CA Unpub Decisions

Robert G., the alleged father of Jewel M., J. G., and Jonah G., appeals from a juvenile court order denying him presumed father status and bypassing services. (Fam. Code, § 7611, subd. (d); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, subd. (b)(6).)[1] We affirm on the ground that appellant failed to show that he received the children into his home and openly and publicly acknowledged paternity. (In re Spencer W. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1647, 1653.)

Defendant Nickolas Clyde Anderson appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of receiving stolen property. Defendant contends the prosecutor had no power to charge him with receiving stolen property because a more specific statute, Penal Code section 484e, subdivision (c), applied to his conduct. We affirm.

K.S. appeals from a juvenile court adjudication finding he had violated Penal Code section 459, declaring the offense to be a felony, and declaring he would remain a ward pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602.

Gregg M. Losonsky appeals from an order striking his first amended complaint (FAC) against his former employer Davis Instruments[1] because it was filed late. He contends the trial court abused its discretion because his FAC stated facts sufficient to support his claims for wrongful discharge and civil rights. Respondent contends that although the order striking appellant’s FAC is not an appealable order, we should nonetheless treat the order as a judgment of dismissal and reach the merits of appellant’s appeal. On the merits, respondent argues that the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit appellant to file his FAC late because the defect here—tardiness—could not be cured. While we agree that the order on respondent’s motion to strike should be treated as a final judgment and thus subject to our appellate review, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the action solely on the basis it was late filed.

Michael Gambino and Denise Gambino appeal from a dismissal entered in favor of defendant Kevin McGushion after the trial court struck appellants' first amended complaint as a SLAPP suit (strategic lawsuit against public participation). (Code Civ. Proc., §425.16.)[1] We affirm and conclude that the action arises from a protected speech activity in connection with an issue of public interest. (§ 425.16, subd. (c)(3); Ruiz v. Harbor View Community Assn. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1468.)

Appellant T. J. (mother) appeals from juvenile court orders sustaining a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300[1] petition as well as a subsequent section 342 petition on behalf of her daughter, I. M. (I., born Oct. 1995). She contends that there is no evidence to support the allegations in either petition. She further argues that even if dependency jurisdiction could be found, there was insufficient evidence to warrant removal of I. from mother’s custody; alternative remedies were available. Finally, mother asserts that the juvenile court erred when it failed to ensure compliance with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).
To the extent mother attacks the juvenile court’s adjudication and disposition orders, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s orders. However, as the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) concedes, we agree that ICWA notice was deficient. Those deficiencies do not compel reversal of the juvenile court’s order. Rather, pursuant to In re Brooke C. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 377, this matter is remanded for the limited purpose of allowing DCFS to provide proper ICWA notice.

A jury convicted defendant Manuel Armendariz of second degree murder in violation of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a)[1] (count 1). The jury found that defendant personally and intentionally discharged a handgun, which caused great bodily injury and death to the victim within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d).
The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 40 years to life in state prison. The sentence consisted of 15 years to life as the base count, plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (d).
Defendant appeals on the grounds that: (1) the trial court erred in not instructing on the lesser included offense of heat of passion manslaughter; (2) it was error to instruct with CALCRIM No. 522 that provocation should be considered in deciding whether murder is reduced to manslaughter where only imperfect self-defense manslaughter instructions were given; (3) the trial court committed reversible error by not instructing the jury that an unintentional killing during an assaultive felony constitutes voluntary manslaughter; and (4) there was insufficient evidence to sustain a finding of murder, since the uncontroverted testimony showed that defendant acted in perfect or imperfect self-defense.

Plaintiffs and appellants are the husband, mother and children of decedent Willie Mae Jackson.[1] Willie died as a result of injuries she sustained in a motor vehicle accident in Texas. In this wrongful death action, plaintiffs assert strict product liability, breach of warranty and negligence causes of action against defendant and respondent Norco Industries, doing business as Adnik (Adnik), and other defendants. Adnik filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the action could more appropriately and justly be tried in Texas, where plaintiffs were pursuing another lawsuit arising from the same accident which caused Willie’s death. The essential issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting Adnik’s motion to dismiss. We shall conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and thus affirm the order granting the motion.

Martin A. Zahorik, in propria persona, appeals from a judgment entered pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8, subdivision (a) in favor of John E. Sweeney and Helen C. Sweeney (the Sweeneys) and Sepulveda Escrow Corporation on Zahorik’s claim for breach of contract, negligence, and declaratory relief.[1] Zahorik contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for appointment of a trustee; denying his motion for a discovery referee; denying his motion to amend the complaint to add a fraud cause of action; denying his motion for appointment of counsel; denying his motion for personal appearance at trial; denying his request for a jury trial; and granting Sepulveda Escrow’s and the Sweeneys’ motions for judgment. In his reply brief, Zahorik contends that he could not provide a reporter’s transcript because he is indigent. We affirm the judgment because Zahorik failed to provide an adequate record for review.

Defendant Waleed Saab appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of felony vandalism and second degree burglary. Defendant contends his attorney provided ineffective assistance in conjunction with the restitution hearing. We affirm.

A modification order.

Appellant Darryl Staten was convicted of two counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211, counts 1-2)[1]; possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, count 3); and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count 5). Gang and firearm allegations attached to counts 1 and 2 were found true, as were prior conviction allegations. Appellant was sentenced to a total of 43 years eight months in prison.
On appeal, appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the criminal street gang enhancements. He also argues that the trial court erred in denying his request to continue sentencing so that he could present a new trial motion. We find that the gang enhancements were not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm in all other respects.

Defendant Carissa Rashea Baxter appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found her guilty of corporal injury of a child between the dates of June 1 and June 30, 2010 (Pen. Code,[1] § 273d, subd. (a); count 1) and corporal injury of a child between the dates of July 1 and July 31, 2010 (ibid.; count 2).[2] The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for a period of five years, with the condition that she serve one year in county jail and pay a fee, including $5,000 in attorney’s fees pursuant to section 987.8.
On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her convictions. She further contends the court erred in denying her motion to dismiss counts 1 and 2 pursuant to section 1118.1, and the trial court erred in admitting the statement of James Branch (Branch)[3] against her as an adoptive admission. Finally, defendant contends that the order to pay attorney’s fees should be stricken because she did not receive notice or a hearing to determine her ability to pay the court ordered attorney’s fees. We agree that the imposition of $5,000 in attorney’s fees should be stricken.

Jennifer Joanne Zito (Zito) stands convicted of stealing more than $800,000 in cash and five vehicles over the five-year period she worked as a bookkeeper for Simi Valley Cycles (SVC). The trial court sentenced her to 18 years in prison. In this appeal, Zito does not dispute the evidence of her guilt. Instead, she argues that many of the charges are time-barred or duplicative, and that her sentence is procedurally defective. We modify the judgment to include a court facility assessment fee, and affirm the judgment in all other respects.