Anderson v. Catholic Healthcare West
Filed 4/11/13
Anderson v. Catholic Healthcare West CA1/1
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
JANET
ANDERSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
CATHOLIC
HEALTHCARE WEST,
Defendant and Respondent.
A127934
(San Francisco City & County
Super. Ct. No. CGC-07-461080)
Janet
Anderson appeals from a judgment after a court trial in favor of her former
employer, Catholic Healthcare West (CHW) doing business as Mercy Medical Center
(Mercy). Anderson, a registered nurse,
sued Mercy for failing to make a reasonable accommodation to allow her to
continue working after she developed a serious latex allergy. Mercy contended no reasonable accommodation
was possible due to Anderson’s medical
restrictions. On appeal, Anderson
contends (1) the trial court erred in ruling on pretrial discovery and summary
adjudication issues, and (2) the judgment after trial is not supported by
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Facts
title="">
CHW
owns and operates medical facilities in California and other states, including
Mercy Medical Center Redding, a hospital and related facilities located in
Redding, California. Anderson started
working at Mercy as a registered nurse in 1979.
Before being selected as the head nurse in the operating room (OR) in
1986, Anderson worked as a float, scrub, and circulating nurse in the OR. In 1992, Anderson injured her lower back
while lifting a patient. Shortly
thereafter, the position of OR data coordinator was created, and Anderson
successfully applied for it. She had no
clinical nursing duties in that role, other than to occasionally provide
assistance in a relief capacity as both the OR manager and the manager of the
was considered a valued employee and received regular pay increases.
On
February 10, 2005, Anderson experienced medical symptoms—itching all over her
arms and torso—that were consistent with an allergic reaction. She had never had a reaction like that, and
had no idea what caused it. An allergic
reaction to latex was first suggested to her as a possible cause a few days
later. On February 15, Anderson went to
the employee health department to consult with Sandra Anberg. Anberg ordered a “RAST†test for sensitivity
to latex.
Before
the results of the RAST test were known, Anderson was called to a meeting with
the director of perioperative services, Jeanette Smith, and the OR manager,
Kirk Williams. Smith had been hired by
Mercy five months earlier to make the OR department financially more efficient
and attract more physicians to perform surgeries at Mercy. As part of that effort, Smith evaluated
Anderson’s position and duties and found them to be nonessential. Smith informed Anderson the position of OR
data coordinator was being eliminated as part of a reorganization of the
OR. The subject of alternative positions
in the OR was discussed with Anderson, including an open position as a
circulating nurse. At no time during the
meeting was Anderson’s allergic reaction or the possibility the reaction was
caused by latex exposure discussed. The
results of the RAST test were not known until after the meeting between Anderson
and Smith had taken place. Ultimately,
the test came back with a negative result for latex sensitivity, which proved
to be a false negative.
Anderson
applied for and obtained a position as a circulating nurse in the outpatient
surgery center. In her application,
Anderson mentioned her 1992 back injury, but not any possible allergy. When she took the position, Anderson for the
first time joined a nurse’s union—the California Nurses Association (CNA)—which
made her job seniority for any position covered by CNA’s collective bargaining
agreement equivalent to that of a newly hired nurse. Anderson worked her first full day in the
outpatient surgery center without incident on March 1, 2005. She awoke the next morning with severe hives,
and had to be driven to the emergency room by her husband.
Dr.
Ronald Renard, an allergist, examined Anderson on March 8, 2005. His impression was that Anderson’s symptoms
were related to latex sensitivity. This
was confirmed by a positive skin test although other etiologies could not be
ruled out. Anderson returned to work,
but experienced another allergic reaction at work on March 11, 2005, and
went to the emergency room. Anderson
discussed the latex allergy with her supervisor at the outpatient surgery
center who then designated one of the rooms as a latex-free area for Anderson
to perform many of her duties. She
continued to be reactive at work.
Anderson stopped working and filed a workers’ compensation claim
relating to the allergic reactions in March.
