P. v. Dixon
Filed 1/29/14 P. v. Dixon CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a),
prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified
for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
PARIS DIXON, III,
Defendant and Appellant.
B250016
(Los
Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA409103)
APPEAL from a
judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard S. Kemalyan, Judge.
Affirmed.
California
Appellate Project, Jonathan B. Steiner, Executive Director and Richard B.
Lennon, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No
appearance for Respondent.
In the underlying action, appellant pleaded nolo contendere to one count of making
criminal threats pursuant to a plea agreement, and was sentenced in accordance
with the terms of that agreement. His court-appointed counsel
has filed an opening brief raising no issues. Following our independent examination of the entire record pursuant
to People
v. Wende (1979)
25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), we
conclude that no arguable issues exist. Accordingly, we affirm.
PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
On June 13, 2013, an amended information
was filed, charging appellant Paris Dixon, III, in count one with
cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), in count two with making
criminal threats (Pen.
Code, § 422, subd. (a)), in count three with kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207,
subd. (a)), and in count four with evading a police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2,
subd. (a)). Accompanying the charges
were allegations that appellant had suffered a strike under the Three Strikes Law
(Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), and seven
prior felony convictions for which he had served a prison term (Pen. Code, §
667.5, subd. (b)). In addition,
accompanying counts two and three was an allegation that he had suffered a
prior felony conviction constituting a serious felony (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)(1)).
On June 19, 2013, after appellant’s jury
trial had begun, he entered into a plea agreement under which he was to be
given a total term of 10 years in state prison.
In accordance with the agreement, appellant pleaded nolo contendere to
the charge of making criminal threats (count two), and admitted the prior
strike under the Three Strikes law, as well as four prior felony convictions
for which he had served prison terms. As
provided in the plea agreement, the trial court imposed the three-year upper
term for making criminal threats, doubled that term pursuant to the Three
Strikes law, and added four one-year enhancements for the prior prison terms
(Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). The
remaining counts in the amended information were dismissed. This appeal followed.
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In the early morning hours of March 17, 2013, appellant attended a night club in Inglewood with Ana P., with whom
appellant lived. Later, California
Highway Patrol and Los Angeles Police Department officers responded to a call
regarding an altercation near a freeway off ramp, and tried to stop an SUV driven
by appellant. At the officers’
direction, appellant pulled his SUV over, but drove away when they walked
toward it. When the officers finally stopped
the SUV, appellant fled on foot.
Inside the SUV, the
officers discovered Ana, whose face displayed injuries. She told the officers that after she and
appellant left the nightclub, they argued, and she tried to walk away. Appellant followed Ana in his SUV, parked it,
and struck her so hard that she lost consciousness. When she regained consciousness, she found
herself inside the SUV, where appellant choked her and said, “I am going to
kill you.†Appellant then drove the SUV
onto a freeway. As he approached a
freeway off ramp, Ana attempted to flee from the SUV, but he dragged her back
inside it.
After
an examination of the record, appellant’s court-appointed counsel filed an
opening brief raising no issues and requested this court to review the record
independently pursuant to Wende. In addition, counsel advised appellant of his
right to submit by supplemental brief any contentions or argument he wished the
court to consider. Appellant has
presented no such brief.
Appellant’s
plea of nolo contendere restricts the scope of the appeal before us. The notice of appeal seeks to challenge the
validity of the plea, and also asserts that the appeal “is based on the
sentence or other matters that occurred after the plea . . . .†In requesting a certificate of probable cause
to attack the validity of the plea, appellant stated that he wished to withdraw
his plea because his 10-year sentence was too harsh, in view of the evidence
likely to be presented at trial.
Because
the trial court denied appellant’s request for a certificate of probable cause,
his appeal is limited to “postplea claims, including sentencing issues,
validity of the plea.†(
374, 379.) Under this principle, “‘“[w]hen
a guilty [or nolo contendere] plea is entered in exchange for specified
benefits such as the dismissal of other counts or an agreed maximum punishment,
both parties, including the state, must abide by the terms of the agreement.â€â€™â€
(Id.
at p. 383, quoting People v. Panizzon
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80.) As appellant’s
sentence was imposed in accordance with the plea agreement, our review of the record
discloses no potential error within the scope of the appeal. We therefore conclude that appellant’s
counsel has fully complied with his responsibilities and that no arguable
issues exist. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d
at p. 441.)
The
judgment is affirmed.
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MANELLA,
J.
We concur:
EPSTEIN, P. J.
WILLHITE, J.
the trial had not been completed when appellant entered into the plea
agreement, the facts are based on the evidence presented at the preliminary
hearing.
