CA Unpub Decisions

Elsie C. (Mother) appeals from the dependency court's denial of her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition[1] and its finding that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) provided reasonable reunification services. We affirm the order.

Defendant, Deon Charles Burrell, appeals after a jury convicted him of willful infliction of corporal punishment upon a present or former cohabitant. (Pen. Code,[1] § 273.5, subd. (a).) Defendant was initially charged by information with a second count of willful harm or injury to a child. (§ 273a, subd. (a).) The information also alleged defendant had sustained four felony prior convictions and served three prior prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b); 1203, subd. (e)(4).) We modify the judgment to impose a $30 court security fee and delete a section 1203.097 fine.

Ricky Lee Locklear appeals the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of arson of an inhabited structure (Pen. Code,[1] § 451, subd. (b)). The jury also found true the allegation that appellant had suffered a prior serious or violent felony (§§ 667, subds. (b) - (i), 1170.12, subds. (a) - (d)). The trial court sentenced him to 16 years state prison.
On April 5, 2010, appellant went to his girlfriend Jennifer C.'s apartment. Jennifer C. called the police and claimed that appellant had hit her in the mouth with his fist.[2] Jennifer C. waited on the porch and walked down the street to talk to the police when they arrived. A few minutes later, Jennifer C. looked up and saw flames coming from her bedroom window. The police asked Jennifer C. to call appellant on her cell phone. A police officer who spoke to appellant on the phone testified that appellant told him he wanted to kill himself and would burn the building down. After the fire department arrived and extinguished the flames, appellant came out of the apartment and surrendered to the police.

A jury convicted appellant William Albarran of attempted second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211)[1] (count 1). The trial court sentenced appellant to the midterm of two years.
Appellant appeals on the grounds that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the attempted robbery conviction; (2) the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of attempted petty theft; and (3) the trial court erred in its determination and award of presentence custody credits.

Defendant, Tony Ernest Taylor, appeals from his conviction for possession for sale (count 1) and sale (count 2) of heroin. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351, 11352, subd. (a).) Defendant admitted the truth of the allegations he served a prior separate prison term (Pen. Code,[1] § 667.5, subd. (b)) and sustained a prior conviction (§§ 667, subds.
(b)-(i), 1170.12). While under observation by police officers, defendant participated in a heroin sale. Defendant was sentenced to state prison for six years on count 2. Pursuant to section 654, subdivision (a), the trial court imposed and stayed a four-year sentence on count 1. The trial court imposed a $200 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1)) and a $200 parole revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45), in addition to other fees and penalties discussed below. We modify the judgment and affirm as modified.

Appellant Cirilo Escobar Arias was convicted by a jury of four counts of child molestation. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).)[1] He was sentenced to five years in prison. He appeals, contending that his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury was violated because the court did not allow him to waive his right to a 12-person jury. We find his contention to be without merit and affirm the judgment.

The jury convicted defendant William P. Rosas of one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1),[1] three counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); counts 2, 4, 5), and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1); count 7). The jury also found true firearm and criminal street gang enhancement allegations as to counts 1, 2, 4, and 5.[2]
In this appeal from the judgment, defendant contends that: (1) his Wheeler/Batson[3] motion was erroneously denied; (2) he was entitled to an instruction on assault with a deadly weapon as a lesser related offense of attempted murder; (3) the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of great bodily injury with regard to the firearm enhancement allegation in count 2 (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)); and (4) his sentence in count 7 is erroneous. After modifying the sentence in count 7, we affirm the judgment as modified.

A psychology professor at a community college distributes to his colleagues a memo that is highly critical of the psychology department chairperson. We conclude the memo falls within the zone of protected speech and is therefore not actionable.
Plaintiff Arthur Olguin, a psychology professor, appeals a judgment in favor of defendants Santa Barbara Community College District (District) and Raymond Launier, a District psychology professor. Launier filed a grievance against Olguin and sent a memo to District colleagues. Launier claimed that Olguin violated academic freedom when Olguin instructed the college bookstore not to order materials Launier authored and planned to use in his classes. Olguin stated the memo contained false statements including the "republication" of a student's complaint to the District about witnessing him commit a lewd act in his office. Olguin sued defendants, alleging multiple causes of action, including defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence by the District for hiring and not supervising Launier. Launier claimed his academic freedom memo fell within a conditional privilege. The jury found Launier did not act with malice.

