CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
|
Plaintiff and appellant Susan Friebel, appearing pro se, appeals from the denial of her request that the trial court enter a civil harassment restraining order against Shasta County Sheriff Tom Bosenko. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (d).) We cannot discern from Friebel’s one-page argument on appeal why she believes the trial court erred in denying her request and, in any event, we must affirm summarily, because Friebel has not produced a record sufficient to enable appellate review.
|
|
Plaintiffs University Partners, LLC (University Partners), and its managing member, Thomas Westley, appeal from a judgment of dismissal following orders granting summary adjudication and sustaining demurrers of plaintiffs’ property insurers, Maryland Casualty Company (Maryland), Northern Insurance Company of New York (Northern), and Zurich American Insurance Company (Zurich) (hereafter collectively defendants). Plaintiffs contend issues of fact remain on their claims against defendants stemming from the latter’s refusal to pay the full replacement cost of plaintiffs’ building after it was destroyed by fire. According to plaintiffs, the record contains evidence that, several years before the fire, defendants participated in various misrepresentations made by their agent, defendant Cummins Insurance Agency (Cummins), that induced plaintiff to switch from an insurance policy with guaranteed replacement cost (GRC) coverage (the Fireman’s Fund policy), that would have provided full replacement cost of their building, to policies with only replacement cost (RC) coverage, that provided only partial replacement cost.
|
|
B. W. appeals from an order terminating his parental rights to Rachael W. and freeing Rachael for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)[1] Appellant claims that the trial court failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and asserts that the parent-child/sibling relationship exception precludes Rachael's adoption. (§§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i) &(v).) We affirm. |
|
Aram Mkrtchyan filed an action alleging fraud against Connect to Communications. On July 24, 2012, the trial court sustained Connect to Communication’s demurrer with leave to amend within 10 days. The court stated that the complaint lacked facts to support the fraud allegations. Mkrtchyan was served with the notice of ruling on July 30, 2012.
On September 18, 2012, the court granted Connect to Communication’s motion to dismiss the complaint (to which Mkrtchyan did not file an opposition). The court ruled: “Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint as of the date of this ruling. Plaintiff apparently no longer intends to pursue this action against Defendant or is unable to amend the defects discussed in the Court’s July 24, 2012 ruling on demurrer. Accordingly, the motion is granted.†Mkrtchyan appealed. Connect to Communication did not file a respondent’s brief. |
|
Frances Delacruz appeals from an order committing him to the California Department of State Hospitals (formerly Department of Mental Health) after the trial court determined that he was a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Pen. Code, § 2960 et seq.)[1] Appellant contends that the evidence does not support the finding that his commitment offense was a crime of force or violence or that he received 90 days of treatment within a year prior to his parole or release date. (§ 2962, subds. (c) & (e).) We affirm. (People v. Stevens (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1401.) |
|
V. O., mother of Manuel T., appeals from a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights, arguing that notice was not given to eight Cherokee tribes as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (a).)[1] We affirm on the ground that the ICWA notice defect was cured after the appeal was filed.
|
|
Defendant and appellant Donta T. Butler appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to two counts of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)),[1] and his admissions that during the offenses he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and, with regard to the attempted murder alleged in the first count, the offense was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of and in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). The trial court sentenced Butler to 30 years 8 months in prison. We affirm.
|
|
Defendant Freddy Sagastume appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury trial. The jury found defendant guilty of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664) in count 1, and assault with a deadly weapon (id., § 245, subd. (a)(1)) in count 2. As to count 1, the jury found true the allegation that defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (id., § 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and the jury found true as to both counts the allegations that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim (id., § 12022.7, subd. (a)).
On count 1, defendant was sentenced to 11 years in state prison: the midterm of seven years, plus one year for personal use of a knife and three years for infliction of great bodily injury. A sentence as to count 2 was imposed and stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. On appeal, defendant contends that the pretrial identification process was impermissibly suggestive. We affirm. |
|
Defendant Freddy Sagastume appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury trial. The jury found defendant guilty of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664) in count 1, and assault with a deadly weapon (id., § 245, subd. (a)(1)) in count 2. As to count 1, the jury found true the allegation that defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (id., § 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and the jury found true as to both counts the allegations that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim (id., § 12022.7, subd. (a)).
On count 1, defendant was sentenced to 11 years in state prison: the midterm of seven years, plus one year for personal use of a knife and three years for infliction of great bodily injury. A sentence as to count 2 was imposed and stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. On appeal, defendant contends that the pretrial identification process was impermissibly suggestive. We affirm. |
|
Defendant and appellant, Rickey Spencer Huff, appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1))[1] and his admission that he previously had been convicted of robbery (§ 211) within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The trial court sentenced Huff to six years in prison and awarded him a total of 87 days of presentence custody credit. On August 23, 2010 and again on May 30, 2012, Huff filed petitions in the trial court in which he asserted he was entitled to additional presentence credits. The trial court denied the petitions. We affirm (§ 1237.1; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4)(B)).
|
|
Defendant Lam Vi Quan appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of assault on a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (c)), personally causing great bodily injury (id., § 12022.7, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced him to eight years in state prison. On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s response to a note from one of the jurors indicating that the juror saw defendant make a throat-slitting motion toward one of the prosecution witnesses. Defendant also claims error in the trial court’s refusal to instruct on self-defense/defense of others. We affirm. |
|
Randy Campbell appeals from the judgment entered in favor of Marianne Partridge, respondent, after a court trial. The judgment requires appellant to sell to respondent all of his shares in the Santa Barbara Independent, Inc. (the Independent). The judgment was based on the trial court's finding that respondent accepted appellant's offer to sell his shares before he withdrew it. Appellant contends that, as a matter of law, respondent did not validly accept his offer. Appellant further contends that, if a valid acceptance occurred, respondent was not entitled to specific performance of the contract because she failed to prove the amount of a "true-up" adjustment to the purchase price. We remand the matter to the trial court with directions to determine the true-up adjustment and to recalculate the purchase price in light of this adjustment. In all other respects, we affirm.
|
Actions
Category Stats
Listings: 77266
Regular: 77266
Last listing added: 06:28:2023
Regular: 77266
Last listing added: 06:28:2023
