P. v. Sanchez
Filed 3/25/13 P.
v. Sanchez CA2/8
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
EIGHT
>
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ENRIQUE SANCHEZ, Defendant and Appellant. | B243630 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA 392915) |
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court of
County, Henry J. Hall, Judge.
Affirmed.
David L.
Kelly, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No
appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * * * * *
Appellant
Enrique Sanchez was convicted of one count of
for a related offense. Pursuant to
opening brief requesting that this court review the record and determine
whether any arguable issues exist on appeal.
We have reviewed the entire record and find no
On February 24, 2012, appellant was
charged with unlawful driving or taking a vehicle with a prior for unlawful
driving or taking a vehicle. (Pen. Code,
§ 666.5.) In addition to the alleged
prior for unlawful driving or taking a vehicle, it was alleged appellant
suffered two prior serious or violent felony convictions within the meaning of
the “Three Strikes†law. It was further
alleged appellant suffered five prison terms within the meaning of section
667.5, subdivision (b).
On the first day of trial, the court
denied appellant’s motion to represent himself.
Appellant was not prepared to go to trial, and the court found that his
motion was untimely and was brought for the purpose of delay.
The court
driving or taking a vehicle. Jurors
found appellant guilty of unlawful driving or taking a vehicle.
Appellant waived jury trial on the
priors. The court found the priors
true. In addition to the charged crimes,
the court found appellant committed an uncharged robbery and had been regularly
committing crimes since 1976.
The court granted appellant’s
serious or violent prior felonies. (
the People elected to try appellant as if the current conviction were a second
strike (not a third strike). The court
sentenced appellant to a 12-year prison term.
On January 13, 2012, Sandra Estrada
owned a 1997 Mercury Mountaineer, which she allowed her son-in-law Abigael
Martinez to drive. On January 13,
Martinez drove the Mountaineer to his work at a Carl’s Jr. restaurant. Martinez put the keys to the Mountaineer on
the counter. Appellant picked up the
keys and drove off in Estrada’s vehicle.
A surveillance camera videotaped appellant taking the keys and driving
off in the Mountaineer. Martinez
identified appellant. Officer Eric Horn
found appellant’s driver’s license in the Mountaineer. Appellant’s girlfriend was found driving the
vehicle. When appellant was arrested, he
made a statement that if his girlfriend had been driving a car it must be
stolen.
Appellant denied taking the
vehicle. Appellant testified that his
license was found in the vehicle because he gave it to his girlfriend in order
to avoid having it on his person because he had absconded from parole. Appellant admitted that he had suffered prior
convictions for four robberies and for residential burglary. He admitted previously stealing cars and that
he had been convicted of grand theft auto.
He admitted being convicted of being a felon in possession of a
firearm. Appellant admitted to violating
his parole.
We conclude that no arguable issue
exists and that appellant’s attorney has fully complied with his
responsibilities. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 277-284; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 118-119;
In reaching the foregoing
conclusion, we have considered appellant’s supplemental brief, which
demonstrates no error. Contrary to
appellant’s assertion the trial court properly denied appellant’s untimely
motion to represent himself, which the court found was made for purposes of
delay. (People v. Powell (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1277 [“[A] trial
court rarely should grant such a motion [for self representation] on the day
set for trial.â€].) There is no
possibility that the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion brought on the
first day of trial that the court found was brought for purposes of delay fell
outside the bounds of reason. (See
Contrary to appellant’s statement,
the overwhelming evidence supported his conviction even though the police
officers did not process fingerprints from the vehicle. Not only did Martinez identify appellant, but
appellant was videotaped taking Martinez’s keys and taking the vehicle. In addition, appellant’s driver’s license was
found inside Estrada’s vehicle.
Appellant purports to challenge the
admission of evidence that his driver’s license was found in the vehicle on the
ground that the license was not produced at trial. But, Officer Horn saw the license inside the
vehicle and properly testified concerning his personal observations. (See Evid. Code, § 702.)
Appellant’s statement that his
counsel rendered the ineffective assistance of counsel is not supported by the
record and appellant identifies no specific error or prejudice from counsel’s
alleged ineffectiveness. Our record
demonstrates no ineffective assistance of counsel.
Similarly, appellant’s bare
assertion that his 12-year sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
lacks merit. This sentence is far less
than that upheld by the
States Supreme Court for recidivist criminals such as appellant who has
been committing crimes since 1976. (See
18, 30-31 [25-year-to-life sentence under “Three Strikes†law for theft of
three golf clubs worth $399 apiece]; Lockyer
v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 77 [two consecutive 25-year-to-life terms
for two separate thefts of less than $85 worth of videotapes].) Here, appellant has committed crimes since
1976 and the trial court found that he “has been nothing but a criminal.†Nor does appellant’s 12-year sentence shock
the conscience or offend fundamental notions of human dignity in violation of
the state constitution. (
prison sentence runs afoul of article I, section 17, if it is “so
disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the
conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.â€].)
Finally, appellant provides a list
of “evidence codes [that] have been violated and not adhered to in my
case . . . along with one penal code†that demonstrates no
error. Appellant’s list contains no
reference to the underlying conduct allegedly constituting a violation and no
citation to the record. As noted, we
have reviewed the entire record and find no arguable issue exists on appeal.
The judgment is affirmed.
FLIER,
J.
WE
CONCUR:
BIGELOW, P. J.
RUBIN, J.
