CA Unpub Decisions

The minor, Francisco A., appeals from an October 5, 2010 dispositional order, following his admission that he had committed four counts of theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). The juvenile court ordered the minor committed to the enhanced ranch program for six to eight months. Upon successful completion of the program, the minor was to continue on probation. The court also ordered that â€

Plaintiff Shaylene Fitzgerald appeals from the trial court's June 2010 corrected judgment awarding defendant El Camino Hospital $20,151.09 in costs after it prevailed in plaintiff's action against it. Plaintiff contends that the trial court could not award defendant costs because defendant did not timely serve its cost memorandum and the court had lost jurisdiction after plaintiff's previous appeal from the judgment to â€

Defendant Ronald Lee Pence pleaded no contest to two counts of committing a lewd act on a child of 14 or 15 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (c)(1)),[1] exhibiting harmful matter to a minor (§288.2, subd. (a)), and dissuading a victim from reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence, placed him on five years' formal probation and, after a contested hearing, ordered him to pay $5,365 in victim restitution. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion and denied him due process because the amount the court ordered him to pay was not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

Petitioner Jose Oliveira has been incarcerated since 1991 for the second degree murder of a rival gang member. In 2009, the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) concluded he was suitable for parole and set a parole date. The Governor reversed the Board's decision. Oliveira sought a writ of habeas corpus in the superior court, alleging that the Governor's decision was not supported by some evidence of current dangerousness. The court agreed and issued an order directing Oliveira's release â€

A modification decision.

Kevin R. appeals findings and orders adjudicating his son, Thomas R., a dependent of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). (Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) He also appeals an order removing Thomas from his parental custody under section 361, subdivision (c)(1). We affirm.

After a jury convicted Ralph Montecino Ryan of murdering James Ramirez, and found true several enhancements, the trial court sentenced him to a total term of 50 years to life in prison. This court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter to allow Ryan's newly retained or appointed counsel a reasonable opportunity to fully investigate and present a new trial motion. (People v. Ryan (May 27, 2009, D054601) [nonpub. opn.] (the Prior Opinion).) We specified that if a motion for new trial was not filed or the motion was denied, the judgment and sentence previously imposed would be reinstated. On remand, the trial court heard and denied the new trial motion.

Trinity County Health and Human Services (the Department) appeals from the juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional orders. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 360, subd. (d), 395; undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.)[1] The Department contends there was sufficient evidence to sustain two of the allegations in the petition that were dismissed by the court. The Department also contends the juvenile court erred in ordering reunification services for the minors' mother because such an order is contrary to law and the court failed to make the necessary findings to support such an order. We agree with the Department's second contention and reverse the juvenile court's order granting reunification services.

Plaintiff John Drew, a commission member of defendant Local Agency Formation Commission of Nevada County (LAFCo), was injured as he got out of a mini-van driven by defendant Katherine Hudson, LAFCo's clerk, upon return to Nevada City from a LAFCo meeting in Truckee. After receiving temporary disability payments under workers' compensation, he brought suit against Hudson and LAFCo for damages. Drew appeals from a judgment of dismissal after defendants' demurrer was sustained without leave to amend. Drew contends it was error to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend because his suit was not barred by the exclusivity rule of workers' compensation. He contends his trip from the meeting in Truckee fell within the â€

A jury found defendant Kevin Vongvilay guilty of attempted murder, shooting into an occupied vehicle, and possessing a concealed firearm while being an active participant in a criminal street gang. The jury also found that the shooting and attempted murder were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang, and that a principal had personally used a firearm and caused great bodily injury. Sentenced to 32 years to life, defendant appeals.
He contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude statements he claims were taken in violation of his Miranda[1] rights. He also contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a high school fight that took place about 17 months before the crime. We affirm.

This case presents yet another example of gang violence and senselessly inflicted harm. The victim was shot and severely pistol whipped about his right eye, causing multiple fractures of the bones above and around the eye, injuring the optic nerve, and destroying vision in the eye.
A jury convicted defendant Cassell Meadors of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664)[1] and found true allegations that he committed the crime for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with the Crips criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)); he intentionally and personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)); and a principal intentionally and personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (e)(1)). The prosecution dismissed two other firearm allegations following jury deadlock and declaration of a mistrial.[2] Defendant was sentenced to state prison for the upper term of nine years for attempted murder plus a consecutive indeterminate term of 25 years to life for discharge of a firearm. The firearm use and gang enhancements were stayed pursuant to section 654.[3]
On appeal, defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the allegations that (1) the firearm discharge caused great bodily injury, and (2) the crime was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with the Crips gang. We affirm the judgment.

Following a jury trial, defendant John Rojas Arvizu was convicted of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (b)(3))[1] and embezzlement of property in excess of $50,000 (§§ 503, 12022.6, subd. (a)(1)). The court denied defendant's motions to dismiss and for a new trial, and sentenced him to three years in state prison. The trial court awarded 99 days' presentence custody credits, consisting of 67 days of actual custody and 32 days of conduct credits, and later amended the award, increasing the conduct credits to 67 days, for a total of 134 days' presentence credit.
On appeal, defendant contends delays in arresting and charging him violated his state and federal rights to a speedy trial, and he was entitled to a new trial based on new evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. We shall affirm.

When real party in interest John Saca (Saca) sought to build a two-story, 46-foot-high house, plaintiff Save Arden-Oaks (a neighborhood association) asserted these plans violated zoning ordinances that limited building height to 30 feet. Under these ordinances, plaintiff argued, Saca would have to obtain a use permit or variance to proceed with his project. (See Ex. 4, p. 32)" Litigation ensued, with plaintiff seeking both a writ of mandate and declaratory relief. The trial court agreed with plaintiff's interpretation of the ordinances and granted the requested relief, but it refused to award plaintiff attorney fees.

Alex Juarez was charged with first degree murder with an allegation of use of a dangerous and deadly weapon. In November 1987, he entered a negotiated plea of guilty to second degree murder, and the prosecutor agreed to dismiss the weapon enhancement allegation. In conformity with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced him to a term of 15 years to life. One term of the plea agreement was that defendant would be housed initially in a Youth Authority facility pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5, subdivision (c), which, in 1987, as now, provides for the Director of Corrections to transfer inmates under the age of 21 to the Youth Authority for housing until either the inmate reaches the age of 25 or the Director of the Youth Authority orders him returned to the Department of Corrections.