In re H.F.
Filed 1/31/14 In re H.F.
CA2/5
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a),
prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified
for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re H.F. et
al., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
B249602
(Los
Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. CK96604)
LOS ANGELES
COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
S.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL
from orders of the Superior Court of the
County of Los Angeles, Stephen Marpet, Referee. Affirmed.
Law
Office of John M. Kennedy, John M. Kennedy for Defendant and Appellant.
John
F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M.
Owens, Assistant County Counsel, Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County Counsel for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant S.C.
(mother) is the mother of three
1995, S.F. born in 1998, and B.C., born in 2011. Her two older children have the same father,
J.F., and B.C.’s father is M.Z.
Mother
appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and disposition order
removing custody of B.C. from
her. According to mother, there was
insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional findings based on her conduct
and insufficient evidence to support the order removing B.C. from her.
We
hold that because the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings based on the
conduct of the children’s fathers are not challenged on appeal, they are
sufficient to support the juvenile court’s assertion of dependency court jurisdiction
over the children, and therefore we need not address mother’s challenge to the
jurisdictional findings as to her. We
further hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the disposition order
removing B.C. from mother. We therefore
affirm the jurisdictional findings and disposition order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On
September 17,
2012, mother’s family was referred to the
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) for an immediate response because
they were homeless. On September 26, 2012, DCFS received another referral concerning the family alleging that
mother was abusing drugs and had threatened to commit suicide.
After
almost two months of investigation, DCFS obtained a detention warrant for the
children. S.F. and B.C. were detained
and placed, but H.F. could not be physically detained because his father, J.F.,
had taken him to Texas without notifying mother or DCFS.
On
November 20,
2012, DCFS filed a petition under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 300
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] alleging that mother had
placed the children in a detrimental and endangering situation by having them
sleep outside overnight. DCFS further
alleged that mother had thwarted DCFS’s remedial efforts to resolve the
family’s problems by failing to call shelters or follow through on
H.F. and S.F., was unwilling and unable to provide care for and supervision of his
two children.
At
the November 20, 2012, detention hearing, the juvenile court found that DCFS
had made a prima facie showing under section 300 that H.F., S.F., and B.C. were
children as defined under section 300.
The juvenile court detained S.F. and B.C. and released H.F. to his
father in Texas. S.F. was placed with
friends of the family and B.C. was placed in foster care. The juvenile
court ordered “HUB†medical services for the children, appropriate
reunification services for mother, and monitored visits with mother twice
weekly.
On
December 11,
2012, DCFS filed a first amended
petition. The amended petition added
counts alleging that mother and B.C.’s father, M.Z., had a history of domestic
violence, including an incident in December 2010 during which M.Z. physically
assaulted mother and S.F. was physically injured trying to protect mother. The amended petition further alleged that
M.Z. had an unresolved history of criminal convictions, including drug
possession and violent criminal acts.
The amended petition also alleged that M.Z. had a substance abuse
history, including recent use of methamphetamine and marijuana. According to the amended petition, mother had
permitted M.Z. to have unlimited access to the children despite her concerns about
his violent history.
On
December 11,
2012, a DCFS dependency investigator filed
a jurisdiction/disposition report in the juvenile court. The investigator reported, inter alia, that
M.Z. had an extensive criminal history dating back to 1985 that included
multiple convictions for possession of controlled substances, as well as
convictions for petty theft, battery, inflicting corporal injury on a spouse,
burglary, assault with a deadly weapon, inflicting injury on a child,
possession or manufacture of a dangerous weapon, vandalism, falsely identifying
himself to a police officer, making criminal threats, resisting arrest, battery
of a spouse, probation violations, felon in possession of a firearm, vehicle
theft, driving under the influence, and the December 2010 battery of mother.