Anderson’s
personal physician, Dr. John Moore, issued a series of orders taking her off
work beginning on April 11, 2005, due to an acute anaphylactic reaction to
latex, and ultimately kept her off work through July 2005. She never returned to her outpatient surgery
position. In notes and letters written
during 2005, Drs. Moore and Renard described the extent and severity of
Anderson’s latex allergy and the limitations imposed by it. In summary, her doctors recommended she be
removed from any work environment that was not latex-free. Dr. Renard stated, “As long as this patient
has ongoing exposure to latex, she will continue to have ongoing medical needs,
and her condition may escalate.â€
Anderson’s medical records described subsequent allergic reactions to
latex in non-hospital settings and to such products as automobile tires,
furniture, food products and food packaging.
She was found to be sensitive to foods handled by food workers wearing
latex gloves, and to latex on chairs and seats in movie theaters and
restaurants. Dr. Moore wrote on March
19, 2007, that Anderson “remains unemployable outside of her own home, which
she has purposefully made latex free.â€
Following
Anderson’s initiation of her workers’ compensation claim, Mercy’s human
resources department began making inquiries as to her ability to return to
work, either in outpatient services or in a temporary modified duty position.
it was sufficient for Anderson to work with latex-free gloves or if she needed
to avoid possible airborne latex as well.
A June 29, 2005 letter from Mercy’s employee health department to Dr.
Moore referred to Mercy’s modified duty program, and inquired as to what
modifications would be necessary to work in a modified duty setting. After examining Anderson, Dr. Moore released
her to transitional (modified) work, full-time depending on location, with no
exposure to latex products.
Myrna
Dorman, Mercy’s human resources department’s benefits coordinator, testified
she could not find any temporary modified duty positions for Anderson due to
the severity of her allergy and the specified medical restrictions. She could not be returned to outpatient
surgery, or to any other clinical locations within or outside of the hospital proper
due to possible latex exposure. Anderson
herself feared exposure to latex in Mercy’s main administrative building. Dorman testified the only area she could
think of that might be safe was the building that housed payroll and
accounting, but those departments had no need of any modified duty employees at
that time. Dorman looked for modified
duty positions until October 2005 when Anderson began receiving long-term
disability benefits, at which point she was not allowed to perform modified
duty. While Anderson was free to apply
for other permanent positions, she was never explicitly advised of this
alternative as Dorman assumed Anderson would know the relevant procedures due
to the length of her employment with Mercy.
Between
October 2005 and June 2006, Mercy was waiting to review the results of a
medical examination being performed as part of the workers’ compensation
process to see what types of work Anderson’s doctor would release her to
perform. Meanwhile, Anderson had begun
regularly reviewing Mercy’s online job postings in April 2005. She also reviewed job listings for other
hospitals and healthcare providers placed in the newspapers or on the
Internet. She did not take any jobs as a
registered nurse out of concern for latex exposure. From mid-2005 through most of 2006, Anderson
was putting extensive time and effort, 50 to 60 hours per week, into starting a
business to provide services for geriatric patients. The venture ended when her business partner
closed it in December 2006.
In
June 2006, the physician engaged to evaluate Anderson in the workers’
compensation proceeding submitted his report, concluding she needed “to be
precluded from all exposure to latex.â€
The worker’s compensation insurer’s administrator, Octagon Risk
Services, Inc. (Octagon), thereafter arranged a meeting between Anderson,
Mercy’s benefits coordinator, Myrna Dorman, and a return-to-work specialist
hired by Octagon, Linda Durrer, to discuss whether Anderson could return to her
employment with Mercy in light of the medical report. As explained in Durrer’s letter to the
participants describing the parameters of the meeting, the purpose was to
discuss whether Anderson’s position could be permanently modified to
accommodate her latex allergy, and if not, whether any other available
positions would be suitable. Dorman was
asked to bring the job description for Anderson’s position at outpatient
surgery to the meeting, as well as a listing of all open positions then
available at Mercy.
All
of those present at the meeting agreed Anderson could not perform the essential
functions of a nurse working in outpatient surgery.
list of current job openings, but did not find any positions that were
appropriate, either due to the potential for latex exposure or Anderson’s lack
of qualifications. A letter prepared by
Durrer memorializing the meeting stated, “We reviewed the list of openings and
agreed that no positions currently exist that would be appropriate given Ms.
