CA Unpub Decisions

On July 21, 2009, appellant, Billy Lee Flowers, waived his constitutional rights and pled no contest to an allegation that he sold a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)). Appellant admitted a prior narcotics conviction enhancement (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2) and a prior prison term enhancement (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). Appellant entered into a Cruz[1] waiver, permitting appellant to be released on his own recognizance pending his sentencing hearing.
Appellant failed to appear for his sentencing hearing on August 11, 2009. On October 9, 2009, the trial court sentenced appellant to the midterm of four years for sale of narcotics plus a consecutive three-year term for the prior conviction enhancement (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2) for a total prison term of seven years. The court stayed appellant's prior prison term enhancement pursuant to section 654. The parties agree that the trial court erred in staying the prior prison term enhancement. Appellant requests that we order that this enhancement be stricken. Respondent requests that we remand the case for a proper finding by the trial court. Court agree with respondent and will remand for further proceedings.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant, Jimmy Blake Broussard, pled no contest to one count of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)).[1] The court imposed the 11-year upper term. Appellant did not request, and the court did not issue, a certificate of probable cause (§ 1237.5). On appeal, appellant's sole contention is that the court abused its discretion in imposing the upper term. Court will affirm.

Appellant, L.R., a minor, admitted an allegation that he carried a dirk or dagger concealed on his person (Pen. Code, § 12020, subd. (a)(4)), a felony, and entered pleas of no contest to allegations that he committed that offense for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further or assist in criminal conduct by gang members (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (d), and that he committed misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). Thereafter, the court found appellant unsuitable for the deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) program (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 790 et seq.); adjudged him a ward of the juvenile court; ordered that he reside in the home of his mother; and placed him on formal probation.
On appeal, appellant's sole contention is that the court erred in finding him unsuitable for DEJ. Court will affirm.

In July 2010, the juvenile court ordered petitioner's minor son, B., removed from her custody pursuant to a Welfare and Institutions Code section 387[1] supplemental petition, terminated family maintenance services, and set a section 366.26 hearing to implement a permanent plan. Petitioner contends there was insufficient evidence to warrant B.'s removal and seeks extraordinary writ relief (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the court's orders. Court find no error and deny the petition.

A modification decision.

A jury convicted defendant Sargis Envieh Lelham of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and making a criminal threat, and found he personally caused great bodily injury. The court sentenced defendant on both convictions and the great bodily injury sentence enhancement attached to the criminal threat conviction.
Defendant contends the enhancement is improper because a criminal threat cannot cause bodily injury as a matter of law. We disagree. Defendant reads too narrowly the statutory language authorizing the enhancement when a defendant causes great bodily injury â€

Kamal and Turkya Batniji (the Batnijis) appeal the judgment entered after the court granted the motion of Christopher Rinehart doing business as Rinehart Electric (Rinehart) to confirm a contractual arbitration award as a judgment and denied the Batnijis' motion to vacate the arbitration award. Court affirm the judgment.

Appellant L. B. and J. B. are the parents of 13-year-old A. B., who has been adjudged a dependent of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code § 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (d).[1] Appellant appeals from a dispositional order, which removed A. B. from appellant's custody.[2] Appellant contends: (1) the juvenile court erred in finding that section 361.2 was inapplicable to the present case; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that it was detrimental to place A. B. with appellant; (3) the placement order interfered with appellant's reunification efforts; (4) the reunification plan was not reasonable; (5) the juvenile court failed to consider A. B.'s wishes. For the reasons stated below, the order is affirmed.

Arnold S. Gridley died on May 8, 2004, leaving approximately 40 percent of his estate to his daughter Christine.[1] Thereafter, two of Arnold's sons, Michael and Robert, filed a petition to determine their interest in Arnold's estate, pursuant to an â€

The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended appellant Philip Louis Bruno's driver's license following a hearing at which it was determined that Bruno had refused a chemical test after he was lawfully arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). On appeal from a trial court order denying his challenge to the DMV's suspension order, Bruno contends the evidence is insufficient to support findings that he refused a blood test and that a breath test was unavailable. He also argues that his due process rights were violated because the DMV failed to provide prior notice of the basis for the license suspension. Court affirm.

Twenty-six retired firefighters and their union, CDF Firefighters, filed suit against the California Department of Personnel Administration (DPA) and the California Public Employee's Retirement System (CalPERS) for increased pension benefits. The individual plaintiffs[1] retired between January 1 and May 16, 2006. Before and after this window of time, pension payments to retirees in plaintiffs' position were limited to 90 percent of their final compensation, but plaintiffs contend that, during this time period, the 90 percent cap did not apply to them. The trial court rejected this argument and sustained CalPERS' demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend. The court sustained DPA's demurrer without leave to amend based on the statute of limitations.
Court conclude that plaintiffs cannot plead a viable cause of action because their case hinges on an erroneous interpretation of Government Code section 21363.4. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Douglas Pierce (plaintiff) appeals from a judgment entered on a jury's special verdict in favor of defendants Morris Shapow and Wellness Medical Center (hereafter, Shapow, the clinic, and collectively, defendants). Plaintiff's complaint alleges he was sexually battered by Shapow during a physical therapy treatment Shapow administered at the clinic.
As a basis for this appeal, plaintiff contends he was severely prejudiced when the trial court permitted defendants to elicit an opinion from defendants' expert witness psychiatrist regarding plaintiff's credibility. The opinion was based on plaintiff's history of being the victim of childhood sexual abuse. Plaintiff further contends defendants never followed statutory procedure for introducing such evidence. He asserts there has been a miscarriage of justice. Our review of the record on appeal convinces us that plaintiff's own trial strategy opened him up to the line of questioning of which plaintiff now complains, and that there was no prejudice from defendants' failure to strictly follow the statutory requirements for attacking plaintiff's credibility. Court will therefore affirm the judgment.

In this dissolution of marriage proceeding, John Yuan (Husband) appeals from a judgment on reserved issues. The respondent in the appeal is Noriko Komiyama Yuan (Wife). The court's hearing on the reserved issues was uncontested because the court had previously stricken Husband's pleading after Husband failed to comply with discovery orders. Thus, only Wife presented evidence at the hearing. Husband represented himself during much of the time this case was in the trial court.
Husband challenges, on procedural grounds, Wife's discovery motions. He also asserts that his actions during the time the case was in the trial court were â€

Victor M. Mendoza appeals a judgment after his conviction of two counts of attempted extortion (Pen. Code, §§ 518, 664) with jury findings that he committed these offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang (id., § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)). After the entry of the verdicts, the trial court granted a defense motion to strike the jury's criminal street gang findings. It ordered the clerk to enter findings that those allegations were "not true." The jury foreman had made a mistake on the initial verdict forms by writing "not true," instead of true.
A juror subsequently informed the trial court of the error. The jury corrected the mistake on new verdict forms, and it found that the gang allegations were true. The court had initially allowed the jury to correct the error with the new verdict forms. But at the hearing on the motion to strike, it found that it was bound by the "not true" findings on the initial verdict forms. Court conclude, among other things, that: 1) substantial evidence supports the judgment, 2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to bifurcate the gang allegations, 3) it properly admitted gang evidence, and 4) the admission of a gang "roll call sheet" was not reversible error. Court affirm.