CA Unpub Decisions

Following a 12-day jury trial, defendant Deverick Lockett was convicted of two counts of kidnapping to commit rape (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1)),[1] and single counts of rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(1)), assault with intent to commit rape (§ 220), attempted rape (§§ 664, 261, subd. (a)(2)), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and misdemeanor battery (§ 242), along with allegations that defendant kidnapped the rape victim (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(2)), moved her in a manner that substantially increased the risk of harm (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(1)), and inflicted great bodily injury (§§ 667.61, former subd. (e)(3), 12022.7, 12022.8). The trial court sustained a prior strike allegation (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and sentenced defendant to a state prison term of 30 years plus 64 years to life.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in finding no prima facie case of racial discrimination in the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges, and his conviction for attempted rape should be stricken as a lesser included offense of assault with intent to commit rape. Only this second contention has merit. We shall modify the judgment accordingly and, in all other respects, affirm the judgment.

J.S.R., the father of the child, Jose R., appeals from a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 parental rights termination order. The father contends the parental rights termination order must be reversed because of noncompliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act and related California provisions. The parties, including counsel for the child, have stipulated to a limited reversal of the parental rights termination order to allow compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act and related California provisions and for immediate remittitur issuance. We accept the parties' stipulation. The parties agree there was noncompliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act and related California provisions. We concur in their assessment in this regard. Further, the parties agree the parental rights termination order must be reversed and remanded to permit proof of compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act and related California provisions.

K.T., the mother of the child, K.G., appeals from a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 parental rights termination order. The mother contends the parental rights termination order must be reversed because of noncompliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act and related California provisions. The parties, including counsel for the child, have stipulated to a limited reversal of the parental rights termination order to allow compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act and related California provisions and for immediate remittitur issuance. We accept the parties' stipulation. The parties agree there was noncompliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act and related California provisions. We concur in their assessment in this regard. Further, the parties agree the parental rights termination order must be reversed and remanded to permit proof of compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act and related California provisions.

In 1986, Roger Hairston was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to a term of 15 years to life in prison. On May 8, 2008, the Board of Parole Hearings found Hairston unsuitable for parole. On Hairston's petition for writ of habeas corpus, the trial court ordered the Board to â€

Appellant Jarmon Sanford appeals from the judgment imposed after resentencing. In our unpublished opinion, case No. B210890, we remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing in counts 1 and 5 and in the enhancements imposed in the subordinate counts. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in resentencing when it imposed the full 10-year terms in the subordinate counts for the gang enhancements pursuant to Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C). Respondent concedes this point.

By way of a petition for writ of administrative mandate, Save Our Neighborhood Group (Song) unsuccessfully sought to overturn the certification under the California's Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15000 et seq. (Guidelines))[1] by the City of Lancaster (the City) of a Final Environmental Impact Report (FEIR) evaluating a project to amend the City's general plan and to change zoning to allow construction of a shopping center on a vacant lot in an area of the City originally zoned for residential use. Song appeals contending that (1) the City violated certain California housing mandates in the Planning and Zoning Law (Gov. Code, §§ 65000 et seq. & 65863) and (2) failed to select an alternative to the project identified in the FEIR. We reverse the judgment denying Song's writ petition.

Billy Gene Mannon was in court awaiting his preliminary hearing on charges of child molestation. The prosecutor determined that the case could not be proved as a felony and asked that it be set for trial as a misdemeanor. Realizing that the case would not conclude as expected, Mannon exclaimed, "Can we just get this thing done?" and added, " I'm telling you this, I want a rope around that dude's neck right there." Although Mannon was ultimately acquitted of the child molestation charge, the prosecution charged him with new felony crimes based on his courtroom statement.