Anderson’s restrictions. She can not be
in a hospital setting due to her exposure to latex dust. Some work for Mercy Medical Center is handled
off-site, however, no appropriate openings exist off-site. [¶] Ms. Anderson was
invited to apply for any future employment situations, which may come available
if outside the hospital setting.â€
Anderson
did not reply to the letter or apply for any open positions within Mercy. Two weeks after the meeting, Anderson was
removed from Mercy’s employment rolls under a CHW policy that terminates
employment after any absence of six months.
Due to fears of latex exposure, Anderson turned down a number of
positions in the healthcare field. She
testified she did not believe there were any nursing jobs in any clinical
nursing arena, such as a hospital, clinic, or surgery center, she could do
safely in light of her allergy unless it was made “latex free or reasonably
free.â€
Anderson’s
first amended complaint (FAC) alleged (1) five causes of action under the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code,
12900 et seq.; FEHA) for disability and age discrimination, failure to
accommodate disability, retaliation, and failure to prevent discrimination; (2)
wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and (3) intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
Mercy
moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for summary
adjudication. The court denied the
motion for summary judgment, but granted summary adjudication of Anderson’s
causes of action for age discrimination,
retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The remaining causes of action were tried to
the court commencing April 13, 2009.
causes of action, and a judgment in Mercy’s favor was entered on December 24,
2009. Anderson timely appealed from the
judgment.
DISCUSSION
Anderson
contends the trial court erred or abused its discretion by (1) denying her
motions to compel discovery of CHW’s job vacancies in Northern California and
to reopen discovery on job vacancies a month before the scheduled trial date,
(2) granting summary adjudication on her causes of action for retaliation and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (3) adopting a statement of
decision that was unsupported by substantial evidence as to several causes of
action.
The
trial court denied a motion by Anderson to compel discovery of all documents
“relating or pertaining†to (1) all job openings, advertisements, recruitment,
and hiring for registered nurses, off-campus administrative positions, or
“Mercy Home Care†positions in Northern California from February 5, 2005; and
(2) qualifications required, criteria for hiring or transfer, and hiring or
transfer of registered nurses to positions within “Mercy Home Care†during the
same period. Mercy objected to the
document requests as overbroad and unduly burdensome, and responded that it
could not “comply with that demand because the particular items [were] no
longer in [Mercy’s] possession, custody or control.†In its opposition to the motion to compel,
Mercy stated: “Mercy Medical Center
employs hundreds of employees and has a large number of job openings at any
given time. Mercy does not keep a
centralized storage system for outdated job listings, advertisements, or job
requirements for available positions. . . . [¶] . . .
Documents relating to the hiring or reassigning of employees to Mercy Home
Health Care are contained in the personnel file of the individuals assigned to
Mercy Home Health Care.â€
name="_ftnref7" title="">[7]
In
March 2009, one month before trial was scheduled to begin, Anderson moved to
reopen discovery based on new law assertedly established by
(2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 952 (Nadaf-Rahrov)
to the effect that a plaintiff alleging a cause of action for failing to engage
in an interactive process has the burden of proving an effective reasonable
accommodation existed. She sought a
“deposition/document production . . . regarding the existence or
non-existence of job vacancies that Plaintiff could have performed with or
without an accommodation . . . .†The trial court denied the motion.
We
review trial court rulings on discovery issues for abuse of discretion. (Greyhound
Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 383; Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377,
388–389.) “ ‘Discretion is abused
whenever, in its exercise, the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the
circumstances before it being considered.
The burden is on the party complaining to establish an abuse of
discretion, and unless a clear case of abuse is shown and unless there has been
a miscarriage of justice a reviewing court will not substitute its opinion and
thereby divest the trial court of its discretionary power.’ †(Denham
v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566.)
