CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Samuel Serrano (Serrano) appeals from an order modifying the terms and conditions of his probation to add a search condition. Serrano contends no changed circumstances justify the modification. We agree and reverse the order.

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, arson, and other crimes after he shot and killed a woman from whom he had previously purchased pain medication, and then set fire to her home, killing her two dogs. Two people who were with defendant on the night of the murder testified against him at trial. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that it was required to determine whether one of the witnesses was an accomplice and, if so, that her testimony required corroboration and must be viewed with caution. We disagree and affirm.

Plaintiffs Roy Allen Nash, Christina Nash (the â€

Ernesto Carranza-Gutierrez (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422[1], count 1), dissuading a witness from reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b), count 2), and unlawful possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1), count 3), and found true the allegation as to counts 1 and 2 that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). He contends: (1) the trial court erred in granting the prosecutor's request to introduce evidence of prior domestic violence; and (2) the sentence under count 2 should have been stayed. We reject the contentions and affirm the judgment.

The minor, S. S., appeals from a dispositional order, following the findings by the juvenile court that he made threats to commit a crime resulting in death or great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 422.)[1] The court placed the minor on probation with various terms and conditions, including that he â€

Defendant Marshall Kent Doud was convicted after jury trial of the first degree murder of his wife, Morgana Doud. (Pen. Code, § 187.)[1] The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for 25 years to life. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) by refusing defendant's request to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter; (2) by refusing defendant's requested instruction on partial unconsciousness; (3) by allowing an expert to testify as to defendant's mental state; (4) by allowing the expert to express an opinion about defendant's credibility; (5) by admitting inadmissible hearsay; and (6) by admitting statements defendant made during guardianship proceedings involving his children. Defendant also contends that his conviction should be reversed due to cumulative error. As we find no prejudicial error, we will affirm the judgment.

Petitioner, Richard Joey Longoria, seeks relief from the failure to file a timely notice of appeal from his criminal conviction. We agree Longoria is entitled to relief, and as such, the petition is granted.
Following a trial, a jury convicted Longoria of two drug related offenses and he was sentenced to a total term of 4 years in state prison. In his declaration, trial counsel states that after Longoria was sentenced, he advised Longoria that he would file a notice of appeal on his behalf. According to trial counsel, he miscounted the days between sentencing and filing the notice of appeal and inadvertently filed the notice of appeal one day late. Although the superior court filed the notice, this court â€

Following a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found true an allegation, set forth in a juvenile wardship petition, that appellant, Jason M., committed second degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b)). Following the subsequent disposition hearing, the court adjudged appellant a ward of the juvenile court; placed him under the supervision of the probation department in the home of his mother; found him jointly and severally liable, with appellant's co-participant in the instant offense, for victim restitution in the amount of $40; and ordered that appellant pay a restitution fine of $100.
Appellant's appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant has not responded to this court's invitation to submit additional briefing.

This is appellant Fernando Jose Ramos's second appeal from the judgment of conviction in case No. 05CM4414 and case No. 06CM0288, after this court reversed one of his convictions and remanded the matter for resentencing. (People v. Ramos (Feb. 3, 2010, F055948) [nonpub. opn.].) Appellant contends the trial court erred at his resentencing hearing by imposing an increased restitution fine in case No. 06CM0288. We agree and therefore modify the judgment to correct the error.

Appellant, Gabriel Angel Perez, was charged in an information filed August 3, 2009, with felony assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), count one)[1] and misdemeanor resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1), count two). The complaint alleged a great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
On September 10, 2009, appellant entered into a plea agreement in which he would admit the allegations, including the great bodily injury enhancement. Under the agreement, appellant would receive probation with a maximum prison term of seven years if he violated the conditions of probation. The trial court advised appellant of the consequences of his plea and explained his constitutional rights pursuant to Boykin/Tahl.[2] The court found a factual basis for the plea based on the preliminary hearing transcript. Appellant pled no contest to both counts and admitted the great bodily injury enhancement.

