CA Unpub Decisions

Maria P. (Mother) appeals a juvenile court jurisdictional/dispositional order which adjudged her daughter, Michele R., born in January 1998, a dependent of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (c)), dismissed the dependency, and ordered sole physical and legal custody to Michele's father, A.R. (Father), with no visitation to Mother. Mother contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jurisdictional allegation, and the court erred in terminating the dependency and denying her visitation. Court reject the contentions and affirm.

Appellant Robert Plummer, Jr. appeals from the judgment entered in favor of respondents Department of Health Services (DHS) and Lavonne Coen after appellant's action was dismissed because he failed to furnish security as ordered by the trial court pursuant to the vexatious litigant statute Code of Civil Procedure[1] section 391.3. The trial court deemed appellant to be a vexatious litigant under section 391, subdivision (b)(1) on the ground that in the past seven years, appellant commenced or maintained five litigations that had been â€

Following the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, Cornell Anderson Barber pleaded guilty to one count of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and admitted he had personally used a firearm to commit the offense. On appeal Barber contends a photograph taken of him by police and the victim's identification of him based on that photograph were the fruit of an illegal detention and should have been suppressed. Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Ardiste Tann of assault with a firearm and found true a related firearm enhancement allegation. The trial court sentenced Tann to an aggregate state prison term of eight years and ordered him to pay $9,905.58 in victim restitution. On appeal Tann contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. He also challenges the court's restitution order. Court affirm.

A jury convicted Armando Torrez of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))[1] and found true the special circumstance allegations of murder during the commission of robbery and burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A) & (G)). The jury also found Torrez guilty of first degree robbery (§ 211) and conspiracy to commit robbery (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)).[2] Torrez was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.[3] On appeal Torrez contends his sentence must be modified to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life because the felony-murder special circumstance provisions are unconstitutional. Court affirm.

Gustavo Vital appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury on two counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211).[1] Vital was sentenced as a second strike offender to an aggregate term of 18 years in state prison. We appointed counsel to represent Vital on appeal. After examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441, in which no issues were raised. At our request, the parties briefed the issue of whether the trial court properly imposed both serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)) and prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) enhancements for the same prior felony conviction pursuant to People v. Jones (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142, 1148-1149. The parties agree the trial court erred in this regard, however, the People request we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. Court deny this request and strike the improperly imposed prior prison term enhancement.

Andrea V. (the minor) was declared a ward of the court and ordered into suitable placement for a maximum period of confinement of six years, after she was found to have committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), using a knife (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1)). On appeal, the minor challenges the admission of her confession into evidence. Court affirm.

Xavier Alvarez appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of misappropriation of public funds (Pen. Code, § 424, subd. (a)(1));[1] count 1), insurance fraud (§ 550, subd. (b)(3); count 2) and grand theft of personal property (§ 487, subd. (a); count 3). He was sentenced to an aggregate term of five years in state prison. Alvarez contends the trial court erroneously failed to stay his sentence for misappropriation of public funds under section 654, and abused its discretion in imposing the upper term for insurance fraud. Court affirm.

Minor N.D. appeals from the order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court for committing an act of vandalism. Because there is substantial evidence that he committed that offense, Court affirm.

Appellant Ryan Abrego was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of involuntary manslaughter in violation of Penal Code[1] section 192, subdivision (b), one count of assault with a firearm in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(2), one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of section 12021, subdivision (a)(1) and one count of unlawful firearm activity in violation of section 12021, subdivision (d)(1). The jury found true the allegations that appellant personally used a firearm in the commission of the manslaughter and assault offenses within the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a) and personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the assault within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a). The trial court selected the assault conviction as the principal term, and sentenced appellant to a total term of 17 years in state prison, consisting of the high term of four years for the conviction plus a ten-year enhancement term for the firearm use pursuant to section 12022.5 plus a three-year enhancement term for great bodily injury pursuant to section 12022.7. The court stayed sentence on the manslaughter conviction pursuant to section 654 and imposed concurrent terms for the two section 12021 convictions.
Appellant appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending that the trial court erred in imposing an enhancement term pursuant to section 12022.7. Court affirm the judgment of conviction.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Jose Alvarez of first degree burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459[1].) The trial court denied defendant's motion pursuant to section 1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 to dismiss a prior strike conviction allegation under the â€

The Sex Offender Registration Act (Pen. Code, §§ 290-290.023)[1] requires persons convicted of enumerated sex offenses to register with local law enforcement personnel and update their registration to reflect any change of residence within California. In 1985, defendant and appellant Eric Lincoln Cassis pled guilty to a qualifying offense--sodomy against a child under 14 years old and more than 10 years younger than defendant in violation of Penal Code section 286, subdivision (c)--and was placed on five years' probation. At the time defendant entered his guilty plea, the prosecutor misadvised defendant that he would be required to register for a period of five years from completion of probation. In fact, the version of the Act applicable at that time set forth no time limitation on the duty to register, implicitly imposing an ongoing lifetime obligation.[2] In 1996, having been charged with failing to register as a sex offender, defendant acknowledged that he was aware of the lifetime registration requirement. Defendant waited until 2009 to file the underlying writ of error coram nobis and alternative non-statutory motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that he was misinformed of the lifetime registration requirement. The trial court denied the writ and motion, finding inter alia that defendant failed to show the required diligence in seeking postconviction relief.
Defendant timely appeals the denial of his petition for error coram nobis, contending (1) his delay was immaterial because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose the 1985 judgment of conviction since it contained an unauthorized provision that he register as a sex offender for a limited five-year period and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying coram nobis relief because the prosecutor's misadvice amounted to a concealment of a material fact that would have invalidated his guilty plea and subsequently impeded his diligent efforts to extricate himself from the Act's lifetime registration requirement.
As Court explain, defendant's appeal fails because the collateral relief he sought required, among other things, a showing of diligence in seeking the extraordinary remedy. As the lower court found, defendant could not justify his 13-year delay in seeking collateral relief from the time he became aware of the lifetime registration requirement. Moreover, his jurisdictional error argument rests on the misapprehension that the court imposed a five-year term of sex offender registration as part of the sentence. Whatever defendant might have been led to believe about the extent of his registration obligations at the time of his plea, the sentence itself included no sex offender registration requirement that was a separate obligation independently imposed by operation of law.

A modification decision.

Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). [1] The jury further found he personally used a handgun in the commission of the offense (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and that appellant personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The court found appellant had two prior convictions for serious or violent felonies within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§ 1170.12, subds.(a)–(d)) and section 667, subdivision (a)(1). He was sentenced to 23 years plus an indeterminate term of 25 years to life.