CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Andres P. Castillo (appellant) appeals his conviction by jury trial of two counts of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2))[1] (counts 1 and 2), forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)) (count 3), misdemeanor battery (§ 242) (count 4),[2] simple kidnapping (§ 207) (count 5),[3] sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (a)) (count 6), and false imprisonment (§ 236) (count 7). The jury found true under the â€

After he pled guilty to having committed robbery and multiple sexual offenses, a jury convicted appellant Nathan Bryan Kinkade[1] of aggravated kidnapping. (Pen. Code,[2] §§ 209, subd. (b), 211, 212.5, subd. (c), 261, subd. (a)(2), 286, subd. (c)(2), 288a, subd. (c)(2), 289, subd. (a)(1); former § 664 [as amended by Stats. 2005, ch. 52, § 1].)[3] Based on these convictions and on certain weapons and other sentencing findings, he was sentenced to a life term in prison.[4] (§§ 667.61, subd. (b), 1203, subd. (e)(1), 12022, subd. (b)(1).) On appeal, Kinkade persuades us that (1) the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on simple kidnapping as a lesser included offense of aggravated kidnapping. He also contends (2) that he was denied his constitutional right to represent himself at trial; (3) that insufficient evidence supports his conviction for aggravated kidnapping and (4) the findings that he was armed with and personally used a deadly weapon during the commission of that offense; and (5) that aspects of his original sentence constituted multiple punishment or lacked statutory authorization. Court reduce the aggravated kidnapping conviction to one for simple kidnapping and remand to the trial court for resentencing on all counts.

Oakland City Councilmember Desley Brooks (Brooks) sued the San Francisco Chronicle (the Chronicle) and a Chronicle reporter, Chip Johnson, for defamation in relation to a column Johnson wrote, and the Chronicle published, entitled â€

A modification decision.

Leonard Lloyd appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction for second degree murder with true findings on related firearm-use and criminal street gang allegations. Court remand for a new restitution hearing to determine the victims' losses and in all other respects affirm.

Defendants Jesus Augustine Cabrera (Cabrera) and Saul Romero-Luna (Romero-Luna) appeal from judgments of conviction entered after a jury trial. Cabrera and Romero-Luna were convicted of three counts of attempted premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664)[1] and one count of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246). The jury found true the allegations that, in the commission of the attempted premeditated murders, a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (c) & (e)(1)) and defendants personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b) & (e)(1)). As to all offenses, the jury found true the allegation that the offenses were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further and assist in criminal conduct by gang members (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). The trial court sentenced each defendant to a determinate term of 60 years, plus an indeterminate sentence of life with the eligibility for parole after 21 years.

In 2003, Appellant Whitney Daniel pled no contest to oral copulation with a minor and was ordered to register as a sex offender as then required under Penal Code section 290. After his probation terminated, Daniel filed a motion to eliminate his lifetime sex offender registration pursuant to People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185. The trial court denied the motion. Daniel appeals the ruling, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to continue to register as a sex offender and committed various other errors. Court affirm.

The action in the Los Angeles County Superior Court had its inception in a construction contract pertaining to the remodeling of a residence. The residence was owned by John S. Brandon and his wife Diane A. Golden in the form of the Brandon-Golden Trust.[1] Jorge Barajas, doing business as Serrano Construction,[2] was engaged to do the construction work. Eventually, the construction company sued for work not paid for by the owners. The owners cross complained for uncompleted and defective work. The results of a bench trial ended in a judgment on the contractor's complaint in the amount of $45,702 and on the cross complaint of owners for $260,543 for costs to correct and complete the contract work for a net recovery to owners in the amount of $214,832. Owners moved post judgment for attorneys fees as the prevailing parties pursuant to statutory authority contained in Civil Code section 3260,[3] which the trial court found inapplicable and denied owners' motion for attorneys fees. This appeal followed as an appealable order under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 213, 223 in which owners contend they are entitled to attorneys fees in the amount of $208,865.90.

A commercial real estate broker sued its client, alleging the client had failed to pay the full commission amount due when the client's property was sold. The client filed a cross-complaint claiming the commission agreement had been modified. The trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer to the client's cross-complaint, and then granted the broker's motion for summary judgment. The client appeals. Court reverse.

Appellants Juan Valle and Rosa Martinez were behind on their mortgage payments and lost their mobilehome to foreclosure. They blame the foreclosure on the mobilehome park where they leased a space. They were also behind on the rent payments, and their landlord Cherryfield Village mobilehome park served the tenants and the lender with a three-day notice for nonpayment of rent pursuant to Civil Code section 798.56, subdivision (e)(1)[1] of the Mobile Home Residency Law (MRL). The three-day notice overstated the amount of delinquent rent based upon the park's mistake in applying the rent Valle paid to another space he leased in the same park. Cherryfield did not evict the tenants, but the lender took action to protect its legal rights.

Harvey A. Saltz, First Advantage Corporation and The Irvine Company (collectively the Saltz parties) appeal from an order denying their special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16[1] four of the five causes of action asserted in the first amended supplemental verified complaint filed by Cyrus M. Sanai following our remand for further proceedings in Sanai v. Saltz (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 746 (Sanai 2009). Mr. Sanai's most recent pleading alleges violations of the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (Civ. Code, § 1785.1 et seq.) (CCRAA) and, alternatively, violations of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.) (FCRA), as well as claims for extortion and unfair business practices, based primarily on negative credit reports created after a dispute between Mr. Sanai and his landlord over the amount of rent due for his apartment and on the actions of the Saltz parties following Mr. Sanai's complaints about the initial credit reports. Although Mr. Sanai's pleading arguably includes collateral or incidental references to the Saltz parties' litigation-related statements or conduct, Court agree with the trial court Mr. Sanai's claims do not arise from the Saltz parties' protected speech or petitioning activity in connection with a public issue within the meaning of section 426.16, subdivision (e). Accordingly, court affirm.

A modification decision.

Mother Claudia A. (Mother), the mother of Kenneth A., Christina A., Monique A., and Joseph A., appeals from the juvenile court's jurisdictional orders of October 16, 2009. Mother also filed a petition for extraordinary writ arguing that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it terminated reunification services as to one of the children. Court hereby consolidate these two proceedings for the purposes of appeal and disposition. In the appeal (No. 219971), Court affirm, concluding that sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court's finding of jurisdiction over Christina A. and finding the appeal moot as to the other children. Court deny the petition for extraordinary writ (No. B224441).

Raquel Marcia Bowen appeals from the judgment entered following her conviction after a jury trial for petty theft with a prior theft-related conviction. No meritorious issues have been identified following a review of the record by Bowen's appointed counsel and our own independent review of the record and analysis of the contentions presented by Bowen in a handwritten supplemental brief. court affirm.