Appellant, Floyd Anthony Hunter, was charged in a first amended consolidated information filed August 28, 2008, with felony assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)).[1] Appellant was also charged with enhancements for personally using a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and for being armed with a handgun (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
On August 28, 2008, appellant entered into a plea agreement in which he would admit felony assault and personal use of a firearm and that he would be placed on probation. The trial court advised appellant of the consequences of his plea and explained his constitutional rights pursuant to Boykin/Tahl.[2] One of the consequences of his plea, the court explained to appellant, was that he faced a prison sentence as low as five years or as high as 14 years. The parties stipulated to a factual basis for the plea.[3] Appellant pled no contest to felony assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury and admitted the gun use enhancement.
Toward the conclusion of the change of plea hearing, the court placed appellant on felony probation for five years upon various terms and conditions. Appellant admitted the current offense constituted a violation of his probation in two unrelated misdemeanor cases. The court found appellant in violation of probation but reinstituted probation.
On July 13, 2009, a petition was filed alleging appellant violated the conditions of his probation by submitting a urine sample that tested positive for methamphetamine and for being a felon in possession of ammunition in violation of section 12316, subdivision (b)(1). On September 14, 2009, appellant admitted he had a positive drug test as alleged in the petition. On October 16, 2009, the court found it would be inappropriate to reinstate probation and sentenced appellant to prison for the upper term of four years for felony assault likely to cause great bodily injury and to a consecutive midterm of four years for the gun use enhancement for a total prison sentence of eight years. The court granted appellant custody credits of 359 days plus conduct credits of 53 days for total credits of 412 days.[4]
On November 13, 2009, appellant filed a motion to stay execution of judgment and a motion to withdraw his plea based on alleged new evidence. On November 17, 2009, the court denied appellant's request for an order shortening time for service of his motion to withdraw his plea. The court denied appellant's motion to withdraw his plea, finding the attached declaration untrustworthy. The court also found the motion to be untimely under section 1018. The court denied appellant's motion for stay of execution of his sentence.

A.B. (born February 2006) and her sister, P.B. (born May 2008) (collectively minors), came to the attention of the Riverside County Department of Social Services (the department) on November 5, 2009, the day after mother brought P.B. to the hospital for treatment for gastroenteritis and dehydration. An immediate response referral was received after a mandatory reporter indicated P.B. had sustained numerous injuries, including a black eye, extensive bruising behind her right ear extending down towards her neck, bruising on the right side of her head, finger marks along her spine, a broken leg, a broken arm, two skull fractures, and concomitant brain injury. The juvenile court detained and later removed minors from mother's custody. The court denied mother reunification services finding minors had been adjudicated dependents of the court as a result of the infliction of severe physical harm. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, subds. (b)(5) & (6).)[1]

A jury convicted defendant Wilbert Frank of the lesser included offense of spousal battery under count 1. (Penal Code, § 243, subd. (e)(1).)[1] The jury found defendant not guilty of corporal injury on a spouse, (count 1--§ 273.5) not guilty of corporal injury on a child, (count 2--§ 273d, subd. (a)) and not guilty of the lesser included offense of child abuse under count 2 (§ 273a, subd. (b)). The court sentenced defendant to three years of probation, and required him to serve 75 days in jail on weekends or on home detention. On appeal, defendant raises two issues: (1) the court erred in instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 5.32, use of force in defense of another, because his wife's rationale for attacking him was irrelevant to defendant's claim of self-defense; and (2) the court erred in instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 5.54, self-defense by an aggressor, because defendant was not an initial aggressor against his wife. We hold that the court properly instructed the jury with CALJIC Nos. 5.32 and 5.54 and affirm the judgment.

Arthur Lopez appeals the summary judgment entered against him on claims for breach of contract and declaratory relief arising out of his resignation as Director of Financial Aid of Southwestern Community College District (the District). After independently examining the record, we find no triable issues of material fact and affirm the summary judgment.
I