CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Charles A. Koch III sued respondent Chemspeed, Inc. for breach of contract and other causes, but the litigation came to a halt with the granting of respondent's motion to quash service of summons, based on a forum selection clause in a settlement agreement among the parties and Chemspeed, Inc.'s parent entity. Koch claims the settlement agreement does not cover his dispute. We conclude that the scope of the settlement agreement, and whether it embraces Koch's claims, is for the selected forum to decide. However, because technically Chemspeed, Inc. should have moved to dismiss or stay based on inconvenient forum, rather than to quash summons, Court remand to the trial court to enter a proper order and in all other respects affirm.

Appellant Marshall Timothy Rudolph contends that the trial court violated his federal constitutional right to due process when it imposed vague and overbroad probation conditions, including prohibiting him from being in the presence of minors and ordering him to submit to polygraph examinations. Court conclude that the probation condition regarding appellant being in the presence of minors is overly broad and must be narrowed in order to avoid constitutional infirmity. Otherwise, Court find no merit in appellant's arguments. Accordingly, we direct the trial court to correct the minute order and modify the challenged probation conditions, and affirm the judgment (order granting probation) as modified.

Appellants H.C. and C.T. are the father and mother, respectively, of three-year-old J.C., a dependent child of the juvenile court. After appellants failed to reunify with J.C., the court found the child was likely to be adopted and terminated appellants' parental rights. Appellants contend there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding of adoptability. Court disagree and affirm.

Appellants H.C. and C.T. are the father and mother, respectively, of three-year-old J.C., a dependent child of the juvenile court. After appellants failed to reunify with J.C., the court found the child was likely to be adopted and terminated appellants' parental rights. Appellants contend there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding of adoptability. Court disagree and affirm.

On March 25, 2009, the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) decided not to set a release date for convicted murderer Henry Garcia. After the San Mateo Superior Court declined to issue a writ of habeas corpus setting aside that decision, Garcia initiated this original proceeding for the writ. The basis for his petition--as it was in the superior court--is that Penal Code section 3041 (section 3041) and title 15, section 2402 of the California Code of Regulations (regulation 2402) require his release because there is no evidence to support the Board's decision and demonstrate that his parole would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to the public safety.
The legal principles governing that decision were recently explained by our Supreme Court:
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Plaintiffs William and Angela Molina appeal from the judgment entered after a jury found that chemicals in solvents made by three oil companies that William Molina had used while working at a tire company did not cause him to incur non-Hodgkins lymphoma. We hold that the trial court did not err by refusing to give a causation instruction geared toward multiple-defendant toxic tort cases where the defendants contest whether exposure to their particular products actually contributed to a plaintiff's illness. Instead, because the defendants in this case conceded exposure to their products, and their proportionate share of their contribution, but claimed their products were not capable of causing William Molina's illness at all, the trial court properly gave the standard pattern instructions on causation. The Molinas also contend that the trial court's pretrial ruling eliminating the consumer expectations theory of product liability was error. Court need not address the issue because the jury's finding that defendants' products did not cause William Molina's illness would have been the same regardless of which products liability theory was presented to the jury.

Edgar Rene Solorzano appeals from the judgment entered upon his convictions by jury of rape by drugs (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(3), count 1)[1] and sexual penetration by foreign object (§ 289, subd. (e), count 4). The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of eight years. Appellant contends that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred (a) in allowing the admission of evidence of prior uncharged sexual conduct, thereby depriving him of his rights to due process and a fair trial, (b) in refusing to allow the defense a full and fair cross-examination of the victim's history of alcohol consumption, thereby depriving him of his constitutional rights to confront the witnesses against him, present a defense, due process and a fair trial, and (c) in excluding two defense witnesses, depriving appellant of his rights to present a defense, assistance of counsel, due process and a fair trial, and (3) execution of sentence on count 4 should be stayed pursuant to section 654.
Court affirm.

In this partnership dispute, the superior court confirmed the arbitrator's award in favor of defendants and cross-complainants Kriti Properties and Development Corporation (Kriti) and Davidson Williams against plaintiff and cross-defendant AP Companies, LLC. (AP). All three parties have appealed from the judgment confirming the arbitrator's award. In addition, AP's general partner, Arpad Domyan, is an appellant in AP's appeal and a respondent in Kriti and Williams's cross-appeal. In the appeal by AP and Domyan, we conclude that the superior court properly denied their petition to vacate the arbitrator's award based on their contention that the award was untimely. In the cross-appeal by Kriti and Williams, court conclude that the superior court erred in failing to confirm the arbitrator's award against Domyan as AP's alter ego, and that the prevailing parties are entitled to contractual attorney fees and costs.

The jury found defendant Tony Bejarano guilty of evading an officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69), driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)), and driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or higher (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)). In a separate proceeding, the trial court found true the recidivist allegations, including two prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) and one prior serious felony conviction under the three strikes law (Pen. Code, §§ 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d), 667, subds. (b)–(i)). The court imposed a prison term of nine years ten months. Subsequently, defendant's strike prior conviction was ruled unconstitutional and set aside. Defendant was resentenced to a term of six years two months.

The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings on appellant Vedran Vrcic's legal malpractice complaint against respondent Frances Louise Martin, based on the one-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, subdivision (a).[1] The trial court determined that appellant's causes of action accrued on the date appellant and his former wife executed a stipulation and settlement agreement that appellant alleges was negligently drafted by respondent, rather than at a later date when the family court construed the agreement against appellant. Court agree with the trial court and affirm the judgment of dismissal.

Defendant George Cantu appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of mayhem, assault with a deadly weapon, and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, with a finding that he personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim. (Pen. Code, §§ 203, 245, subd. (a)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a).) He contends there is insufficient evidence to support the verdict and the trial court erred by admitting evidence of a prior uncharged offense. Court affirm the judgment.

Appellant Leonel Arroyo appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of count 1, the lesser included crime of kidnapping (Pen. Code,[1] § 207, subd. (a));[2] count 3, oral copulation of an unconscious person (§ 288a, subd. (f)); count 4, sodomy of an unconscious person (§ 286, subd. (f)); count 5, oral copulation of an unconscious person (§ 288a, subd. (f)); count 6, rape of an unconscious person (§ 261, subd. (a)(4)); count 7, rape of an unconscious person (§ 261, subd. (a)(4)); and count 8, the lesser included crime of assault (§ 240).[3] Appellant was acquitted of count 2, rape of an unconscious person (§ 261, subd. (a)(4)).
The trial court selected kidnapping, count 1, as the principal term and sentenced appellant to the midterm of five years on count 1. On counts 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 the court imposed consecutive midterm sentences of two years each, and on count 8 a concurrent term of six months.
Court modify the judgment to stay execution of sentence on count 8 and otherwise affirm.

This is an appeal from the denial of a petition to compel arbitration. The trial court found that appellants waived their right to arbitrate. Court agree and affirm the order.

Plaintiff and appellant Ardas Yanik appeals from a judgment in favor of defendant and respondent Penik Ben Tascian (the Administrator), as the administrator of the estate of Dogan Levon Tasciyan, in this action to recover money on a contract related to the sale of property. The trial court found that Yanik was not entitled to compensation, because he participated in the negotiations of the purchase agreement between Tasciyan and a third party without being licensed as a real estate broker or salesperson. Yanik contends the court's finding is not supported by substantial evidence. Court conclude substantial evidence supports the court's finding, and therefore, Court affirm.[