CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant Miguel Cuevas Sanchez of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on three years formal probation.
Defendant appeals, in part, because after the court stated the conditions of probation in open court, the minute order added several additional provisions. Relying on cases dealing with pronouncement of sentences, he argues the additions should be struck. But “though the older rule is to give preference to the reporter’s transcript where there is a conflict, the modern rule is that if the clerk’s and reporter’s transcript cannot be reconciled, the part of the record that will prevail is the one that should be given greater credence in the circumstances of the case. [Citations.] (In People v. Thrash (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 898 [146 Cal.Rptr. 32], the appellate court held that probation conditions ‘need not be spelled out in great detail in court as long as the defendant knows what they are; to require recital in court is unnecessary in view of the fact the probation conditions are spelled out in detail on the probation order . . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1346.) Here defendant had access to the minute order and thus notice of the conditions was sufficient. If he contends the minute order does not reflect the intentions of the trial court, he could have sought correction in that court and failed to do so. Defendant was placed on probation under Proposition 36 (Pen. Code, §§ 1210, 1210.1) and the conditions imposed are within the spirit of that proposition. (Pen. Code, § 1210.1, subd. (a).)
In addition, defendant complains that several of the conditions of his probation are vague or overbroad. We will review each of these.

The juvenile court found J.L. was a person described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 602[1] after he admitted allegations charging him with one count of residential burglary, with a nonaccomplice present during the burglary. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a), 667.5, subd. (c)(21).) Though J.L. was eligible for deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) pursuant to section 790 et seq., the juvenile court found J.L. “unsuitable” for DEJ. J.L. appeals from the dispositional order challenging the finding he was not suitable for DEJ. We affirm.

A jury convicted Luis Alberto Pineda of 17 counts of committing a lewd act on a child under 14 years old (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); all statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated), two counts of forced sodomy (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)), two counts of sodomy of a child under 16 years old (§ 286, subd. (b)(2)), two counts of oral copulation of a child under 16 years old (§ 288a, subd. (b)(2)), two counts of committing a lewd act on a child at least 10 years younger (§ 288, subd. (c)(1)), one count of oral copulation or sexual penetration of a child under 10 years old (§ 288.7, subd. (b)), one count of attempted lewd act on a child (§ 288, subd. (a), § 664, subd. (a)), and three counts of misdemeanor assault (§ 240). As to counts 1-2, 5-11, 14-18 and 26-30, the jury found that appellant committed crimes against multiple victims (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (e)). As to counts 2, 6-7 and 14-15, the jury found that substantial sexual contact occurred with the victims (§ 1203.66, subd. (a)(8)).
Pineda contends the trial court abused its discretion by excusing an ill juror during trial and replacing her with an alternate. The parties agree the court’s sentencing minutes should be amended to reflect that Pineda was found guilty by the jury of counts 27 through 29. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the judgment and direct the trial court to correct its minutes.

Plaintiff Lourdes C. Alo stopped paying her mortgage once she allegedly learned that her appraiser and bank employees had lied to her regarding the value of the subject property. She tried three times to plead a cognizable cause of action against the two banks involved (the remaining defendants are not parties to this appeal), and failed on each occasion. The bank defendants’ demurrers were eventually sustained without further leave to amend. We subsequently stayed foreclosure proceedings pursuant to a writ of supersedeas to retain the status quo while this appeal was pending. We conclude that Alo has failed to plead a proper cause of action against either defendant, and we therefore affirm the judgment, dismiss the petition and dissolve the stay.

In 2012, a jury convicted Garrett Edward Taplin of sexual penetration by a foreign object by force (Pen. Code, §§ 289, subd. (a), 801.1, subd. (a),[1] count 1); assault with intent to commit rape (§ 220, subd. (a), count 2); and child annoyance with a prior sex conviction (§ 647.6, subds. (a)(1) & (c)(2), count 3). At a bifurcated bench trial later that day, the trial court found true Taplin suffered a prior serious and violent felony conviction (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (d), & (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)(1), 667.71,
subd. (a)), and suffered two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). At a sentencing hearing the following month, the trial court denied Taplin’s motion to strike his prior conviction pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 529-530. The trial court sentenced Taplin to 67 years to life in prison as follows: count 2-the upper term of six years doubled to 12 years plus a consecutive term of five years for the prison prior; and count 1-25 years to life doubled to 50 years to life. The court stayed the sentence on count 3 pursuant to section 654.
On appeal, Taplin argues his prosecution for counts 2 and 3 was barred by section 654’s proscription against multiple prosecutions, there was insufficient evidence to support count 2, and the trial court erred in instructing the jury with a modified version of CALCRIM No. 1191. Finding none of the contentions have merit, we affirm the judgment.
FACTS
In March 1999, 14-year-old Irene A. (Irene) was leaving a party when she stopped to talk with Taplin, who was standing behind the fence of an adjacent yard. At some point during the conversation, Taplin reached through the fence, touched Irene’s breast, stated, “‘I’m going to fuck you, bitch. I’m going to fuck you[,]’” digitally penetrated her vagina, and had her touch his erect penis. Irene returned to the party and told a friend what had happened. A teacher helped Irene report the incident to the police.

