CA Unpub Decisions

The demurrer of defendants Grace Cheng and the Progressive Tax Group to the second amended complaint for fraud filed by plaintiff Geoffrey E. Woo-Ming was sustained without leave to amend. Plaintiff then moved to set aside the judgment of dismissal (Code Civ. Proc., § 473),[1] claiming he made a mistake of law in relying on a single cause of action for fraud, when he should have alleged causes of action for breach of oral contract, common counts, and constructive fraud.
The trial court denied his motion to set aside the judgment, and plaintiff appeals. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and affirm the judgment.

Defendant, Quick Silver Towing, Inc., purports to appeal from a judgment entered on August 14, 2012. On that date, the trial court granted the ex parte application for entry of judgment filed by plaintiff, Ambrose Development Limited. The judgment states that the enforcement of the judgment was stayed until September 4, 2012, or further court order. On August 17, 2012, plaintiff served a notice of ruling of the order granting the ex parte application for entry of judgment. Attached to the notice of ruling is a file-stamped copy of the judgment with the trial court’s signature and handwritten stay order. The August 17, 2012 notice was served on defense counsel.

On September 26, 2012, defendant, Frank Edward Edmonds, pled nolo contendere to a felony violation of Penal Code section 69. Defendant, who has filed a notice of appeal, failed to secure a probable cause certificate. We have a duty to raise issues concerning our jurisdiction on our own motion. (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126; Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 398.) We issued an order to show cause re possible dismissal and placed the matter on calendar.
Defendant has failed to fully and timely comply with both Penal Code section 1237.5 and California Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b). (In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 651; People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1099; People v. Way (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 733, 736.) Without a probable cause certificate, defendant cannot appeal. (People v. Kaanehe (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 8; People v. Ribero (1971) 4 Cal.3d 55, 61; People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, 600-601; People v. Ward (1967) 66 Cal.2d 571, 574-576.) Moreover, the notice of appeal fails to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4)(B) in that it does not state defendant is appealing from matters occurring after the plea which does not affect its validity. (People v. Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1096; see People v. Fulton (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1235-1236, disapproved on another ground in People v. Maultsby (2012) 53 Cal.4th 296, 298.)
Defendant argues that he wishes to challenge the denial of a peace officer personnel records motion. Such an order would not be appealable after defendant pled nolo contendere. (See People v. Mazurette (2001) 24 Cal.4th 789, 792; People v.
DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 896, People v. Collins (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 137, 148; compare People v. Moore (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 94, 99-100.) Even if the pre-plea peace officer personnel records order would be appealable, no probable cause certificate has been secured and that ends the matter. Insofar as defendant attempts, on direct appeal, that we consider his declaration which was not before the trial court, we decline to do so. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405; People v. Merriam (1967) 66 Cal.2d 390, 396, overruled by People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 882.) If defendant wishes to raise these issues by means of a habeas corpus petition where we can consider the additional evidence, he remains free to do so. Finally, we judicially notice the July 12, 2012 transcript attached to defendant’s papers filed in response to our order to show cause.

William C. Wilson (Wilson) and his law firm Wilson Getty LLP (collectively “petitioners”) are the defendants in an action pending in Los Angeles Superior Court. They have filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging an order denying their motion to transfer venue of the pending action to San Diego County. After considering their petition, this court concluded that San Diego County was in fact the proper venue for the pending action. Accordingly, this court issued an order pursuant to Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 180 (Palma), notifying the superior court that we intended to issue a peremptory writ in the first instance unless the superior court vacated its denial order and issued a new order transferring the action to San Diego County. As part of the Palma order, this court issued a temporary stay of all proceedings in the pending action.
After a hearing on the matter, the superior court notified this court of its decision not to comply with our order issued pursuant to Palma. We directed the plaintiff and real party in interest, San Marino Skilled Nursing & Wellness Centre, LLC (San Marino Centre) to file a response to the petition for writ of mandate. Neither petitioners nor San Marino Centre have requested oral argument before this court.
We hereby issue a peremptory writ in the first instance directing the superior court to vacate its order denying petitioners’ motion to transfer venue of the underlying action to San Diego County, and issue a new order granting said motion. The temporary stay is now lifted and the matter may proceed in accordance with the present decision.

L.K. (Mother), the mother of a dependent child of the juvenile court, appeals from an order denying her petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1] to modify prior orders and return her daughter to her care or, in the alternative, permit unmonitored visitation. We affirm.[2] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding Mother failed to sufficiently demonstrate that there were changed circumstances or that the best interests of the child would be served by the proposed change of order.