The
investigator further reported that during his interview with S.F., she told him
that “there were many domestic violence incidents between [M.Z.] and her
mother.†S.F. observed M.Z. threaten
mother by “putting his fist close to her face.â€
M.Z. “‘would threaten to shoot [S.F.’s] mother and [S.F. and her family]
knew he had a gun, so [they] felt that he would do it.’†M.Z. would make copies of mother’s keys “so
he could always get into the [family’s] apartment . . . .†He also constantly accused mother of sleeping
with other men and would lock mother in her room. On one occasion, mother and M.Z. argued, and
then mother told the children “to pack up all [their] stuff.†While the children packed, M.Z. grabbed B.C.,
who was in mother’s arms, causing B.C.’s head to “hit the wall.†S.F. also described the December 2010,
domestic violence incident between mother and M.Z. during which S.F. was
injured as follows: “‘One time, [M.Z.]
had his hands around . . . mother’s throat and [S.F.] jumped on his back to get
him to let go, and he threw [her] off and pushed [her] down to the ground. [M.Z.] acted like he was going to hit [S.F.],
but [she] slapped him and he backed away.’†S.F. was the only family member who would
“stand up to†M.Z.; her two brothers “knew what was going on but didn’t want to
get involved.â€
According
to S.F., she did not “‘want to go back with [her] mom because [she] had been
hurt emotionally and [did not] want to go back to that situation. [She had] a pretty strong feeling that when
[M.Z. was released from] jail, [mother would] go back to him.’â€
When
the investigator interviewed mother, she explained that M.Z. began abusing her
a couple of months after they began dating. Mother said that M.Z. would hit her and
threaten her with more violence. He
threatened mother in front of the children.
According to mother, she and M.Z. would fight constantly over his
continuous accusations that she was sleeping with other men. Mother knew M.Z. had a criminal history
because he had just been released from prison when they met. M.Z. served 10 months for the domestic
violence against mother in December 2010.
She learned she was pregnant with B.C. during that 10-month
incarceration. Mother said the criminal
court issued a “no-contact†order against M.Z., but he nevertheless found her, and
she moved in with him between December 2011 and February 2012.
The
investigator attached, inter alia, copies of the police report for the December
2010 domestic violence incident between mother and M.Z., as well as a Sheriff’s
Department report of a June 11, 2012, incident involving M.Z. The June 11, 2012, report stated that a
sheriff’s deputy had been dispatched to an apartment complex based on a report
of two juveniles involved in an assault.
After arriving at the scene, a concerned citizen informed the deputy
that she knew deputies were looking for M.Z, and that he was in the apartment
complex. She believed M.Z. was armed and
dangerous. The deputy returned to his
patrol vehicle, called for back-up, and confirmed that M.Z. was wanted for a
parole violation and was considered armed and dangerous. The deputy also confirmed that M.Z. had an
extensive criminal history with numerous weapons charges, parole violations,
and drug violations. As the deputy
awaited back-up, he saw mother arrive at the scene and contacted her. Mother, who was carrying a baby, informed the
deputy that she thought M.Z. was hiding in her apartment. Mother gave the deputy permission to search
the apartment, but wanted to remove her children from the apartment first. When mother and the deputy entered the
apartment, the deputy saw M.Z. hiding in the bedroom. The deputy told M.Z. to come out of the
bedroom and show his hands. M.Z. refused
to comply, asking the deputy “to put [his] taser away.†M.Z. produced a knife and threw it on the
floor in front of the deputy claiming it was the only weapon he had. When the deputy refused to holster his taser,
M.Z. said, “‘It’s all over anyway. Just
pull your real gun and do it.’†As
back-up deputies arrived, M.Z. made a “quick move†and the deputy “deployed his
taser†causing M.Z. to fall to the ground.
M.Z. continued to resist as deputies attempted to handcuff him, but he was
ultimately handcuffed.
The
deputies received permission from mother to search her apartment, where they
recovered a knife, a loaded .22 handgun, .22 handgun ammunition, a charred
methamphetamine pipe, and baggies. When
the deputy interviewed M.Z., he told the deputy he was at the apartment to
visit his infant daughter, that the bedroom where the handgun was located
belonged to mother’s teenage son, H.F., and that the weapon did not belong to
M.Z. H.F. told the deputy that the
weapon and the pipe did not belong to him. M.Z. was booked for violation of Penal Code section
29800, subdivision (a)(1), felon in possession of loaded handgun.
