CA Unpub Decisions

The court sustained the petition alleging that 15-year-old J.J. unlawfully received a stolen motorcycle, found the offense to be a felony, and adjudged him a ward of the court. The court placed J.J. on probation and ordered him to complete a 21‑day, in‑patient detoxification program. It also imposed a lengthy set of probation conditions. On appeal, J.J. argues that the conditions which restrict his computer and Internet use are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Court agree and modify the judgment.

John Blair has been incarcerated for almost 27 years on a 17 years-to-life sentence for second degree felony murder. In March 2009, at his tenth parole hearing, the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) found Blair suitable for parole. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger reversed the Board's decision. Blair filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court and we issued an order to show cause why the relief requested should not be granted.
During the pendency of the writ proceeding, the Board again found Blair suitable for parole. The Governor has not exercised his right to reverse that grant of parole. On July 23, 2010, Blair was released from prison and is currently on parole. The Attorney General requested that we dismiss the appeal as moot. Blair disagreed, asserting that the petition was not "completely" moot as he may be entitled to a credit against his parole term for the time he spent in prison after the effective date of the Board's 2009 parole grant. Court conclude that Blair is not entitled to any credit against his parole term for the time he spent in prison after the effective date of the Board's 2009 parole grant. (Pen. Code, § 3000.1, subd. (b); People v. Chaudhary (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 32, 38.)
The petition is dismissed as moot.

After a mistrial following a hung jury, defendant Joedon Brown was tried a second time and convicted of possession of methamphetamine (count 1; Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury also found true allegations that defendant had three prior convictions and one strike prior. The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss his strike prior pursuant to Penal Code section 1385. The court sentenced defendant to four years four months in state prison.
Defendant appeals from judgment entered following his jury conviction for possession of methamphetamine. He contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized after he was unlawfully detained and searched in violation of his federal constitutional Fourth Amendment rights. Defendant also contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 87 (Brady), and erred in allowing prejudicial evidence revealing that defendant was on parole.[1]
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motions to dismiss and suppress evidence. There also was no abuse of discretion in allowing evidence of defendant's parole status since the evidence showed that defendant's search was lawful and refuted defendant's police misconduct allegations. We thus affirm the judgment.

Mohammed Izhar, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Reed Smith, Margaret M. Grignon, Judith E. Posner, and Christine A. Kohler for Defendants and Respondents.
In December 2002, Dr. Mohammed Izhar, plaintiff, a radiologist with defendant Kaiser Foundation Hospital, lost his privileges to perform cross-sectional imaging, and a few months later, the National Practitioner Data Bank was informed of the privileges reduction. In June 2003, plaintiff was informed by a letter that the reduction had taken effect and had been reported to the state regulatory body, although plaintiff's request for a hearing had not been acknowledged. In 2008, five years later, plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Kaiser Foundation Hospital and three individual Kaiser doctors (referred to collectively as Kaiser) for (1) violation of the fair procedure provisions of Business and Professions Code sections 809 and 809.6; (2) for damages for violation of Business and Professions Code section 809.9, and (3) for damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The trial court sustained Kaiser's demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) the action was time barred; (2) plaintiff failed to avail himself of the statutory remedy of mandamus for violations of section 809; (3) there is no private right of action for damages for violating section 809; and (4) the individual defendants were not proper parties. Plaintiff appeals, and Court affirm.

Cross-complainant and appellant James E. Wanless (Husband) initiated this abuse of process cross-action against Cross-defendant and respondent Richard Houghton (Houghton) based on a letter written by Houghton to a real estate broker seeking to enforce a Family Law Attorney's Real Property Lien (the Lien), which was granted to Houghton in the pending dissolution case between Husband and his wife, Joan (Wife). Husband claims the letter sought more than was permitted under the applicable statute. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Houghton on the grounds that (1) the letter was absolutely privileged pursuant to Civil Code[1] section 47, subdivision (b), and (2) there was no evidence of any wrongful motive. Husband appeals and Courtaffirm.

