CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant was convicted, by a jury, of attempted murder of a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 664, 187, subd. (a));[1] assault on a peace officer (§ 245, subd. (d)(1)); possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)); carrying an unregistered loaded firearm (§ 12031, subd. (a)(1)), and evading a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a).) Appellant was sentenced to a determinate state prison term of 3 years and 8 months plus an indeterminate term of 25 years to life.

Appellant Fernando C. was detained under Welfare & Institutions Code section 602, charged with second degree robbery, a felony. (Pen. Code, § 211.) A second count, for misdemeanor petty theft under Penal Code section 484, subdivision (a), was dismissed on the prosecution's motion at the adjudication hearing.

A modification decision.

Lisa Thomas appeals from the judgment entered after she pleaded guilty to second degree commercial burglary in violation of Penal Code section 459[1] and admitted that she had served a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). Thomas contends that the trial court erred by declining to award her the increase in conduct credits provided for in former section 4019, as amended January 25, 2010. We affirm.

J.W. (father) appeals from orders entered in the dependency case filed on behalf of J.W. (minor). Father contends: (1) unspecified orders should be reversed on the grounds that the Department of Children and Family Services (Department) did not provide the notice required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA); and (2) the juvenile court erred when it denied his petition under section 388 of the Welfare and Institutions Code[1] seeking six months of reunification services.

The information charged Denise Tett with one count of sale or transportation of marijuana in violation of subdivision (a) of Health and Safety Code section 11360 (count 1) and one count of possession of marijuana for sale in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11359 (count 2). Tett pleaded not guilty.
Tett moved, pursuant to Evidence Code section 1043 and 1045, for disclosure of records of certain forms of alleged misconduct by two of the police officers involved in her apprehension. The court conducted an in camera hearing and ordered that some documents be disclosed. Tett also moved for disclosure of the observation post from which law enforcement officers claimed to have seen her commit the charged crimes. The court conducted an in camera hearing and denied the motion but did allow defense counsel, on cross-examination, to ask the officers various general questions about the location of the observation post.
The jury convicted Tett on count 1 and acquitted her on count 2 but found her guilty of the lesser included offense of possession of more than 28.5 grams of marijuana in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11357, subdivision (c). The court placed Tett on formal probation for three years subject to various conditions including that she serve 90 days in jail, less 24 days of presentence custody credit (12 days actual time plus 12 days good time/work time). The court also ordered Tett to provide DNA samples and imposed certain statutory fines and fees. Tett timely appealed.

Appellant was convicted, by a jury, of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).)[1] The jury also found he inflicted great bodily injury on the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) Following the trial, appellant admitted he served four prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b) and had two prior convictions within the meaning of sections 667, subdivision (a)(1) and 1170.12 (b) through (i). He was sentenced to a determinate term of 13 years plus an indeterminate term of 25 years to life.
Appellant contends the trial court improperly denied his motion for a new trial and erroneously allowed the prosecutor to admit evidence that, in the past, he had thrown a brick at the victim. We reject the contentions and affirm the judgment.

Mindith Rahmat appeals orders awarding attorney fees to Charla R. Miller. Rahmat contends that the trial court erred by awarding Miller attorney fees that are not authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6,[1] or any other statute. We affirm.

In a felony complaint filed by the Los Angeles County District Attorney, defendant and appellant Adrian Aranda was charged with possession of marijuana for sale in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11359 (count 1). It was further alleged that appellant had suffered prior convictions pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), section 667.5, subdivision (b), section 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d),[1] and Health and Safety Code section 11370, subdivisions (a) and (c). Appellant pled no contest. Probation was denied, and appellant was sentenced to 16 months in state prison. Appellant was awarded 24 days of presentence custody credits, consisting of 16 actual days and eight days of good time/work time.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. He contends that he is entitled to an additional eight days of conduct credit pursuant to section 4019, in effect at the time of his March 25, 2010, sentencing.
Because appellant was previously convicted of a serious and violent felony, he is not entitled to the new accrual rate of good time/work time credits set forth in section 4019. Accordingly, we affirm.

Appellant Vallory Conkle is both the trustee of an inter vivos trust and the executor of the trust settlors' wills. The corpus of the trust estate and probate estate is, in large part, the same. As trustee of the Worden Family Trust, she appeals from an order of the probate court denying her requests for trustee compensation and attorney fees. We affirm.

Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office filed a petition alleging that defendant and appellant J.C. committed attempted robbery in violation of Penal Code sections 664 and 211. Appellant denied the petition.
Following the presentation of evidence, the juvenile court sustained the petition and ordered that appellant be suitably placed. The order does not indicate the maximum physical confinement time. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. He contends: (1) There is insufficient evidence that he had the specific intent to steal from the victim. (2) The juvenile court erred in failing to calculate the maximum term of confinement.
We conclude that sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court's attempted robbery finding. That said, the juvenile court erred in failing to set the maximum confinement time. Accordingly, we affirm the order and remand the matter to the juvenile court to set the maximum confinement time.

Thomas Mundy (Mundy) appeals (1) the judgment in favor RLA Properties, LLC (RLA) on Mundy's complaint and (2) the subsequent order awarding RLA its attorney fees. We affirm the judgment in favor of RLA. However, the postjudgment order awarding attorney fees must be reversed.

Kyle Martin Rubin appeals from the judgment following his conviction by jury of three counts of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a)/664; counts 1-3);[1] three counts of first degree burglary (§ 459; counts 4-6); and one count of attempted first degree burglary (§ 459/664; count 7). The jury also found true allegations that he personally used a knife in each attempted murder (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury on the count 2 attempted murder victim. The trial court imposed a total sentence of 31 years eight months to life. Appellant contends that the trial court admitted his custodial statements in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) and it violated section 654 by imposing the count 4 and 5 burglary sentences. We modify the judgment to stay execution of sentences for counts 4 and 5, but otherwise affirm.

Defendant James L. Williams appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of inflicting corporal injury to a cohabitant, a violation of Penal Code[1] section 273.5, subdivision (a), and misdemeanor assault, a violation of section 240. At sentencing, the trial court found defendant was not qualified for a mental health assessment under former section 1170.9 (which made such an assessment available to certain veterans), denied probation, and sentenced defendant to four years in prison. On appeal, defendant's counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Based on our review of the record on appeal, we asked for and received further briefing on whether defendant qualified for a mental health assessment under section 1170.9.
We conclude the trial court committed no error, but due to an amendment in section 1170.9, defendant's eligibility for a mental health assessment must be determined. We vacate the sentence and remand for this determination.