CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Kardell Jones entered a negotiated plea of no contest to a charge of petty theft with a prior. He also admitted one of three â€

In this dependency case (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300 et seq.),[1]Pamela S., the mother of the subject dependent minor child D. H. (Mother and the minor, respectively), has appealed from a section 366.26 order that terminated her parental rights to the child. The minor's father, Richard H. (Father), has appealed from that order as well because his parental rights were also terminated. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.200 (a)(5), Mother incorporates into her appellate presentation the argument made by Father in his opening appellate brief, to wit, that Father and the minor have a parent‑child relationship that is so strong and beneficial to the child that it the warrants not terminating Father's parental rights and thus their father-son relationship meets the statutory exception to termination of parental rights found in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). Additionally, Mother asserts that if Father's parental rights are restored by this court then her parental rights must also be restored. However Father's appeal has already been decided by this court in case B227523 and we affirmed the order terminating his parental rights.[2]

Monika S., the mother, has appealed from the depositional orders after the child, Jordan C., was found to be a dependent. We will address the issues raised by this court and the parties. We affirm the dispositional orders.

Father, Mark W., Sr., challenges an order granting a subsequent petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 342 and removing his son, Mark W., Jr., from his custody. Father contends the use of a section 342 petition was procedurally improper, the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding on the subsequent petition is not supported by substantial evidence, the removal order is not supported by substantial evidence, and reversal is required to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We strike the jurisdictional finding, reverse the order of removal and remand with directions to dismiss the section 342 petition and to comply with the notice requirements of ICWA and state law.

Defendant Kwame Alexander Francis appeals from a judgment entered after he pled no contest to one felony count and admitted a prior conviction, in exchange for the dismissal of four other felony counts and a sentence to the low term, doubled under the â€

Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment (SCOPE) appeals from the trial court's denial of its writ of mandate. Through the writ of mandate, SCOPE sought to set aside the City of Santa Clarita's (the city) approval of a Master Plan to allow real parties Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (the hospital) and G&L Valencia, LLC (collectively â€

Defendant and appellant Fred DiPaolo (defendant) appeals from the judgment imposed by the trial court following his conviction of three counts of oral copulation/sexual penetration with a child under 10 years of age, in violation of Penal Code section 288.7, subdivision (b).[1] The trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life as to count 1, a consecutive 15-year-to-life term as to count 2, and a concurrent term of 15 years to life as to count 3. Defendant was accorded 335 days of presentence custody credit, consisting of 335 days of actual custody and no conduct credit.
Defendant contends the sentence imposed constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because it is grossly disproportionate to the offenses and because it is grossly excessive and beyond his life expectancy. He asks this court to find the sentence imposed by the trial court unconstitutional as applied and to reduce the sentence to either a determinate sentence not to exceed 12 years or a concurrent 15-year-to-life sentence as to all three counts.
Both defendant and respondent agree the matter should be remanded for resentencing because the trial court did not believe it had discretion to sentence defendant concurrently as to count 2. Defendant and respondent also agree that defendant is entitled to an additional four days of actual presentence custody credit and an additional 50 days of conduct credit.
We remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing only and direct the court to exercise its discretion and determine whether the sentence imposed as to count 2 is consecutive or concurrent and to accord defendant an additional 54 days of presentence custody credit. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Defendant Christopher Duke Young appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury trial. He was charged with two counts of first degree burglary (Pen. Code,[1] § 459; count 1, burglary of Georgia Case's home, and count 2, burglary of Kim Dupree's home) and one count of receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a); count 3). It was alleged as to all three counts that defendant had two prior felony convictions within the meaning of the â€

Homeowners brought an action against local governmental entities for inverse condemnation, continuing public nuisance, and continuing dangerous condition of public property. [1] The governmental entities are the County of Ventura (the County) and the Ventura County Watershed Protection District (the District). The County and the District are hereafter collectively referred to as appellants. The trial court found in Homerowners' favor on the inverse condemnation cause of action. It granted appellants' motion for summary adjudication on the nuisance and dangerous condition causes of action. As to these two tort causes of action, the court concluded that appellants had established the affirmative defense of design immunity and that respondents had not raised a triable issue concerning the loss of immunity.
Appellants contend that the trial court erroneously admitted two reports, that it was biased in favor of and became an advocate for Homeowners, and that it engaged in misconduct. Homeowners cross-appealed, raising a number of issues. We affirm the judgment in its entirety.

Codefendants Kamaron Walker (Walker) and Eric Alexander Williams (Williams) appeal from their judgments of conviction entered after a jury found them guilty of the murder of Dion Holloway (Holloway).
Walker contends that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of a key prosecution witness, as well as the agreement the witness signed, granting him immunity and leniency in exchange for his truthful testimony. In the alternative, he asserts ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the testimony and agreement. Walker also contends that a series of evidentiary rulings was erroneous and that the cumulative effect of them was prejudicial.
Williams contends that the trial court conducted an inadequate Marsden[1] inquiry, and that the sentence imposed upon him pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1),[2] was unauthorized. Williams also asks that the abstracts of judgment be amended to reflect that the restitution order was joint and several, and he joins in any arguments made by Walker to the extent they benefit him.
We conclude that defendants' contentions are without merit, and affirm the judgments.

Terrance Lee Bracks appeals from his conviction for attempted robbery with a personal use of a firearm enhancement and for a felon in possession of a weapon. His only contention on appeal is that the firearm enhancement is not supported by sufficient evidence. We affirm.

Defendant Mohtaram L. Koursaris (â€

Defendant and appellant Proskauer Rose LLP (Proskauer) appeals a judgment following a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff and respondent Myra Benson (Benson). Proskauer also appeals an order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV).[1]
The essential issue presented is whether the jury returned inconsistent verdicts on two of Benson's claims.
We conclude the verdicts as to two of Benson's claims are irreconcilable so as to require reversal and a partial new trial on those claims.

A jury convicted Daniel Ricardo Clarke of rape, burglary, and related charges. Clarke appealed and filed a simultaneous petition for writ of habeas corpus on numerous grounds, including ineffective assistance of counsel. We granted a limited form of relief on the habeas petition, directing the superior court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and rule on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The superior court held the hearing and ruled against Clarke, who then filed a new habeas petition in this court. We issued an order to show cause and ordered that the petition be heard concurrently with Clarke's still-pending appeal. We now conclude that Clarke's ineffective assistance of counsel claim has merit and that Clarke was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance. We accordingly grant the petition and vacate the judgment.