Ives, Kirwan & Dibble and Steven B. Kotulak for Real Parties in Interest Palmden Restaurants, LLC, Karen McBride, and Christopher Bluhm.
Donald R. Holben & Associates, Daniel M. DiRe, Leah M. Peer and Donald R. Holben for Real Party in Interest Terrelle Ford.
Petitioner Delos Insurance Company (Delos) seeks the issuance of a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to vacate its order denying petitioner's motion for summary judgment and to enter a new order granting the motion. Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in determining that there exist triable issues of material fact whether its insurance policy, issued to real parties in interest Palmden Restaurants, LLC, Karen McBride and Christopher Bluhm (collectively Palmden), excluded coverage for injuries suffered by real party in interest Terrelle Ford (Ford) as the result of an assault and battery on the insured's premises. We agree and grant the petition. Facts and Procedural History

The trial court entered a judgment dissolving the 14-and-one-half year marriage of Colleen J. Pilz (wife) and Bradford J. Pilz (husband). The judgment also resolved issues concerning characterization and division of the parties' assets, plus child custody and child and spousal support. In this appeal, husband contends the court erred by finding all of the distributions received during the marriage from his separate property vehicle leasing business constituted community property. As a result, he also argues the court erred in finding a community interest in other assets into which those distributions were traced. In addition, husband claims the court erred by finding contributions made to a simplified employee pension plan individual retirement account (SEP IRA) by his other separate property business constituted community property.
Court conclude the trial court properly found the SEP IRA constituted a community asset. But husband's first assignment of error has merit. Thus, we reverse the judgment's property division and remand the matter for further proceedings.

This is Angelica's (the mother's) second appeal from an order made under section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. (All references are to that code, and all references to â€

A jury convicted defendant Sean Britt Hughes of two counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a child under age 14 (Pen. Code § 288, subd. (a); all statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless noted), and one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child under age 14 (§ 288.5, subd. (a)). The jury also found defendant engaged in substantial sexual conduct. (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8).)
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by excluding sexually explicit text messages the minor victim sent to a third party. The court permitted generic testimony about the messages, but defendant argues admission of the actual messages was necessary to attack the victim's credibility and establish a possible motive to fabricate the abuse. Defendant also challenges the prosecution's amendment to the information to conform to proof at trial. Finally, he argues trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm.

This appeal is related to In re Marriage of Pilz (Oct. 15, 2010, G040955, [nonpub. opn.]). That case involves an appeal by Bradford J. Pilz (husband) from the judgment dissolving his marriage to Colleen P. Pilz (wife) and challenges the trial court's characterization and division of certain assets. In this appeal, wife challenges a postjudgment order reducing the amount of child and spousal support. Since husband's motion to modify support was not supported by a showing of a change of circumstances, we reverse the postjudgment order.

Defendant Ho S. Ahn appeals the judgment entered awarding him over $41,000 for loss of goodwill after his property was taken by the Department of Transportation (plaintiff) in a condemnation action. He contends the court erred in excluding evidence of his claim for mitigation expenses. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Bradshaw & Associates, P.C., (Bradshaw) appeals from a court order granting a motion to set aside default and judgment. The trial court granted the motion after finding that defendants Mary Lonergan and Patricia Lonergan (individually, Mary and Patricia; collectively, the Lonergans) and Therese Murphy[1] demonstrated excusable neglect pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) (§ 473(b)). The sole question on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion. Finding no abuse of discretion, Court affirm.

Minor Jeffrey P., 17 years old at the time of the charged offense, seeks reversal of the rulings of the juvenile court establishing wardship and placing him on probation for four years. Court affirm the juvenile court's rulings.

S. H. (Minor) appeals from a dispositional order adjudging him a ward of the juvenile court, removing him from his mother's custody, and setting a maximum term of confinement. Court shall direct the juvenile court to amend the order to reduce the maximum term of confinement and to designate one of the counts as a misdemeanor.