CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant Randy Overstreet of attempted sexual intercourse with a minor and found true allegations that he had four prior prison terms. The trial court sentenced him to 13 years in state prison.
Defendant now contends (1) the trial court erred in admitting a recorded out-of-court interview with the victim pursuant to Evidence Code section 1360, and (2) defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to other out-of-court statements made by the victim.
We conclude (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the victim’s interview statements because the evidence provided sufficient indicia of reliability; and (2) regarding defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance, he does not establish prejudice because the challenged statements were admissible as spontaneous declarations.
We will affirm the judgment.

Following a jury trial, defendant Efrain Leon-Herrera was convicted of attempting to commit an act of sexual intercourse or sodomy of a child 10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code, §§ 664/288.7, subd. (a) -- count one; undesignated statutory references to follow are to the Penal Code), sexual penetration of a child 10 years of age or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b) -- count three), and two counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 by force or fear (§ 288, subd. (b)(1) -- counts two & four). The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive state prison terms of 9 years and 15 years to life.
On appeal, defendant contends his convictions for counts one and two must be reversed under the corpus delicti rule, and counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony regarding the victim’s statements to a police officer. We affirm.

Maria P.’s parental rights with respect to her son Joseph R. were terminated pursuant to section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.[1] Maria P. claims on appeal that her son was not adoptable and that the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the parent-child relationship exception to the statutory preference for adoption. We affirm.

Diana M. (mother) appeals from a judgment declaring her son Damien O. (born December 2010) a dependent of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code section 360, subdivision (d).[1] Specifically, mother argues that there was no substantial evidence to support the findings as to mother under section 300. In addition, mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it required that mother remain in her sister’s home as a condition of its home of parent order. We find no error and affirm the judgment in full.

Appellant Michael A. appeals the order terminating parental rights over his daughter, E.A. (E.), under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Appellant contends that due process required a finding supported by clear and convincing evidence that he was an unfit parent or that return of the girl to his custody would create a risk of harm or detriment to the girl, and that the absence of such a finding or substantial evidence to support it precluded the court from terminating his parental rights. We agree and reverse.

Appellant Nancy D. appeals from the juvenile court order sustaining a dependency petition under subdivisions (b) and (j) of Welfare and Institutions Code, section 300.[1] The court found appellant’s three children were persons described by section 300, but did not declare them dependents of the court. Appellant contends there was not substantial evidence to support the court’s findings. Respondent Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) cross-appeals the trial court’s dismissal of an allegation under section 300, subdivision (a). We affirm the court’s jurisdictional findings.

Stephen Smith appeals an order denying his motion to vacate his 1990 conviction for possession of marijuana for sale, a felony. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359.) We affirm.
We conclude, among other things, that: 1) substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Smith was advised of the immigration consequences of his plea, 2) Smith failed to show his counsel provided ineffective assistance, and 3) the court did not err by not holding an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Richard Tell was charged by amended information with assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), felony possession of ammunition (Pen. Code, §§ 12021, 12316, subd. (b)(1)), second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)), and attempted first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664). It was also specially alleged as to counts 1, 3 and 4 (assault, robbery, attempted murder) that defendant personally used a deadly weapon, a screwdriver, and inflicted great bodily injury (Pen. Code, §§ 12022, subd. (b)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a)) in the commission of those offenses. It was further alleged defendant had suffered two qualifying felony strikes for robbery and assault, and had served three prior prison terms (Pen. Code, §§ 1170.12, 667, 667.5).

A jury convicted defendant Junius MacArthur Turner of one count of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a))[1] and found true the allegation that he was on bail in an unrelated case (§ 12022.1). The trial court sentenced him to state prison for a total term of four years. He appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending that the evidence is insufficient to prove that value of the items taken exceeded $950, and that therefore his conviction of grand theft must be set aside. We affirm the judgment.

This appeal arises from a wrongful death action based on medical malpractice which is alleged to have occurred in the course of treating a gunshot victim in a hospital emergency room. This appeal concerns an emergency room nurse. The trial court granted the nurse’s motion for summary judgment, and entered summary judgment accordingly. We affirm.

Minor and appellant, Juan P. (minor), appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court entered after the court sustained a petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 (petition or section 602 petition). Minor contends that the judgment is not supported by substantial evidence. We find no merit in minor’s contention and affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Bryan Smith (defendant) appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of evading an officer in a vehicle driven in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 1), misdemeanor hit-and-run driving (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a); count 2), and unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 3). Defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness concerning count 3, based on that witness’s unavailability at the time of trial, and that the trial court’s erroneous ruling violated defendant’s federal and state constitutional right of confrontation.
We conclude that the trial court did not err by admitting the prior testimony of an unavailable witness and therefore affirm the judgment.

Plaintiffs and appellants Joanne Stathoulis (Stathoulis), Charles Gianfisco (Gianfisco), and Frisco’s Downey, Inc. (Frisco’s) (collectively, plaintiffs) appeal from the order dismissing with prejudice their action against defendants and respondents City of Downey (the City), Gilbert A. Livas (Livas), and David Blumethal (Blumenthal) (collectively, defendants) after the trial court sustained, without leave to amend, defendants’ demurrer to the third amended complaint (TAC). We affirm the trial court’s order.

Defendant and appellant Charles Lee Dotson (defendant) appeals from a final judgment following his conviction by jury of violations of Penal Code section 550, subdivisions (a)(1) (presentation of a false or fraudulent claim for loss or injury, including payment of a loss or injury under a contract of insurance); (a)(2) (presentation of multiple claims for the same loss or injury, including presentation of multiple claims to more than one insurer with intent to defraud); and (b)(3) (concealing or failing to disclose an event affecting a person’s continued right to entitlement to any insurance benefit or payment).[1] We affirm.