CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Dennis Leeroy Hammack is serving a six-year sentence after a jury convicted him of unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). In this appeal, defendant argues: 1) there was insufficient evidence that he had the specific intent to deprive the victim of possession of her car; 2) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury using Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instruction CALCRIM No. 376; 3) the prosecutor inappropriately argued that Hammack had an affirmative obligation to prove his innocence and referred to facts not in evidence; and 4) the cumulative effect of the trial court errors requires reversal. As discussed below, we reject these arguments and affirm the conviction.

A jury convicted Jaime Ayala Delgado of two counts of committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a))[1] and found true that he committed felony sex offenses against multiple victims (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(5)).[2] Defendant argues the trial court erred in a number of respects when it sentenced him, consecutively rather than concurrently, to a determinate term of six years on the substantive charges and an indeterminate term of 15 years to life on the multiple-victim enhancement. As discussed below, we conclude that the trial court intended to and did sentence defendant to consecutive terms. However, because the trial court expressed a belief that it had no discretion to impose concurrent terms, we order a limited remand so the trial court can exercise its discretion on whether to impose the terms concurrently or consecutively.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Douglas Alexander Mialkousky of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1))[1] and found he had personally inflicted great bodily injury in committing the crime (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The court found defendant had three prior felony convictions that qualified as serious felonies and strikes, and had served four prior prison terms. (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (c), (e)(2)(A), 667.5, subd. (b), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A).) He was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 43 years to life. The court imposed and stayed one-year sentences for each of the four prior prison terms.

Zachary S. and L.S. (together, the parents) seek writ review of juvenile court orders terminating their reunification services regarding their daughter, Brenna S., and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Zachary contends the court erred by terminating reunification services because there was a substantial probability Brenna would be returned to parental care by the 18-month date; substantial evidence does not support the finding reasonable reunification services were provided; and the court abused its discretion by suspending visitation without a finding of detriment and by delegating discretion to the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) to decide whether to reinstate visitation. L.S. joins Zachary's arguments. We deny the petitions. We vacate the stay of the section 366.26 hearing.

Attorney Victoria Tran Sood was appointed by the court to represent the conservatee, Emmanuela Genise,[1] in this conservatorship proceeding. Emmanuela had been diagnosed with dementia and her five adult children were disputing among themselves about various matters from their mother's testamentary documents to whether she could be removed from the assisted living facility where she resided to whether one of the siblings should continue to live rent free in the family home. A global settlement among all parties was ultimately reached and approved by the court, which then discharged Tran Sood as Emmanuela's attorney.
The court also simultaneously entertained Tran Sood's petition for payment of $23,441.03 in attorney fees and costs for her representation of Emmanuela. Roland Genise, as trustee of his mother's trust, filed a written objection to payment of any fees over $7,500. At the hearing on the petition, Tran Sood requested that the matter of her fees and costs be continued to allow her to respond to Roland's objection, but she asked if payment of the undisputed $7,500 could be made pending the court's resolution of the balance of her fee request. From the bench, the court confirmed that this payment â€

The Board of Parole Hearings (Board) granted parole to respondent Roderick McConnell. After the Governor reversed the Board's decision, McConnell brought a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the superior court granted. Appellant Warden challenges the superior court's order. We conclude that the Governor's decision was not supported by some evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the superior court's order.

Plaintiff Darren Duffy brought a tort action against Corinna Loveland (defendant), his former sister-in-law, and Lena Fuentes (Fuentes), his former wife. Plaintiff and Fuentes had been involved in prior court proceedings involving the custody of their minor child. In the present tort action, plaintiff obtained entry of default on the complaint against defendant and, following a prove-up hearing, was awarded $135,000 in damages in a default judgment against defendant. Thereafter, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his claims against Fuentes.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court had â€

Defendant Adriaan Daniel Knox appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378 - count 1), possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a) - count 2), possession of a controlled substance without a prescription (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4060 - count 3), and possession of controlled substance paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a) - count 4). Defendant also admitted that a prior narcotics conviction enhancement allegation (Health & Saf. Code, 11370.2, subd. (c)) in connection with count 1 was true. The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for a term of two years.[1] On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence; (2) he was penalized for exercising his right to trial by jury; and (3) he was entitled to additional conduct credits pursuant to Penal Code section 4019.[2] We find no error and affirm the judgment.

R.S. (father) was alleged to have sexually abused his 12-year-old stepdaughter, K.T. Both K.T. and father's then five-year-old son, S.S., were taken into protective custody. Father waived his right to trial at a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing. The juvenile court declared S.S. to be a dependent child, removed S.S. from father's custody, and denied visitation and reunification services to father. Father appeals from the jurisdiction and disposition orders, and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which we have consolidated with the appeal.
Father argues the juvenile court failed to fully advise him of his trial rights before he submitted to the juvenile dependency petition on the basis of the social workers' reports. Father signed a waiver of rights, and initialed the boxes indicating he understood the rights he was waiving. We find no error.

Defendant David Gabriel Marason was convicted of second degree robbery and burglary, stemming from a bank robbery, and sentenced to a total of three years in prison.
We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), setting forth the facts of the case and requesting that we review the entire record. Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, appointed counsel suggested we consider as possible issues whether the trial court erred in certain evidentiary rulings.
On April 21, 2011, this court provided defendant with 30 days to file written argument on his own behalf. That period of time has passed, and we have received no communication from him.
We have examined the entire record and counsel's Wende brief, and find no arguable issue. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) We therefore affirm.

The Krauses were annoyed with their next door neighbors, the Richards. The Krauses feared that trees which the Richards had planted would damage a drainage system the Krauses had installed. The Krauses thought that the Richards were storing their garbage cans in a common area where they had no right to store them. The Krauses did not like the Richards parking one of their vehicles in front of the Krauses' home. The Krauses further thought the Richards were storing unsightly and excessive chairs and tables in their backyard, open to the Krauses' view. The Richards had also neglected to repair a broken cement patio in the same backyard. And the Krauses objected to bushes planted by the Richards alongside a common â€

Defendant Orlando Garcia was found guilty after a jury trial of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1); all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated), possession of ammunition by a felon (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1), possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)), and participating in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)). The jury also found defendant committed the offenses for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).

Defendants Andrew Raymond Aguirre and Yulliana Beltran pleaded guilty to various offenses after the trial court denied their motion to suppress evidence. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5; all statutory references are to the Penal Code unless noted). They contend Santa Ana police officers illegally entered and searched their home without a search warrant or other legal justification in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the judgment.

Defendants and appellants are South Coast Home Furnishings Centre, LLC, Birtcher Development & Investments, LLC (Birtcher Development), Birtcher Enterprises, LLC, and Brandon R. Birtcher (collectively, Appellants). They appeal from an order denying their motion to disqualify the law firm of Jackson DeMarco Tidus & Peckenpaugh (Jackson DeMarco) from representing plaintiffs and respondents Dale A. Williams and South Coast Home Furnishing Center, LLC (collectively, Respondents), in the underlying lawsuit.[1]
Appellants contend Jackson DeMarco represented a wholly owned subsidiary of Birtcher Development by preparing leases for it in an unrelated matter while concurrently representing Respondents. In so doing, Appellants argue, Jackson DeMarco violated State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3‑310(C), which prohibits concurrent representation in separate matters of clients with adverse interests. The trial court found no attorney‑client relationship had been created between Jackson DeMarco and the Birtcher Development subsidiary. The record and the law support the trial court's finding, and we therefore affirm the order.