CA Unpub Decisions

In August 2009 police detained then 17-year-old T.B. (the minor) after he and other youths took a cellular telephone by force from the victim Byron D. The People filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition against him. The juvenile court sustained the petition and declared the offense to be a felony. The minor was adjudicated a ward of the court and ordered home on probation.
Court appointed counsel to represent him on appeal.

Appellant Charlene P. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court order denying her request for a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388. Court find no abuse of discretion, and affirm the juvenile court's order.

Mother Cindy V. (Mother) appeals orders summarily denying her petition brought pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388,[1] and terminating parental rights to her child, Matthew M. To obtain a hearing on a section 388 petition seeking to change, modify, or set aside a previous dependency court order, a parent must show that there is a change of circumstances or new evidence, and that setting aside or modifying the prior order would be in the child's best interests. We conclude that the petition did not provide new evidence that setting aside the order terminating family reunification services to Mother would be in Matthew's best interests, and that summary denial of Mother's section 388 petition was not an abuse of discretion. Court affirm that order and the order terminating parental rights.

In this action, plaintiff and real party in interest Alberto Gutierrez, a former teacher at San Fernando High School (SFHS), contends that defendants and petitioners Jose Luis Rodriguez, Kelly Welsh, and Kenneth Lee (collectively defendants), administrators at SFHS during plaintiff's tenure, violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for his off-campus speech. After the trial court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment, defendants filed a petition for writ of mandate and/or prohibition, which is the subject of this opinion.

Father seeks extraordinary writ review of an order of the juvenile court terminating reunification services and setting the matter for a hearing terminating parental rights and establishing adoption as a permanent plan. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother is not a party to the writ proceeding. Court deny the petition.

Following his plea of no contest to evading a police officer and obstruction of a peace officer, and admitting his prior convictions for attempted murder and shooting at an occupied vehicle, defendant appeals his 25-years-to-life sentence. Defendant alleges seven reasons the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to strike one of his prior convictions. He claims the court erred under the Burgos/Benson â€

Appointed counsel for defendant Brian Espitia asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We examined the entire record and found no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant. In addition, there are no Penal Code section 4019 concerns. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.

The defendant Marco Charles Yokum appeals his sentence following his guilty plea to possession for sale of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) and admission of a prior strike and to violating the terms of his probation. His appeal is subject to the principles of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110. Pursuant to the latter, we provide the following summary of the offense and the proceedings in the trial court.

The minor Jack W.[1] appeals from the order of the juvenile court that found he came within its jurisdiction for committing misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, § 242), and placed him on probation. His appeal is subject to the principles of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110. Pursuant to the latter, we provide the following summary of the offense and the proceedings in the juvenile court.
A petition alleged that Jack W. committed misdemeanor battery in September 2009. Before adjudication, the minor rejected an offer of informal probation. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 654.2.)[2]
The (then) 16-year-old victim testified that she was walking home from high school with the (then) 16-year-old minor, who was a friend that had walked home with her a couple of previous times. The minor put his left arm around her waist. The victim unsuccessfully tried to move away, because this made her feel uncomfortable. After looking behind them at the victim's father, who was coming up behind them in a car, the minor asked how she thought her father would respond if the minor â€

This appeal is brought pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).
On February 18, 2010, as part of a plea agreement that resolved two felony cases, a misdemeanor case, and a misdemeanor probation violation, defendant Eddie Albert Savala pleaded no contest to petty theft with a prior, battery, and possession of methamphetamine, and admitted a prior strike conviction. (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 666, 667, subds. (b)-(i); Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a).) In exchange, other charges were dismissed and defendant was to receive a stipulated sentence of seven years four months in state prison.

In this malicious prosecution action, the trial court granted defendants' special motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.16)[1] based on plaintiff Jeffrey A. Agnew's inability to show a probability of prevailing. Agnew contends the court erred by finding his voluntary dismissal from the underlying action was not a favorable termination within the meaning of malicious prosecution law. We affirm the order, as defendants' undisputed evidence shows the dismissal was based solely on financial considerations, and does not reflect the merits of the underlying action. Contrary to Agnew's assertion, he adduced no evidence from which a jury could reasonably find favorable termination. Moreover, the question of favorable termination is based on the court's view of the underlying judgment as a whole, and Agnew challenges the merit of only one of three causes of action against him in the underlying action. He claims defendants realized the fraud cause of action lacked merit, but he ignores the causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence. Given our holding, we are not required to address the probable cause and malice elements of the malicious prosecution action.

A jury found Jermain Onze Morgan guilty of attempted first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a), 189)[1] (count 1), assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) (count 2), and mayhem (§ 203) (count 3). With respect to counts 1 and 3, the jury found that Morgan intentionally and personally discharged a firearm and proximately caused great bodily injury to the victim (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). With respect to count 2, the jury found that Morgan personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). On count 1, the trial court sentenced Morgan to prison for life with the possibility of parole for the underlying offense, plus 25 years to life for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement. The court imposed and stayed imposition of the sentences on counts 2 and 3 pursuant to section 654.

Concordia Homes of California, LLC and LB/L-Concordia Master LLC (collectively Concordia) sued defendants Don Jack, Farwest West American Trust Contractual Business Organization (Farwest) and Pacific View, Ltd for breach of contract (Concordia lawsuit) alleging that Don Jack had breached a settlement agreement by filing an earlier lawsuit (Jack lawsuit). Defendants filed a Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16[1] special motion to strike the complaint, which the trial court granted partly on grounds Concordia had not shown a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of its claim because Judge Quinn had ruled that the Jack lawsuit was not released under the terms of the settlement agreement. Plaintiff Concordia Homes of California, LLC appeals the grant of the motion.

A jury found Jason Duane Cooper guilty of two counts of murder in the first degree (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 187, subd. (a), 189), found true the allegation he personally used a deadly weapon during the commission of the offenses (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and found true the special circumstance allegations, namely, that the two murders were intentional and involved the infliction of torture (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)) and involved more than one offense of murder, one of which was in the first degree (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). The jury also subsequently found that Cooper was sane at the time he committed the two murders. The trial court sentenced Cooper to two consecutive terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole, with an additional one year (concurrent) for the use of the deadly weapon.