CA Unpub Decisions

A.W. (mother) appeals jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders entered with respect to her now 13-year-old son, J.W. Mother contends the jurisdictional finding and the order removing J.W. from her care are not supported by substantial evidence. We reject these claims and affirm the orders of the juvenile court.

A modification decision.

Leon Davis appeals from the trial court’s summary judgment dismissing his complaint for employment discrimination based on age and race. Because the trial court erred in excluding evidence that created a triable issue of age animus, we reverse summary judgment and remand for further proceedings on appellant’s cause of action for age discrimination.

Defendant and appellant, Timothy Nelson Lusk, appeals his conviction for possession of marijuana, being under the influence of a controlled substance, and transportation of marijuana, with prior serious felony conviction and prior prison term enhancements (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11357, 11550, 11360; Penal Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 667.5). Lusk was sentenced to state prison for nine years.
The judgment is affirmed.

A modification decision.

A jury found defendant and appellant Raymond Reyes, III guilty of one count of heroin possession. After the trial court found true prior convictions and denied his Romero[1] motion, the court sentenced him to 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law. Reyes now contends that the court abused its discretion by denying his Romero motion, that his sentence violates federal and state constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment,[2] and that his constitutional right to present a defense was denied when the court refused to compel the attendance of in-custody witnesses. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

This case arises from the ashes of two separate fires that occurred on February 12, 2005, at the Leona Valley property owned by Kerri Roepel and Roepel’s then-husband, Howard Breuer. Their residence, which at the time was under construction from a January 2002 fire, was completely destroyed. A detached quonset hut, located approximately 50 feet from the residence, was also destroyed. Roepel claimed to have lost several hundred thousand dollars in personal property stored in the hut. Roepel timely submitted her claim to her insurer, Pacific Specialty Insurance Company (PSIC). Approximately 20 months later, PSIC denied Roepel’s claim and rescinded her policy based on numerous material misrepresentations contained in her application for insurance.
The jury concurred, finding Roepel misrepresented material facts on her application for insurance entitling PSIC to rescind its policy. The jury also found Freeway Insurance Services, Inc. (Freeway) was Roepel’s broker, not PSIC’s agent. Judgment was entered for PSIC and against Roepel on November 18, 2010. Notice of appeal was timely filed by appellants Roepel and her children, Ryan, Jesse, Kathryne and Madison Roepel (the Children).
Appellants argue there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings, evidentiary rulings by the trial court undermined appellants’ case, and the special verdict was unduly biased against appellants. Appellants also argue the trial court erred by sustaining PSIC’s demurrer without leave to amend, by granting a directed verdict for PSIC as to punitive damages and by granting a nonsuit as to Roepel’s children. We agree with PSIC that substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict. In addition, we find all other claims of error lack merit. According

Joseph Allen Banks appeals from a judgment and sentence to state prison imposed following a determination that he violated probation in three cases for his failure to obey all laws. His court-appointed counsel has filed a brief requesting our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, in order to determine whether there are any arguable grounds for appeal. We conclude there are no issues that warrant review and affirm.

Defendant appeals from a guilty plea entered in the Superior Court of Lake County. Defendant had entered guilty pleas to a violation of Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivision (a) (causing bodily injury while driving under the influence of alcohol, Count One of the information, a felony), a violation of Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a) (leaving the scene of an accident, Count Three, a felony), and Vehicle Code section 14601.2, subdivision (a) (driving with a suspended license after sustaining a DUI conviction, Count Four, a misdemeanor). He also admitted violating his probation in three other cases. Appellate counsel has reviewed the file in this case and has determined there are no meritorious issues to raise on appeal. She has complied with the relevant case authorities. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was notified of his right to file a supplemental brief, but has not done so. Upon independent review of the record, we conclude that no arguable issues are presented for review, and affirm the judgment.
The information in this case was filed on December 2, 2011. Count One also alleged defendant had suffered a prior conviction for driving under the influence occurring within 10 years of the charged incident.
On May 29, 2012, defendant pled guilty to Counts One, Three and Four. He also admitted violating probation in three other cases. At the sentencing on July 30, 2012, the trial court denied defendant’s application for probation. The court sentenced defendant to state prison for a term of three years eight months. This sentence was determined by imposing the upper term of three years on Count One with a consecutive eight months (one-third the midterm of two years) on Count Three.
The aggravated term was imposed because the trial judge found three aggravating factors under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421. The defendant had engaged in prior conduct numerous times resulting in convictions and his behavior was increasingly serious. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2).) He was on probation when this offense took place. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(4).) His prior behavior on probation had not been satisfactory. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(5).) A factor in mitigation was defendant’s decision to enroll in Hilltop Recovery Services, but this was done after this criminal offense. The trial court determined the aggravating factors were more substantial than the factors in mitigation.
The court imposed a consecutive sentence for Count Three because it found the two felonies were independent of each other and had different objectives under California Rules of Court, rule 4.425(a)(1).
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on July 31, 2012.

