CA Unpub Decisions

Paula F. challenges jurisdictional and dispositional orders made by the juvenile court in this dependency proceeding in which her infant daughter, Allison F., was declared a dependent of the court. We find substantial evidence of risk to the child to support jurisdiction and no abuse of discretion in the disposition order.

Roberta J. (Mother) has four children, A.S. (born 2002), Mario, (born 2003) Ar. J. (born 2006) and Au. J.(born 2009). All of them had different fathers, and none of the fathers are parties to this appeal. Mario lives out of state with his father and was not a party to these proceedings. Mother appeals from an order of the juvenile court on May 8, 2013, terminating her parental rights as to Ar. J. and Au. J. We affirm the order of the juvenile court.

Raymond Angel Fuamatu (appellant) appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his conviction for second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211).[1] The jury found true the allegation that appellant personally used a firearm during the commission of the offense (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced appellant to 12 years in state prison comprised of the low term of two years for the robbery, plus 10 years for the firearm allegation.
We appointed counsel to represent him on appeal. After examination of the record, counsel filed an “Opening Brief” in which no issues were raised. On September 9, 2013, we advised appellant that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues which he wished us to consider. No response has been received to date.
Appellant’s conviction was based upon the following facts: On October 22, 2012, at approximately 7:40 p.m. Juan Garcia was walking towards Firestone Boulevard in the City of Los Angeles. He was approached by two men on bicycles—one to his left side and the other in front of him. Appellant, who wore a red sweatshirt with a hood asked Garcia where he was from. Garcia responded that he was from the City of Cudahy. Appellant pointed a gun at Garcia’s right side and said “I’m sorry. This is my job. Give me everything you have.” Garcia handed appellant his cell phone and wallet containing approximately $80. Appellant and his companion rode away on bicycles towards Firestone Boulevard. Garcia called 9-1-1 from a nearby laundromat.

Charles Wesley Jackson was convicted by plea of possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) and appeals from the order granting him probation after the trial court found he was not amenable to Proposition 36 drug treatment (Pen. Code, § 1210.1, subd. (b)(5)). We affirm.
Proposition 36
Proposition 36 mandates probation and drug treatment, instead of incarceration, for persons convicted of a "nonviolent drug possession offense. . . ." (Pen. Code, § 1210.1, subd. (a).)[1] Subdivision (b) of section 1210.1, however, excludes five categories of defendants from Proposition 36 drug treatment. Of relevance is subdivision (b)(4) which excludes "[a]ny defendant who refuses drug treatment as a condition of probation." Subdivision (b)(5) excludes "any defendant who (A) has two separate convictions for nonviolent drug possession offenses, (B) has participated in two separate courses of drug treatment pursuant to subdivision (a), and (C) is found by the court, by clear and convincing evidence, to be unamenable to any and all forms of available drug treatment. . ."

In this appeal from an order imposing sanctions (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (h)),[1] plaintiff and appellant Ana Salazar contends that because the court allowed the deposition of respondent David Lee to be taken, the court denied Lee’s motion for a protective order, which eliminated any basis for sanctions. We conclude, however, that because the court granted Lee’s motion for a protective order, the court was authorized to impose sanctions.

Defendant and appellant Juan Hilario Osuna (defendant) was convicted of first degree residential burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459[1]). On appeal, appointed counsel for defendant filed an opening brief in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 requesting that this court conduct an independent review of the record to determine if there are any issues which if resolved in defendant’s favor would require reversal or modification of the judgment. On September 12, 2013, we gave notice to defendant that his counsel had failed to find any arguable issues and that defendant had 30 days within which to submit by brief or letter any grounds of appeal, contentions, or arguments he wished this court to consider. Defendant filed a letter brief in which he contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We have reviewed the record and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Rogelio Nava appeals from the judgment entered following the trial court’s finding that he violated the terms and conditions of probation. He contends the court erred by ordering him to pay restitution to a victim and failing to either impose or strike a sentence for an enhancement. The Attorney General agrees with defendant and also requests that we order the abstract of judgment amended to reflect the imposition of mandatory fines. We will vacate the restitution order and direct the superior court to correct the abstract of judgment.

Defendant and appellant, Richard Deon Jackson, appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial which resulted in his conviction of two counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211),[1] during the commission of which he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced Jackson to 13 years in prison. We affirm.