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Plaintiffs Joel and Rose Spinosi appeal from the court’s November 15, 2012 order denying their application for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the foreclosure sale of their home.[1] The trial court concluded plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on the merits. We agree. Accordingly, we affirm the order.

A jury found defendant Dimas Rene Culajay guilty of four counts of lewd act on a child under 14 years of age (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)), involving three different victims, and found the offenses involved multiple victims (Pen. Code, § 667.61, subd. (b), former subd. (e)(5); Stats. 1998, ch. 936, § 9).[1] The court sentenced defendant to two consecutive terms of 15 years to life. Defendant contends the trial court violated his right to confrontation and to present a defense, erred in instructing the jury, and abused its discretion in imposing a consecutive sentence. We affirm.

A jury found defendant Merijildo Garza guilty of two counts of committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under 14 years old, and one count of sexually penetrating a child 10 years of age or younger. The jury also found true several enhancement allegations.
We affirm. The trial court did not err by admitting evidence, under Evidence Code section 1108, showing that Garza previously committed other uncharged sexual offenses. The court properly exercised its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 before admitting that evidence. The court did not abuse its discretion by admitting expert testimony on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. In his opening brief, Garza argues that we must direct the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the correct statutory violation for which he was convicted in count 2 of the information. During the pendency of this appeal, an amended abstract of judgment, citing the correct statute for count 2, was filed.

Defendant Nanette Ann Packard was sentenced to state prison for life without the possibility of parole after a jury convicted her of first degree murder for a 1994 homicide and found she committed the crime for financial gain. Defendant asserts claims of undue delay in charging her with the murder, ineffective assistance of counsel, and errors in the admission of evidence at trial. Finding no prejudicial error, we affirm the judgment.

This appeal concerns two motions for sanctions made under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7.[1] The underlying lawsuit concerns Genutec Business Solutions’ (Genutec’s) breach of fiduciary duty claims against its former attorneys, accountants, and board of directors, including Michael Taus and Lawnae Hunter. Believing there was no basis for a lawsuit against them, Taus and Hunter filed a section 128.7 motion for sanctions (hereafter referred to in this opinion as the Taus/Hunter sanctions motion). They sought $1,098,046.03 against Genutec and its counsel, namely, (1) the Law Offices of Candice Bryner (the Bryner Firm), and (2) Shulman, Hodges & Bastian (the Shulman Firm). In response, Genutec filed a counter motion for sanctions permitted by
section 128.7, subdivision (h), on the grounds the Taus/Hunter sanctions motion was filed primarily for an improper purpose (hereafter the counter motion). The counter motion sought $51,990 against Taus, Hunter, and their counsel, Eisner, Kahan & Gorry (the Eisner Firm).[2]
The court denied the Taus/Hunter motion for sanctions. It awarded the Bryner Firm $45,000 for attorney fees and costs incurred to successfully oppose this motion. The court granted the counter motion, awarding Genutec sanctions of $50,467.50.
On appeal, Taus, Hunter, and the Eisner Firm make the following arguments: (1) the court should have granted their motion for sanctions; and (2) it was an abuse of discretion to award sanctions to the Lee Firm, the Bryner Firm, and the
Shulman Firm because they were all self-represented litigants. Genutec filed a cross-appeal, arguing the trial court erred in denying its request for attorney fees incurred in defending the Taus/Hunter sanctions motion. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s orders.

The Mabury Ranch Homeowners Association (the Association) successfully sued a homeowner regarding maintenance of his property and related issues. Due to an untimely notice of appeal, the only issue currently before this court is whether the trial court properly granted the Association $160,000 in attorney fees and $7,213 in costs as a prevailing party. Because Peterson has not established the trial court committed error, we affirm.
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Melody M. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] as to her three-year-old son, Christopher. Melody contends the juvenile court erred in declining to apply the exception to adoption contained in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), hereafter referred to as the “beneficial relationship” exception. We affirm.

Appellant Alejandro S. (father) appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights pursuant to Family Code section 7822.[1] He contends there was no substantial evidence that he left his daughter Angelina S. with her mother with the intent to abandon her.
We disagree and affirm the court’s order.

Vanessa L. appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order. She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the juvenile court ordered her nine-year-old son, Thomas, detained and subsequently removed from her physical custody at the dispositional hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.)[1] Vanessa contends the dispositional orders must be reversed because there was no evidence Thomas was at risk in her care and there were less restrictive alternatives to removal. We affirm the juvenile court’s orders.