Appellant Larry W. appeals from a final judgment disposing of all issues between the parties. Appellant's counsel has filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised and asks this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel has declared that he notified appellant that no issues were being raised by counsel on appeal and that an independent review under Wende instead was being requested. Appellant was also advised of his right personally to file a supplemental brief raising any issues he chooses to bring to this court's attention. No supplemental brief has been filed by appellant personally.

Travis E. appeals from the juvenile court's order setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] permanency planning hearing and the court's subsequent orders denying his section 388 petition and terminating his parental rights.[2] He contends the Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) failed to provide him notice of the hearing that resulted in the setting of the permanency planning hearing, and his absence from that hearing prevented him from elevating his status to presumed father. He contends the juvenile court erred in denying his section 388 petition seeking presumed father status and reunification services. He also contends the Agency violated the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We affirm the juvenile court's orders but remand the case for compliance with ICWA inquiry and notice requirements.

Defendant Andrew Brian Belant appeals a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of six counts of committing a lewd and lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code,[1] § 288, subd. (a)), four counts of forcible oral copulation on a child under the age of 14 (§ 269, subd. (a)(4)), five counts of oral copulation on a child under the age of 14 (§ 288a, subd. (c)(1)), and two counts of possession of child pornography (§ 311.4, subd. (c)). He was sentenced to a determinate prison term of 29 years 4 months, and a consecutive indeterminate term of 60 years to life. Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support all of the convictions relating to one of the four boys he molested, and that the trial court committed evidentiary and instructional error. We shall order defendant's conviction on count 10 reversed, and otherwise affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Jared Lacey Adams of attempted murder, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, second degree robbery, shooting at an occupied building, shooting at an occupied vehicle, evading a police officer, and multiple counts of unlawfully taking a vehicle and carjacking. The jury also found true multiple enhancements including personal and intentional discharge of a weapon causing great bodily injury pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d).[1] The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 70 years to life.
Defendant contends both the prosecutor and trial court committed numerous acts of misconduct that were individually and cumulatively prejudicial, requiring reversal. We conclude either no misconduct occurred, or if it did, it was not prejudicial, and therefore affirm the judgment.

After a neighborhood dispute, a jury found defendant Eero Herrick guilty of the felonies of arson and making a criminal threat, and a misdemeanor count of vandalism. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive prison terms for the felony convictions, with a concurrent jail term for vandalism.

Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the prosecutor to amend the information to allege the count of making a criminal threat because there was insufficient evidence at the preliminary examination to support it, thus violating his right to due process. He also argues the court should have stayed punishment on the vandalism conviction ( ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 16 s IUPXBE000001 xpl 1 l "Pen. Code, § 654" Pen. Code, § 654)[1] because it involved the same course of conduct as the arson conviction. Finally, defendant claims entitlement to additional conduct credit. We shall affirm the judgment as modified.

Paciano Duran Beltran, Jr. appeals the judgment of conviction following his plea in case number 2010030702 to failure to register as a sex offender with a prior conviction. (Pen. Code, § 290, subd. (b)).[1] Appellant admitted that the prior conviction was a strike within the meaning of the Three Strikes Law (§§ 667, subds. (c)(1) & (e)(1); 1170.12, subds. (a)(1) & (c)(1)), and admitted violating probation in case number 201003367 involving a conviction for failing to register as a transient (§ 290.011, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced appellant to 32 months state prison (16 month low term, doubled based on the prior strike) in case number 201003072, and a concurrent 16 month term in case number 2010003367. Appellant was ordered to pay a $200 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a $200 parole revocation fine (§1202.45) in each case.