We
note first, the trial court denied Anderson’s motion to compel “without
prejudice to a further motion in the event new evidence concerning defendants’
records or document retention policies is discovered.†In other words, the court denied the motion
not because it believed responsive documents in Mercy’s possession were irrelevant
or outside the scope of permissible discovery, but because it credited Mercy’s
assertion that it did not maintain records responsive to Anderson’s
requests. On appeal, Anderson
acknowledges Mercy did not maintain paper or electronic records of the job
vacancy information she was seeking. She
cites trial testimony by Mercy witnesses confirming that fact. Her sole colorable appellate argument on this
issue—that the documents sought were relevant and discoverable—is simply beside
the point. If the documents did not
exist, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to order Mercy
to produce them.
title="">[8]
Anderson’s
belated request to reopen discovery was also properly denied. It was unrealistic and unreasonable to expect
Mercy to be able to produce a witness knowledgeable about all job vacancies
throughout its hospital system which Anderson “could have performed with or
without an accommodation.†There was no
evidence CHW had a centralized human resources department that kept track of
openings at all of its California facilities, much less that any person with
such comprehensive knowledge of job vacancies would also be sufficiently
familiar with Anderson’s medical condition and restrictions to be able to
cross-check them against all job vacancies.
As Mercy points out, there would have been further, unanswerable
questions as to whether Anderson had more union seniority than all other
qualified applicants for any position that could be identified.
from the discovery sought or she would have had to expand it to cover multiple
deponents and work locations, unavoidably requiring postponement of the trial.
We
are also not convinced the Nadaf-Rahrov
decision changed either Anderson’s discovery needs or the scope of permissible
discovery. The issue of whether a
reasonable accommodation was possible was logically relevant to Anderson’s
claims under section 12940, subdivisions (m) and (n)—and an important
subject of discovery for the plaintiff—no matter which party had the burden of
proving it. Anderson clearly appreciated
that before Nadaf-Rahrov was
decided. Before the cutoff date, her
attorneys had vigorously pursued discovery on the issue of possible
accommodations Mercy could have made on her behalf. That was the objective of the document
requests and motion to compel she had filed in March 2008 (six months before
including Mercy’s home health care director, on possible jobs for which she
might have been considered, and to identify persons within Mercy who were
knowledgeable on this subject. There is
no evidence the trial court ever held such discovery was impermissible, or that
Mercy sought to prevent it on the mistaken grounds that Anderson had no burden
of proving a reasonable accommodation existed.
The “deposition/document production†Anderson sought in her motion to
reopen discovery broke no new ground. It
was merely an attempt, albeit an impracticable one, to resume discovery
Anderson had been pursuing before the discovery cutoff date. Nadaf-Rahrov
was not a sufficient justification for allowing this to continue down to the
eve of trial.
The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Anderson’s discovery
motions.
B. Summary Adjudication
Anderson
contends the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on her
retaliation and intentional infliction of emotional distress causes of
action.
1. Retaliation
Section
12940, subdivision (h) bars employers from discharging or discriminating
against employees because they oppose practices violating FEHA, or file a FEHA
complaint against the employer with the California Department of Fair
Employment and Housing (DFEH), or otherwise participate or testify in a
proceeding brought under FEHA. The court
found Anderson’s “only complaint is the 2006 DFEH complaint and [she] has not
shown a causal link between the complaint and her termination.†The court cited a declaration of Mercy’s
benefits coordinator, Myrna Dorman, stating Mercy did not become aware of
Anderson’s 2006 DFEH complaint until after
Anderson filed her civil complaint in March 2007. Anderson contends her own FAC created a
factual issue on this point apparently because it alleged “the DFEH transmitted
Right to Sue Letters†in response to her DFEH complaint on March 6, 2006, and
Mercy’s attorney attached a copy of the FAC to his declaration in support of
the motion for summary adjudication. She
further contends Mercy admitted it responded to the DFEH complaint in a sworn
interrogatory response.
name="_ftnref10" title="">[10]
As
to the alleged transmission of right-to-sue
letters, the allegations of Anderson’s complaint do not create a triable
issue of material fact. Allegations in a
pleading are not evidence. (
197 Cal.App.4th 133, 154.) The fact
Mercy submitted a copy of the FAC to the court as part of its moving papers for
the court’s convenience does not mean it admitted any fact alleged in the FAC. Even if the allegation made in the FAC is
treated as evidence, the complaint does not in fact assert or prove anything
was transmitted to Mercy on March 6, 2006, or at any other time. With regard to Mercy’s interrogatory
response, the response does not establish when
Mercy learned of Anderson’s DFEH complaint or responded to it. In fact, none of the evidence Anderson
references, either within the trial court record or outside of it, establishes
when Mercy learned of the DFEH complaint.