In
January and February 2013, DCFS filed second and third amended petitions, the
former pleading adding, inter alia, allegations of domestic violence between
mother and M.Z., including the June 11, 2012, incident during which M.Z. was
arrested, and the latter pleading adding allegations concerning J.F., the
father of H.F. and S.F. On February 21,
2013, DCFS filed an addendum to the jurisdiction/disposition report in which it
advised the juvenile court, inter alia, that mother had leased for one-year a
two-bedroom apartment that was furnished and “adequately kept.†H.F. was residing with mother, and she
informed DCFS that her new address would be kept confidential. DCFS recommended in the addendum that H.F. be
released to mother and that S.F. and B.C. be suitably placed. DCFS also recommended transferring the case
to Riverside County because mother resided there.
At
a February 21, 2013, hearing, the juvenile court detained H.F. from his father
mother. The juvenile court also released
S.F. to mother and granted DCFS discretion to release B.C. to mother on an
extended visit prior to the next hearing.
In
a May 2, 2013, last minute information for the court, DCFS reported that it was
concerned about the safety and well being of H.F. and S.F. in mother’s home
based on the conduct of their adult sibling, Jason, who also resided in the
home. Mother had represented to DCFS
over the prior two months that Jason would move out, but mother allowed him to
remain in the home. On the day before
the last minute information was filed, mother reported that Jason had moved out
of her home.
DCFS
further reported that M.Z. had attempted to contact mother by mail. Mother was participating in the safe at home
program through the victims of violent crimes program. But DCFS was concerned about releasing B.C.
to mother because “there was no verification from a professional therapist
addressing any progress that the family [had] made in alleviating the issues
that [had] brought them to the attention of DCFS and the [juvenile court].†Mother had just started individual
counseling, but had not made much progress. Moreover, H.F. and S.F. had not started
individual counseling, and the family had yet to participate in conjoint
therapy. Mother had participated in a
10-session cooperative parenting course.
In
a May 7, 2013, last minute information for the court, DCFS reported that although
mother had leased an apartment and was working as a housekeeper, she had made
“minimal progress†in recommended programs and services. In addition to completing a 10-session
parenting program, mother had attended three sessions of individual therapy
through the victims of violent crime program.
DCFS had recommended individual and conjoint family therapy for H.F. and
S.F., but mother had refused DCFS’s referral, choosing instead to wait for
funding from the victims of violent crime program. Mother did not want any services offered
through DCFS. DCFS concluded that
because the family had not had enough time in a “peaceful home†environment, it
could not recommend returning B.C. to mother’s home. DCFS recommended that the juvenile court order
the family to participate in individual counseling and conjoint family
counseling and order mother to complete a domestic violence program prior to
releasing B.C. to mother.
At
the May 8, 2013, jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the juvenile court sustained
the third amended petition in its entirety, including the allegations that
mother failed to protect the children from M.Z.’s domestic violence, criminal
background, and drug use, as well as the allegations against M.Z. based on his
violent criminal history and drug use and the allegations against J.F., the father
of H.F. and S.F., based on his failure to provide support for his children.
The juvenile
court then held a hearing on disposition.
The maternal grandmother testified on behalf of mother as follows. The maternal grandmother monitored mother’s
visits with B.C. and found them to be appropriate. She had no concerns about anything mother had
done during the visits. Mother worked
for the maternal grandmother’s housekeeping business. The maternal grandmother had also observed
mother parenting H.F. and S.F. and had no concerns about mother’s parenting.
Mother
testified on her own behalf as follows.
She had completed a 10-week parenting program and had begun individual
therapy. She was not enrolled in a
domestic violence program, but was willing to enroll in a program in Riverside County. Through the victims of violent crimes program,
she had relocated with a confidential address. To her knowledge, M.Z. did not know her new
address. Mother and her older children
were not in conjoint therapy, but she had applied and was waiting
approval. Mother had leased an apartment
and was working at least five days a week.