Following a jury trial, defendant Johnny A. Flores was convicted of first degree murder (count 1), two counts of burglary of a vehicle (counts 3 & 4), and two counts of receiving stolen property (counts 5 & 6). (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 459, 496, subd. (a).)[1] He was found not guilty of the unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (count 7).[2] (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).) With respect to the murder, defendant was tried under the felony-murder rule, as the prosecution alleged that the killing occurred during the commission of a burglary. Defendant appeals, contending: (1) auto burglary is not a predicate felony for purposes of the felony-murder rule; (2) a finding that auto burglary is a predicate felony for purposes of the felony-murder rule violates equal protection; (3) his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; and (4) the trial court committed sentencing error. We conclude that two of the sentences imposed must be stayed. As modified, we affirm the judgment.

Johnnie Lee Johnson appeals from the judgment entered following a finding that he was in violation of probation. We affirm.
Underlying Offense in Case No. TA088204
In December 2006, appellant was charged by felony complaint with five counts of corporal injury to a child, in violation of Penal Code section 273d, subdivision (a). The complaint further alleged as to counts 2 through 5 that appellant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (b)(1).
In February 2007, appellant accepted an offer to plead no contest to counts 3 and 4 and admit the use of the deadly weapon in exchange for five years of formal probation. The court accepted the no contest pleas and imposed the high term of six years in state prison on count 3, plus one year for the weapon allegation, for a total of seven years. Execution of the sentence was suspended, and appellant was placed on five years of formal probation on the condition that he serve 360 days in county jail. The court imposed the requisite fines, fees, and conditions, and gave appellant credit for 240 days of actual custody and 120 days of good time/work time credit for a total of 360 days. Sentence on count 4 was stayed, and the remaining three counts were dismissed.

A jury convicted Patrick Redman on two counts of making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422).[1] On appeal, Redman contends the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to give the jury a unanimity instruction, and the evidence is insufficient to support one of the convictions. We affirm.

Appellant Shanel Stasz appeals the judgment entered in favor of plaintiff and respondent Park Wellington Homeowners' Association after a court trial. Appellant asserts that the judgment was inconsistent with the evidence, and that the court erred by denying her a continuance, by proceeding in violation of a bankruptcy stay, and by allowing counsel, who Stasz believed had not properly appeared, to represent respondent at trial. For the reasons set forth below, we find appellant has not demonstrated that the trial court either abused its discretion or erred. We affirm.

Alan Javier Gonzalez appeals the judgment, by jury, convicting him of the second degree murder of 19-year old Alex Aldana (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189),[1] assault with a semiautomatic firearm on Lydia Hernandez (§ 245, subd. (b)(1)), two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)), and one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition. (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1).) The jury further found that, in committing the murder and the assault, appellant personally discharged a firearm and that he committed the offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§§ 12022.53, subd. (b)-(d), 186.22, subd. (b).) Appellant admitted that he had one prior strike conviction. (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subd. (a)-(d).) The trial court sentenced appellant to a term in state prison of 55 years to life for the murder, plus 47 years, 4 months on the remaining convictions.

This is an appeal from the trial court's order determining that the cross-complainant's claims against the cross-defendant law firm fell outside the ambit of Civil Code section 1714.10, subdivision (a), which imposes a prefiling requirement for claims against an attorney based on a civil conspiracy with the client, and instead fell within the subdivision (c) exceptions specifying that no prior court order is required where (1) the attorney has an independent legal duty to the plaintiff (or cross-complainant) or (2) the attorney's acts go beyond the performance of a professional duty to serve the client and involve a conspiracy to violate a legal duty in furtherance of the attorney's financial gain. Because the statute does not apply to the claims alleged, we affirm.

Defendant appeals from a judgment entered on his plea. His counsel has asked this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We find no arguable issues and affirm.
On June 4, 2010, defendant was charged by information with one count of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211[1]--count 1), with allegations that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and caused great bodily injury (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.7, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d), (g)); one count of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)--count 2), with allegations that he personally used a firearm and caused great bodily injury (§§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.7, subd. (a)); and one count of unlawful firearm activity (§ 12021, subd. (c)(1)--count 3). The charges stemmed from an incident in Oakland on December 12, 2009, when defendant shot the victim in both thighs after demanding that the victim â€