The trial court properly granted summary adjudication on the retaliation
cause of action.
Distress
The
trial court also found no triable issue as to Anderson’s seventh cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, ruling there was
insufficient evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct on Mercy’s part. On appeal, Anderson asserts the evidence
submitted in opposition to the motion “clearly demonstrated the existence of a
material dispute†as to whether Mercy’s conduct was sufficiently extreme and
outrageous to reach a jury. However, she
does not cite to or specify any of that evidence, or explain why it is
sufficient to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact. Her sole argument is that the trial court had
previously allowed her to amend her complaint to add a prayer for punitive
damages under a statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.14, that
requires plaintiffs seeking punitive damages against a religious corporation to
demonstrate the “existence of sufficient evidence to establish a
damages.†(Rowe v. Superior Court (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1711, 1723.) But the standard of evidence for proving
extreme and outrageous conduct is higher than that for proving malice. (Cochran
v. Cochran (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 488, 496.)
We see no triable issue of fact shown in the record as to whether
Mercy’s conduct was “ ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’ †(Ibid.) Anderson fails to demonstrate the trial court
erred in granting summary adjudication to Mercy on her seventh cause of action.
C. Substantial Evidence Issues
Anderson
contends the statement of decision as to the issues tried to the court is not
supported by substantial evidence.
Where
the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, we “start with the
presumption that the record contains evidence sufficient to support the
judgment; it is the appellant’s burden to demonstrate otherwise.†(Baxter
Healthcare Corp. v. Denton (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 333, 368.) We consider all of the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every
reasonable inference, and resolving conflicts in support of the judgment. (Howard
v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 630.) “It is not our task to weigh conflicts and
disputes in the evidence; that is the province of the trier of fact. Our authority begins and ends with a
determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is
or uncontradicted, in support of the judgment.â€
(Id. at pp. 630–631.)
1. Disability
Discrimination/Wrongful Discharge
Relative
to her causes of action for disability discrimination and wrongful termination,
Anderson claims the following finding of fact in the statement of decision is
not supported by any credible evidence:
“Plaintiff was not discharged because she was allergic to latex. Mercy decided to discharge plaintiff because
she was not released to return to work within six months of her leave.†According to Anderson, Dorman was the
decision maker and she “admitted that the real reason Anderson lost her
employment was ‘because she had a latex allergy.’ †Anderson takes Dorman’s response to one
question out of context, and ignores the actual import of what she said. Dorman testified, consistent with the trial
court’s findings, that Anderson was discharged after the interactive process
meeting when it was clear no position acceptable to Anderson and consistent
with her medical safety could be found for her.
Dorman testified, and the termination notice substantiated, that Mercy
discharged her pursuant to CHW’s policy of terminating employees after any
absence of six months. Although Dorman
stated under cross-examination that Anderson’s latex allergy was the “reasonâ€
for her termination, it was clear from the context she meant it precipitated
the events leading to termination, not that Anderson’s allergy was the reason
Mercy terminated her. Dorman’s testimony
and other substantial evidence presented at trial, if credited, showed Anderson
was discharged because she was unable to perform the essential functions of her
job, no reasonable accommodation could be found for her, and she had been on
leave from her employment for more than six months. “[A]n employer is not liable for discharging
a person with a disability because of the disability if the person is unable to
perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodations.†(Nadaf-Rahrov,
supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 976.)
Anderson
fails to demonstrate the trial court’s statement of decision with respect to
disability discrimination and wrongful termination based on disability was
unsupported by substantial evidence.
2. Failure
to Accommodate
Regarding
her cause of action for failure to accommodate, Anderson asserts the trial
court failed to fully consider evidence Mercy’s accommodation efforts fell
short of the legal standard. Without
discussing any specifics of their testimony, she faults the trial court for not
considering the testimony of her treating physicians and human resources
expert.
