In re Baby Boy R.
Filed 3/29/13 In re Baby Boy R. CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE
DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
In re BABY BOY R., A Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
B244073
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
MARTHA R.,
Defendant
and Appellant.
(Los
Angeles County
Super. Ct.
No. CK82796)
APPEAL
from an order of the Superior Court
of
County.
Sherri Sobel, Referee.
Affirmed.
California
Appellate Project, Jonathan B. Steiner, Executive Director, and Anne E.
Fragasso, Staff Attorney, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Appellant.
Amir
Pichvai for Respondent.
__________________________
Mother
Martha appeals from the court’s order terminating her parental rights in her
son, Baby Boy R. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In
February 2012, appellant Martha (mother), who had a history of
gave birth to Baby Boy R. That same day,
mother was involuntarily hospitalized for psychiatric evaluation and
treatment. Two days later, respondent
placed Baby Boy R., whose father was unknown, with a couple who eventually
became his prospective adoptive parents.
On
February 10, 2012,
respondent filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section
300. The petition alleged mother
suffered from mental and emotional problems, including schizophrenia with
psychotic episodes and auditory hallucinations, and suicidal and homicidal
ideation, that prevented her from providing regular care to Baby Boy R. The petition also alleged that mother had two
other children who were dependents of the court because, among other reasons,
mother’s mental and emotional problems prevented her from taking care of them.
The
court sustained respondent’s petition and set a hearing for termination of
mother’s parental rights. The hearing
was held on September 7, 2012. The court’s minute order states the court
received into evidence a copy of Baby Boy R.’s birth certificate and
respondent’s report recommending termination.
The minute order further states that the court “read and consideredâ€
respondent’s report. At the end of the
hearing, the court terminated mother’s parental rights. (The men whom mother had identified as
possible fathers of Baby Boy R. had already disavowed any interest in the boy’s
custody or their parental rights.)
Mother’s appeal followed.
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]
Mother
contends respondent offered no evidence whatsoever at the hearing on
termination of her parental rights, let alone any
court’s termination order. The record
does not support mother. Ten days before
the hearing, respondent lodged with the court respondent’s report recommending
termination of parental rights. The
report, which the court received into evidence, stated Baby Boy R. was
adoptable and had bonded with his prospective parents, who had been approved
for his adoption. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309;
27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573-574 [adoption is preferred placement when no
reasonable likelihood of reunification].)
Mother
notes that the reporter’s transcript of the termination hearing contains no
direct reference to or discussion of respondent’s report. From this silence, mother contends a conflict
arises between the reporter’s transcript and the court’s minute order which we
must resolve in favor of the transcript to find respondent’s report was not in
evidence. (People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385-386
[reporter’s transcript prevails in conflict between transcript and minute
order].) Mother’s contention fails because
she cites no authority that the court must expressly state on the record that
the court had received respondent’s report into evidence. Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26,
subdivision (b) requires only that “[a]t the hearing . . . [the court] shall
review the report [and] shall indicate
that the court has read and considered it.â€
(Italics added.) (§ 366.26,
subd. (b).) Although the court did
not explicitly refer to the report on the record during the hearing, the court
discussed Baby Boy R.’s birth certificate that had been attached to the report,
which demonstrates the court had received the report and supports an inference
that the court had read and considered it.
In any case, the supposed conflict between the minute order and the
reporter’s transcript is more imagined than real because silence in the
transcript does not mean absence from evidence when the evidence is, as here, a
writing. Because mother’s briefs do not
discuss the contents of respondent’s report received into evidence, any
challenge she could mount to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
court’s termination order fails. (
197, 210 [issue waived if not addressed in briefs]; In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 402 [appellant’s brief
must recite facts pertinent to contentions on appeal]; In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 329 [appellate
court must review evidence supporting dependency court’s orders in the light
most favorable to those orders].)
DISPOSITION
The
order terminating mother’s parental rights is affirmed.
RUBIN,
ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
FLIER,
J.
GRIMES,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] About
one month after respondent filed its petition, the court appointed a guardian
ad litem to assist mother in the dependency proceedings. Mother’s opening brief incorrectly states the
guardian ad litem did not attend the hearing on termination of mother’s
parental rights, but mother withdrew that claim when she learned she was
mistaken.
