his filing of the multiple complaints which he had done on behalf of his disabled clients, including one against her in a related action. He contended that such actions on his part were constitutionally protected activity within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute and the claims asserted by Cho were barred by the absolute litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b).) Although he was asserting a purely legal argument, the trial court denied the motion to strike on the sole ground that Mehrban had failed to file a declaration in support of his motion.[3]

Defendant Edwin Darcell Turner, along with codefendants Kevin D. Wallace, Daqunn L. Tunstall, and Tony L. Hobson, was charged by information with two counts of premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a); counts 3 & 4), as well as firearm and gang allegations (§§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), 186.22, subd. (b)(5), (b)(1)(C)). Turner was additionally charged as a felon in possession of a firearm (former § 12021; count 5). The defendants were tried separately.[1]
In his first trial, Turner was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon (count 5), but the jury deadlocked on the attempted murder counts (counts 3 & 4), and the court declared a mistrial. The attempted murder counts were retried to a second jury, and Turner was found guilty on both counts and all corresponding allegations were found true. (The jury was unable to make a unanimous finding for the premeditation allegations, however, and a mistrial was declared as to those allegations.) Turner was sentenced to 51 years 4 months in prison.