Appellants Jeremiah Baskin and Traveon Hill were convicted of attempted second degree robbery and second degree commercial burglary. Appellants were charged with the murder of accomplice Brandon Lincoln under the provocative act doctrine, but the jury found them not guilty of that charge. The jury found true the allegations that the burglary and attempted robbery were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang within the meaning of Penal Code section 186.22, subd. (b)(1).[1] Appellant Hill admitted that he had suffered two prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law and section 667, subdivision (a), and that he had served a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). Appellant Baskin admitted that he had suffered a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law and section 667, subdivision (a), and that he had served a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced appellant Baskin to a total term of 16 years in state prison and appellant Hill to a term of 30 years to life in state prison.
Appellants appeal, contending the trial court: made numerous improper and prejudicial remarks during jury voir dire; erred in instructing the jury on consciousness of guilt; and in denying the joint defense motion to bifurcate the trial on the gang enhancements. Appellants further contend there is insufficient evidence to support the true finding on the gang enhancements. Appellants also contend the prosecutor committed misconduct. Additionally appellants contend the trial court abused its discretion in denying their motions to strike their prior convictions for sentencing purposes. We affirm the judgments of conviction.

Defendant Rafael Berumen appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of one count of murder in the first degree (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),[1] and found to be true the firearm allegations (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)). The jury did not reach a finding on the alleged special circumstance that the murder was committed by means of lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)).
Appellant was sentenced to a total term of 50 years to life in state prison based on a term of 25 years to life for his murder conviction and a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d), firearm enhancement.
Appellant contends that the trial court prejudicially erred when it instructed the jury that, as a matter of law, smirking or grinning is inadequate provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter under a heat of passion theory. Although the instruction may have been erroneous, any error was not prejudicial. We affirm.

Plaintiff, Wilmington Trust, N.A., appeals from an order granting summary adjudication in favor of defendants, William M. Caldwell V, Blake Caldwell and Tyler Caldwell. On September 6, 2011, plaintiff was appointed administrator with will annexed of the estate of William M. Caldwell IV (“William IV”[1]). Defendants are the living descendants of William IV. On May 31, 2012, defendants moved for summary adjudication. Defendants argued William IV’s share of the Caldwell Living Trust (“the trust”) belongs to his subtrust, not his probate estate. On January 31, 2013, the probate court granted defendants’ motion. Plaintiff argues the probate court erred. Plaintiff asserts William IV had exercised his right to remove assets from the trust, which thereby belong to his estate. We affirm the order.

Appellants Vladimir and Lisa Syelsky sued Jeffrey Edwards, alleging breach of a promissory note, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud. After Edwards failed to answer the complaint, the Syelskys obtained entry of default and, subsequently, a default judgment. Edwards moved to set aside both the default and the default judgment. Over the Syelskys’s objections, the trial court did so. We reverse, and remand for further proceedings.

Noah K. appeals from an order of the juvenile court declaring him a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 after the court found true an allegation that he committed second degree robbery, a felony, in violation of Penal Code section 211. His appointed counsel found no arguable issues for appeal. We find no basis for reversal and affirm.

Katie Baker appeals from the summary judgment entered in favor of respondent Prudential Overall Supply, Inc. (Prudential) on her first amended complaint for wrongful termination. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473c.)[1] Appellant asserts that the judgment should be set aside based on the inexcusable neglect of her trial attorney. (§ 473, subd. (b).) We affirm.
Facts
Appellant sued Prudential for wrongful termination, breach of contract, negligence, and unfair business practices (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200) after she was terminated as a sales representative in 2009. The first amended complaint alleges that appellant was hired in 2008 and received good job reviews until her manager, Chuck Bradley, "forged" a document extending her probation period. Appellant was terminated on May 11, 2009, allegedly without cause and in violation of the employment agreement.
Prudential filed a summary judgment motion based on requests for admissions (RFAs) that were deemed admitted when appellant failed to respond to discovery. Appellant's trial attorney, Michael Fox, blamed the discovery default on a contract attorney who failed to appear at a discovery hearing. Appellant signed verified RFA responses that were lodged with the trial court.
The trial court, over Prudential's objection, considered the RFA responses. The court also reviewed the employment agreement ("Summary of Employment Offer") which is attached to the First Amended Complaint, finding that it is an at-will employment contract. Based on the verified RFA responses, the trial court ruled there were no triable material facts that Prudential breached the employment agreement or that appellant was wrongfully terminated.