She was financially able to provide for her children. Her adult son Jason no longer lived in the
apartment. Mother believed H.F. and S.F.
would benefit from therapy.
If
M.Z. located mother, she would not allow him in her apartment and would
immediately contact the authorities.
Mother did not have a civil restraining order against M.Z., but the
criminal court had issued a no contact order.
If
B.C. was returned to mother, she would have the resources to care for her. Mother would be able to keep B.C. safe from
harm. Mother wanted B.C. returned to
her.
A
DCFS dependency investigator confirmed that mother had not been provided
referrals in Riverside County because she had previously refused to accept all
services from DCFS. Mother had also
refused services from the Department of Mental Health. In addition, mother had refused to sign an
authorization for a regional center assessment of B.C. The investigator did not recommend that H.F.
or S.F. be placed with mother, and he believed B.C. would be at risk if she was
placed with mother.
After
argument, the juvenile court made the following findings: “The Court is going to find that the care,
custody, control of the children are taken from their fathers, and [H.F.] and
[S.F.] are ordered home of parent mother, that [B.C.] is detained from mother
and father as the court finds by clear and convincing evidence there’s a
substantial danger to the minor’s physical and mental well-being. There is no reasonable means to protect
without removal, and reasonable efforts have been made to prevent removal. [¶]
[B.C.] is ordered suitably placed.
[¶] . . . [¶] The Court: All you need to do is reread the police
report of 2010, [mother], and realize the significance of what’s gone on in
your life that caused the chaos that your children are faced with. That is dramatic. It’s intense.
I mean, [S.F.] was, what, 12 at the time, saw what was going on between
you and [M.Z.], jumped in to try to save you.
I don’t know if she got injured or not, but the fact remains that she’s
visualized all this going on and this is just one time. It’s significant. It’s got to sink in at some point for you to
take control of your life and not have this go on so that these children can
see some sanity. That’s why [H.F.] wants
to get out. It’s obvious.â€
DISCUSSION
of Review
“‘In
reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
jurisdictional findings and disposition,
we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports
them. “In making this determination, we
draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and
orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and
credibility are the province of the trial court.†(In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th
183, 193 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 315].) “We do
not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine
if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court. [Citations.] ‘“[T]he [appellate] court must review the
whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine
whether it discloses substantial evidence . . . such that a reasonable trier of
fact could find [that the order is appropriate].â€â€™ [Citation.]†(In re Matthew S. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d
315, 321 [247 Cal.Rptr. 100].)’ (See In
re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924 [171 Cal.Rptr. 637, 623 P.2d
198].)†(In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th
766, 773.)
B. Jurisdiction
“‘When
a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor
comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm
the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the
statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is
supported by substantial evidence. In
such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the
other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’ [Citation.]â€
(In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th
at p. 773.) “It is commonly said that
the juvenile court takes jurisdiction over children, not parents. [Citations.]
While this is not strictly correct, since the court exercises personal
jurisdiction over the parents once proper notice has been given [citation], it
captures the essence of dependency law. The
law’s primary concern is the protection of children. [Citation.]
The court asserts jurisdiction with respect to a child when one of the
statutory prerequisites listed in section 300 has been demonstrated. [Citation.]
The acquisition of personal jurisdiction over the parents through proper
notice follows as a consequence of the court’s assertion of dependency
jurisdiction over their child. [Footnote omitted.] [Citations.]
Parental personal jurisdiction allows the court to enter binding orders
adjudicating the parent’s relationship to the child [citation], but it is not a prerequisite for
the court to proceed, so long as jurisdiction over the child has been
established. [Citation.] Further, every parent has the option not to
participate in the proceeding, even if properly noticed. [Citation.]
[¶] As a result of this focus on
the child, it is necessary only for the court to find that one parent’s conduct has created
circumstances triggering section 300 for the court to assert jurisdiction over
the child. [Citations.] Once the child is found to be endangered in
the manner described by one of the subdivisions of section 300—e.g., a risk of
serious physical harm (subds. (a) & (b)), serious emotional damage (subd.
