CA Unpub Decisions

Petitioner in propria persona seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452 (rule)) from the juvenile court's order setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing[ as to her four minor children. Court conclude her petition fails to comport with the procedural requirements of rule 8.452. Accordingly, we will dismiss the petition as facially inadequate.

A.S. (father) appealed from a May 2010 order terminating parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to his daughter L.S. (child)[1] After reviewing the entire record, father's court-appointed appellate counsel informed this court she could find no arguable issues to raise on father's behalf. Counsel requested and this court granted leave for father to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error did exist. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844.)
Father later submitted a letter in which he stated simply that he â€

Plaintiff V3I, Inc. appeals from a judgment in favor of defendants Western Digital Corporation, Keen Personal Media, Inc., Russell M. Krapf, and Frank Paulson on its complaint for securities fraud under Corporations Code section 25401, fraud, and breach of oral contract. It contends the court erred in granting several motions for nonsuit and also asserts instructional error. Finding none of these arguments meritorious, Court affirm.
Plaintiff filed a second appeal from the award of attorney fees and costs (G041836). Court deny defendants' motion to consolidate the two appeals.

As set out in the opinion in the related case (V3I v. Western Digital Corporation (Sept. 29, 2010, G040832) [nonpub. opn.]), which we file concurrently, we affirm a judgment in favor of defendants Western Digital Corporation, Keen Personal Media, Inc., Russell M. Krapf, and Frank Paulson. In this case plaintiff V3I appeals from attorney fees and certain costs awarded to defendants. It claims the motion for fees was untimely, Keen incurred no fees, and the award to Western is too high. It also asserts the court abused its discretion in awarding expert witness fees. Court are not persuaded by any of these arguments and affirm the judgment. Defendants filed a motion to consolidate the two appeals, which we deny.

A wholesale used car dealer sold vehicles to a second used car dealer with the agreement the second dealer would pay for the cars when title was available for transfer. The second dealer sold the vehicles to consumers under conditional sales contracts, sold (and assigned) the conditional sales contracts to two finance companies, and went bankrupt before paying the wholesale dealer for the cars and obtaining certificates of title as required by the terms of the conditional sales contracts. The wholesale dealer filed this action against the finance companies seeking a declaration they were required to pay the wholesale dealer for the vehicles to obtain certificates of title. In a bench trial, the trial court followed this court's decision in Quartz of Southern California, Inc. v. Mullen Bros., Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 901 (Quartz), which on largely identical facts held as between the wholesale dealer and the finance company, the wholesale dealer was the legal owner of the title certificates and the finance companies were required to purchase the titles from the wholesale dealer for transfer to the consumer buyers. The finance companies appeal from the judgment raising a variety of contentions, none of which have merit. Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant William Aranda, Jr., of possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), possession of heroin for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351), and participating in a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a)). It also found true that defendant committed the drug crimes for the benefit or in association with a street gang. (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The court sentenced him to prison for five years, four months. Defendant claims the court erred by failing to sever the gang crime from the drug crimes and to bifurcate the gang enhancement allegations from the substantive charges, by excluding evidence of an officer's purported prior misconduct, and by admitting evidence of prior charges. Finding no error Court affirm.

Hyduke's Valley Motors (Hyduke's) appeals from the postjudgment order denying its motion for attorney fees against Lobel Financial Corporation (Lobel) and County Finance Services (CFS). Car wholesaler Hyduke's prevailed in its action to recover from finance companies CFS and Lobel the purchase price of vehicles it sold to a used car dealer, which the dealer in turn sold to consumers, with financing provided by CFS and Lobel. Hyduke's contends attorney fees were authorized by the conditional sales contracts between the used car dealer and the consumers that were then assigned to the finance companies. Court reject its contentions and affirm the order.

Francis Doyle and Anthony Caselli appeal an order denying their special motion to strike a complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (section 425.16), the anti-SLAPP statute. Doyle and Caselli contend they met their burden to show that the legal malpractice lawsuit brought against them by Bonnie Burdett and Joyce Anthony, successor trustees of the KMP Trust, arose from petitioning activity on behalf of their client, former KMP Trustee, James Valentine. Court conclude that Burdett and Anthony's action was not subject to dismissal as a SLAPP suit, and therefore, affirm the order.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on August 14, 2009.
Following the filing of appellant's brief and the record in this case, respondents Progressive Insurance notified this court by mail that the parties had reached a settlement of the case, and appellant had executed a release of all claims against respondents. Although respondents requested that appellant file a request with this court to dismiss the action pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.244(c)(1), she failed to do so.
We issued an order requiring appellant to file a notice of dismissal, or a letter stating good cause why the appeal should not be dismissed.
We received no response to the order, and as a result, shall dismiss the appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.244(a)(4)).

A modification decision.

Respondent Robert Siemons filed suit against a predecessor in interest of appellant Chase Bank USA, N.A. (Chase), based on the predecessor's conduct in connection with a theft of Siemons's identity. When the predecessor did not file a timely response to the complaint, Siemons took its default. Three years later, Chase moved to set aside the default under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5 (hereafter section 473.5), contending it had only recently learned of Siemons's lawsuit. In response, Siemons provided evidence his attorney had discussed the lawsuit with a paralegal at Chase two years earlier. The trial court denied the motion to vacate, finding proper service of process had been made and crediting the attorney's evidence regarding his contacts with Chase. Finding no evidence Chase or its predecessor had actual knowledge of the lawsuit in time to prevent entry of the default, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the default and permit Chase to defend the action on the merits.

Appellant Curexo Technology Corporation (Curexo) appeals from the denial of its motion to compel arbitration of employment-related claims brought by Curexo's former employee, respondent Ramesh C. Trivedi (Trivedi). Curexo contends the trial court erred in finding that the arbitration clause contained in the parties' employment agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Alternatively, Curexo argues that if the arbitration clause was properly found unconscionable, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to sever the offending provisions of the arbitration clause and to enforce the remainder. Court affirm.

Defendant James Fredrick Ledesma pleaded guilty to failure to register as a sex offender (Pen. Code, § 290.012, subd. (a)), and admitted three prior strike convictions (Pen. Code, § 1170.12) and service of a prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). It was understood that defendant would be permitted to withdraw his plea if the court did not grant his motion to strike the prior convictions (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497) and grant him probation in the case. The court struck the strike convictions, reduced the registration offense to a misdemeanor, and ordered defendant â€

Aaron M., a minor, appeals from a final judgment disposing of all issues between the parties. Appellant's counsel has filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised and asks this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Appellant's counsel has not briefed any issues. Appellant was also advised of his right personally to file a supplemental brief raising any issues he chooses to bring to this court's attention. No supplemental brief has been filed by appellant personally.