Defendant was convicted of sale or transportation of heroin, possession of methamphetamine, and providing false information to a police officer after he was found to be storing a significant quantity of narcotics in his pants and jacket. As a result of three prior convictions for robbery, defendant was sentenced under the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (b)–(i)) to a term of 25 years to life imprisonment. Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his requests to represent himself at trial and to appoint substitute counsel and in granting his request for a mistrial. He also contends his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment and asserts the court should have stricken his prior robbery convictions. We affirm.

Appellant Moysey Vaynberg worked for respondent Chevron Products Company (Chevron) through an employment agency for nine years, from August 1999 through April 2008. For the last eight of those years, appellant worked through Value Added Consulting Group (Value Added). Appellant sued Value Added[1] and Chevron for wage and hour violations, primarily the failure to pay him overtime. At trial, there was no dispute that Value Added was appellant’s employer; the main issue was appellant’s employment relationship with Chevron. Appellant contended that he was also an employee of Chevron, i.e., that Value Added and Chevron were appellant’s “joint” or “dual” employers. Chevron maintained that appellant was an independent contractor. The jury returned a verdict for Chevron and the trial court denied appellant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
On appeal, appellant contends the trial court prejudicially misinstructed the jury on the common law test for an employment relationship and also erred in excluding evidence. Finding no reversible error, we will affirm.

Defendant Paul Robert Wilcox was convicted by a jury of deterring an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69).[1] The jury deadlocked on a second charge of arson (§ 451, subd. (c)) and found Wilcox not guilty on a charge of attempt to burn (§ 455). The trial court dismissed the arson charge after the prosecution indicated it would not proceed with a retrial. On January 26, 2012, Wilcox was sentenced to 270 days in county jail and five years probation, with custody credits of 93 days. The court imposed a $200 restitution fine, a $40 court security fee and a $30 court facilities fee. The court also imposed and stayed a $200 probation revocation fine. Wilcox timely appealed.
On July 5, 2012, the court terminated Wilcox’s probation for absconding.
We appointed counsel to represent Wilcox in this court. Appointed counsel filed an opening brief which states the case and the facts, but raises no specific issues. We notified Wilcox of his right to submit written argument in his own behalf within 30 days. That period has elapsed, and we have received no written argument from Wilcox.

In March 1997, a jury convicted Karl Ivan Avetoom of one count of selling stolen property, one count of grand theft by false pretenses, and two counts of operating a motorcycle chop shop as charged in a 32-count information. The convictions were based on the theft of Duane Cruz’s 1990 Suzuki motorcycle with a vehicle identification number (VIN) of JS1GV73A8L2100380 (the Cruz 380 Bike).[1] The prosecutor alleged the Cruz 380 Bike was stolen, Avetoom altered or caused to be altered the Cruz 380 Bike’s VIN to JS1GV78A8L2100880,[2] and Avetoom sold the Cruz 380 Bike with the altered VIN to Bert’s Motorcycles. That motorcycle, however, was never made available to Avetoom’s defense, despite his motion that it be produced. In our prior nonpublished opinion People v. Robert Burns Yule II & Karl Ivan Avetoom (June 28, 1999, G022070) (Avetoom I), we affirmed Avetoom’s convictions.
Almost 11 years later in April 2010, Avetoom filed a motion to vacate his convictions pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.6[3] based on newly discovered evidence. He argued newly discovered evidence established that in 1995, the prosecution had two motorcycles in its possession, one with VIN JS1GV73A8L2100380 and another with VIN JS1GV78A8L2100880, and that the prosecution destroyed or altered the motorcycle with VIN JS1GV78A8L2100880 to falsely implicate him in the operation of a motorcycle chop shop based on the theft and alteration of the motorcycle with

Appellant, Gabriel M., a minor, admitted an allegation set forth in a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) that he committed an assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, in violation of former Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1).[1] At the disposition hearing, the court adjudged appellant a ward of the court, declared the instant offense to be a misdemeanor and placed appellant on probation with various terms and conditions, including that he serve 30 days in juvenile hall.
On appeal, appellant’s sole contention is that the court erred in imposing the juvenile hall condition of probation. We affirm.