B.R., a minor, appeals from adjudication and disposition orders. The juvenile court found that on October 25, 2011, the minor committed assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (count 1) and deadly weapon assault (count 3). The juvenile court found the deadly weapon assault was a serious felony. (Former Pen. Code,[1] §§ 245, subd. (a)(1) (Stats. 2004, ch. 494, § 1, pp. 4040-4041); 1192.7, subd. (c)(31).) At the time of the altercation, the minor was on probation for petty theft. The juvenile court sustained the Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition and found the minor in violation of probation. The minor was released home on probation. We affirm the orders under review.

This appeal arises from the dependency proceeding concerning appellant Joan H.'s son, Peter H. The appeal is from an order vacating a finding that Aaron H. is Peter's presumed father, and orders denying Joan H.'s request for a re-hearing on the issue. Peter himself is the respondent, DCFS having taken no position. We affirm.

Anthony Spinner brings this “idea submission” lawsuit against American Broadcasting Company, Inc. (ABC) for ABC’s alleged use of his ideas in creating and developing the hit television series LOST. Spinner submitted a script entitled “L.O.S.T.” to ABC in 1977, while ABC’s LOST was created and developed in 2003 and 2004. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of ABC. We affirm.

Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company (Lumbermens) seeks a writ of mandate directing the superior court to stay or dismiss proceedings in a lawsuit involving Lumbermens and its insured, Marin Cleaners. Lumbermens asserts stay or dismissal is warranted because it is presently subject to an “Agreed Order of Rehabilitation” (rehabilitation order) issued by the Cook County Circuit Court, Illinois, which enjoins all persons from prosecuting any lawsuits against Lumbermens, and the rehabilitation order is effective in California under the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act (UILA; Ins. Code,[2] § 1064.1 et seq.). Finding merit in Lumbermens’ contention, we grant the petition.

Mario M. appeals from an order terminating his parental rights to his now 17-month-old daughter. He contends the court violated his right to due process by setting the permanency planning hearing without first providing him a reasonable chance to establish his paternity and fitness as a parent and that the violation of his constitutional rights was compounded by the failure of the Sonoma County Human Services Agency (the agency) to exercise due diligence in providing timely notice of the proceedings. We conclude that any potential violation of Mario’s rights was harmless and shall affirm the judgment.

Appellant Jason M. (Minor) admitted to having raped a young woman in concert with another by means of force or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury. (Pen. Code, §§ 261, 264.1, subd. (a).) Based on that admission, the juvenile court committed Minor to the custody of the Division of Juvenile Justice of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DJJ). Minor now challenges the juvenile court’s dispositional order, arguing the court abused its discretion in committing him to DJJ. He also claims his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the dispositional hearing. Minor further contends he should not be subject to sex offender registration requirements and residency restrictions when he is discharged or paroled from DJJ. Finally, he argues the record does not reflect that the juvenile court considered the individual circumstances of his case in determining his term of confinement.
We find none of Minor’s contentions persuasive. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted appellant Richard Clyde Bonella of eight counts of lewd conduct with a child under 14 committed against a single victim. (Pen. Code,[1] § 288, subd. (a).)[2] Sentenced to 22 years in state prison, he appeals. Bonella contends that (1) his mother was improperly excluded from the courtroom during part of his trial; (2) he was erroneously precluded from questioning the victim about financial gain as a motive for bringing false charges against him; (3) inflammatory evidence was improperly admitted; (4) the trial court denied him full access to the victim’s psychiatric records; (5) prosecutorial misconduct occurred during closing argument; and (6) his motion for new trial should have been granted. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant Joseph Perkins appeals from a post-judgment order denying his motion for additional presentence conduct credit under Penal Code section 4019.[1] For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the order.

Plaintiffs Alan Palmer and Santa Cruz Properties LLC brought this action against neighboring landowners Anthony and Kandy Silveira, to expunge certain recorded agreements between defendants and the parties’ common predecessors in interest insofar as those agreements might establish or give record notice of servitudes burdening plaintiffs’ property. From a judgment in plaintiffs’ favor, defendants appeal. Plaintiffs contend that defendants have not preserved their challenges to the judgment. We reject this contention, but conclude that defendants have not carried their burden of establishing reversible error. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.