(c)), sexual or other abuse (subds. (d) & (e)), or abandonment (subd. (g)),
among others—the child comes within the court’s jurisdiction, even if the child
was not in the physical custody of one or both parents at the time the jurisdictional events occurred. [Citation.]
For jurisdictional purposes, it is irrelevant which parent created those
circumstances. A jurisdictional finding
involving the conduct of a particular parent is not necessary for the court to
enter orders binding on that parent, once dependency jurisdiction has been established. [Citation.]
As a result, it is commonly said that a jurisdictional finding involving
one parent is ‘“good against both. More accurately, the minor is a dependent if
the actions of either parent bring [him] within one of the statutory
definitions of a dependent.â€â€™ [Citation.]
For this reason, an appellate court may decline to address the
evidentiary support for any remaining jurisdictional findings once a single
finding has been found to be supported by the evidence. [Citations.]â€
(In re I.A. (2011) 201
Cal.App.4th 1484, 1491-1492.)
Mother
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the counts alleged
against her. She does not, however,
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the counts involving
the conduct of J.S., the father of H.F. and S.F., or the counts involving
B.C.’s father, M.Z. Under the
authorities cited above, the jurisdictional findings based on the counts
against both fathers were sufficient to support the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction over the children.
Therefore, we do not need to address the jurisdictional findings based
on mother’s conduct
title="">[3]
because once the juvenile court obtained jurisdiction over the minors for any
of the reasons alleged in the petition, it had corollary jurisdiction over
mother, after proper notice, to make orders affecting the welfare of the
children.
B. Disposition
Mother
contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s
disposition order removing B.C. from her custody. According to mother, there was no evidence to
support the juvenile court’s finding that there was a current risk of harm to
B.C. in mother’s custody.
There
was evidence that B.C.’s father, M.Z., had a long history of serious criminal
behavior and a long history of substance abuse.
There was also evidence that M.Z. had assaulted mother in June 2010,
while her children were present, an assault for which M.Z. was incarcerated for
10 months. And, there was additional
evidence supporting the disposition. In
late 2011, after B.C. was born, mother allowed M.Z. to live with her and her
children for several months. S.F.
reported that M.Z. often physically abused mother and threatened to kill her. During one such incident, B.C., who was in
mother’s arms, struck her head against a wall.
S.F. also reported that she was concerned that once M.Z. was released
from custody, mother would reunite with him.
There
was further evidence in a police report of the incident that led to M.Z.’s June
2012 arrest showing that M.Z. was hiding in mother’s apartment with the
children present while armed with a handgun and knife and in possession of drug
paraphernalia. When police arrived, M.Z.
resisted arrest, causing a deputy to use his taser on M.Z. and arrest him for,
inter alia, probation violations and being a felon in possession of a firearm. That incident supported a reasonable
inference that M.Z. presented a serious risk of physical and emotional harm to
mother and her children, including B.C., yet mother continued to allow him into
her apartment with her children, apparently oblivious to the serious risk to
her children.
In
addition, notwithstanding that DCFS had offered mother services to address case
issues and assist mother in reuniting with B.C., there was evidence that mother
refused such services, including individual and conjoint therapy for her and
the children.
title="">[4] Mother’s refusal to accept services and
complete recommended programs supported a reasonable inference that, at the time
of the disposition order, she still did not fully appreciate the risk her
conduct posed to her children, including B.C.
When
the foregoing evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the disposition
order, indulging all reasonable inferences and resolving all factual conflicts
in favor of that order as we are required to do, it supports the juvenile
court’s finding that returning B.C. to
mother’s custody would not be in her best interests because mother’s history
with M.Z. and her apparent inability to comprehend the seriousness of the risk
he posed to her and her children supported a reasonable inference of a current
risk of physical and emotional harm to B.C.
DISPOSITION
The
jurisdiction and disposition orders are affirmed.
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MOSK,
J.
We concur:
TURNER, P. J.
KRIEGLER, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] All
further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise indicated.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] During
argument, H.F.’s counsel explained that the minor’s father had flown him to Los Angeles from Texas to attend a “delinquency†hearing.
