CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Edgar Navasardyan was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of stalking in violation of Penal Code[1] section 646.9, subdivision (a) and one count of making criminal threats in violation of section 422. The trial court sentenced appellant to two years in state prison.
Appellant appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior incidents of domestic violence, in instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 2.50.02 and in failing to instruct the jury on unanimity. Court affirm the judgment of conviction.

Richard B. (father) appeals from the judgment and orders of January 21, 2010, declaring his son Richard B. (â€

Appellant Lovebirds Café and Bakery, Inc. appeals the judgment entered in favor of respondent Frances Anne Martel in this lawsuit concerning construction services provided by respondent to appellant. Finding no error, Court affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff, Jean Letourneau, appeals from an August 27, 2009 judgment entered on an arbitration award in her favor. Judgment was entered against defendants, Hamilton Cove Homeowners Association, Donald Schwartzkopf, Pegi Herrington and Paul M. Cohen. Plaintiff argues she was entitled to additional interest. The trial court awarded plaintiff post-arbitration prejudgment interest from the date the arbitrator, Retired Judge Richard W. Luesebrink, issued the award (January 28, 2005) to the date defendants first tendered payment (May 9, 2005). Plaintiff contends she was entitled to additional interest for the period from the January 28, 2005 award to the August 27, 2009 judgment. Defendants have moved to dismiss the appeal arguing plaintiff waived her right to appeal. We disagree and deny the dismissal motion. On the merits, we uphold the trial court's interest determination and affirm the judgment. We find there was substantial evidence defendants tendered payment and plaintiff forfeited any defect in the tender by failing to object. We conclude that, as a result, the indebtedness ceased to bear interest.

Sammie Vinson appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of possession of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1))[1] with a great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Appellant was sentenced to seven years state prison and ordered to pay victim restitution (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)), a $1,000 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a $1,000 parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45), a $30 court security fee (§ 1465.8) and a $30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373), and to submit to DNA testing (§ 296). Court appointed counsel to represent appellant in this appeal. After examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief in which no issues were raised.

D.C. (mother) appeals from jurisdictional and dispositional orders made by the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 395[1] with regard to her infant son, A.K., who was born in June, 2009. The juvenile court removed A.K. from the custody of mother,[2] who was then 24 years old, based on her history of illicit drug use, which periodically rendered her unable to provide regular care to, and supervision for, A.K., and her substance abuse, which endangered A.K. and placed him at risk of harm. The juvenile court declared A.K. a dependant of the court and removed him from mother's custody.
On appeal, mother contends there was not substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional orders. Mother also argues the juvenile court failed to consider other reasonable means to protect A.K. without removal from mother and failed to consider and balance the harm from removing the child against the harm the removal was intended to prevent. In addition, mother argues the dispositional orders requiring her to participate in counseling to address case issues, parental education, and a drug rehabilitation program, were â€

S.C. (father) appeals from the judgment and orders of March 29, 2010, declaring his son, Joshua C., a dependent of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 360, subdivision (d).[1] He contends substantial evidence does not support the jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), or the order removing the child from his custody. Court conclude the jurisdictional findings and dispositional order are supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant Jerry Lynn Ward guilty of two counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; counts one and two)[1] and found not true an allegation he was armed with a firearm during the commission of count two (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found he had two prior strikes (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and a prior felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)) and served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subds. (a),(b)). The trial court initially sentenced defendant to 60 years to life in prison, consisting of two consecutive terms of 25 years to life on the two robbery counts, plus a consecutive five years for the prior felony conviction, a consecutive three years for one of the prior prison terms, and a consecutive one year each for the two remaining prison terms. A week later, the court modified defendant's sentence on count two to run concurrent with his sentence on count one, thereby reducing his aggregate sentence to 35 years to life.
On appeal, defendant asks us to conduct an independent review of the records that were the subject of his Pitchess[2] motion. (See Evid. Code, § 1043.) In addition, he contends the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike at least one of his prior strike convictions. The People agree we should conduct an independent review of the sealed records but assert the trial court properly declined to strike defendant's prior strike convictions. The People further contend that the trial court lacked the discretion to run defendant's sentence on count two concurrent with his sentence on count one, and that defendant's sentence must be modified to correct the error. We shall conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to (1) disclose any documents in response to defendant's Pitchess motion or (2) strike one or more of his prior strike convictions. We shall further conclude the trial court was required, under section 667, subdivision (c)(6) to sentence defendant consecutively on counts one and two. Court shall modify the judgment accordingly, and affirm it as modified.

Appointed counsel for defendant Tina Yevette Wilson asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) We find no arguable error and no Penal Code section 4019 concerns. Court shall affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Jennaro Eugene Harvey of first degree murder (Pen. Code,[1] § 187, subd. (a)) and attempted kidnapping (§§ 664, 207, subd. (a).) In addition, the jury also found true allegations Harvey personally used a handgun in the commission of these offenses. (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b).) Harvey also admitted the truth of a prior prison conviction allegation. (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668.) The trial court sentenced Harvey to a total term of 35 years to life in prison.[2]
Harvey appeals, contending there is insufficient evidence to support his attempted kidnapping conviction. He further contends the trial court violated his constitutional right to adequate notice of the charges against him by granting the prosecution's belated request to include attempted robbery as a target crime for the prosecution's felony-murder theory of culpability. Court conclude there is no merit to these contentions and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Steven Antony challenges the judgment of the trial court to the extent that the judgment requires that he register as a sex offender pursuant to Penal Code[1] section 290. The trial court ordered Antony to register as a sex offender as part of the sentence that the court imposed on Antony after he pleaded guilty to two counts of lewd acts with a minor between the ages of 14 and 15, and three counts of unlawful intercourse with a minor more than three years younger than Antony. Antony contends that imposition of the mandatory registration requirement on him, based on his convictions for lewd acts with a minor between the ages of 14 and 15, violates his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because whether mandatory sex offender registration--as opposed to discretionary registration--applies to a defendant may be based on a discretionary charging decision of the district attorney, rather than on the offender's conduct. Court reject Antony's argument and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

New Frontier Trading Corporation filed this lawsuit alleging that a quitclaim deed, signed by Cory Humphries (Cory) in favor of Stephanie Humphries (Stephanie) conveying Cory's record interest in a residence (the home) to Stephanie, was a transfer in fraud of creditors. The matter was tried to the court and, after the plaintiff[1] rested his case-in-chief, the court granted the defense motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8 for judgment in favor of defendants. After judgment was entered, Kahn timely appealed. On appeal, Kahn argues the court made numerous legal errors requiring reversal of the judgment.

Appellant Donald L. Gruneisen (Father) appeals from October 2009 postjudgment orders denying modification of his child support obligation, and also granting a modification of visitation orders, in the dissolution action between Father and his former wife, Dianne E. Gruneisen (Mother).[

Antonio Steward (Steward) and his parents sued Stratus Security Services, Inc. (Stratus) for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Stratus. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c.) Steward contends that the trial court erred (1) because he presented triable issues of fact; (2) because Stratus failed to meet its burden of proof; (3) by granting various evidentiary objections; and (4) by denying Steward leave to amend the complaint. Court reverse the judgment.