Section
12940, subdivision (m) provides it is unlawful for an employer to “fail to make
reasonable accommodation for the known physical . . . disability of
an . . . employee,†as long as it can do so in a manner that does not
“produce undue hardship . . . to its operation.†An employer is liable under this subdivision
“only if the work environment could have been modified or adjusted in a manner
that would have enabled the employee to perform the essential functions of the
job.†(Nadaf-Rahrov, supra,
166 Cal.App.4th at p. 975.)
Substantial evidence supported the following trial court findings on
these issues: (1) Anderson was unable to
perform the duties of a registered nurse in the outpatient surgery center due
to her latex sensitivity; (2) Mercy could not alter the hospital environment to
make it suitable for Anderson’s degree of latex sensitivity, even in nonclinical
settings; and (3) reassignment to a home health or hospice position was
not feasible due to the risk of exposure to latex, the infeasibility of
prescreening the patient residences in which Anderson would be required to
work, and Anderson’s inability to meet the minimum requirements for the
position including recent clinical care experience. Mercy’s hospital administration expert
testified Mercy responded appropriately to Anderson’s medical condition,
conducted an appropriate interactive process, and made reasonable efforts to
determine whether she could function effectively in another position. While some of the relevant evidence was
certainly in conflict, Anderson fails to demonstrate no substantial evidence
supported the trial court’s findings and legal conclusions.
3. Failure
to Engage in Interactive Process
Section
12940, subdivision (n) makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail to engage in
a timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee . . . to
determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to [the
employee’s] request for reasonable accommodation . . . .†To prevail on a claim under this subdivision,
the plaintiff must prove not only that the employer failed to engage in an
appropriate interactive process, but that a reasonable accommodation was
possible. (Nadaf-Rahrov, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 984.)
The
trial court made the following findings, among others, on this cause of
action: (1) Anderson did not request any
specific accommodations or apply for any positions at Mercy; (2) Mercy and its
workers’ compensation administrator timely requested information from
Anderson’s treating physicians as to the extent of her allergy and whether she
could return to work if she avoided latex gloves; (3) Mercy actively sought
modified duty options for Anderson until she began receiving long-term
disability in October 2005; (4) Mercy promptly scheduled an interactive process
meeting once the results of the agreed-upon workers’ compensation evaluative
process were known (finding Anderson’s disability to be permanent and
stationary); and (5) the testimony of Dorman and Durrer and related
documentation concerning the meeting established Mercy met its obligations
under section 12940, subdivision (n). In
addition, the court pointed out Anderson failed to meet her burden of proving a
reasonable accommodation was possible, a prerequisite to relief under this
subdivision.
On
appeal, Anderson quotes at length from Nadaf-Rahrov
and then asserts in conclusory fashion the interactive process broke down in
this case due to Mercy’s “complete lack of compliance with the requisite
process.†She does not address the
court’s findings, the evidence in the record supporting them, or the testimony
of Mercy’s expert about the appropriateness and completeness of the interactive
process that took place, discussed above.
She fails to meet her burden of demonstrating no substantial evidence
supported the court’s determination on this cause of action.
4. Other
Causes of Action
Anderson
offers no separate arguments discussing the court’s findings in favor of Mercy
on her causes of action for (1) failing to investigate or prevent harassment or
discrimination under section 12940, subdivisions (j) and (k); and (2) wrongful
termination in violation of public policy.
She merely asserts in cursory fashion these must be reversed for lack of
substantial evidence based on the “same analysis†as her other claims. We treat these claims as forfeited due to
Anderson’s failure to make any reasoned argument supported by legal authority
in support of them. (
Cal.App.4th 779, 784–785 [“When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts
it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority,
we treat the point as waivedâ€].)
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
_________________________
Margulies,
Acting P.J.
We concur:
_________________________
Dondero, J.
_________________________
Banke, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1]
The following is adapted from the trial court’s statement of decision.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2]
Moore later testified in his deposition, “I think it’s overstated that she was
unemployable outside the home as I read it now . . . .â€
