CA Unpub Decisions

On September 28, 2009, pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant Erick M. admitted allegations of a juvenile court petition that he had committed a felony robbery in which a principal was armed. (Pen. Code, §§ 212.5, subd. (c); 12022, subd. (a)(1).)[1] He was declared a ward of the court and placed in a local camp detention facility, with a commitment to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) stayed. On January 22, 2010, after a series of incidents in which appellant repeatedly violated the rules of the program to which he had been committed, a probation violation notice was filed. Appellant admitted the violations and was committed to DJJ. He appeals. We affirm.

Petitioner Sharon Elizabeth Zullo sued her employer, real party in interest Inland Valley Publishing Co. (Inland) for wrongful termination in violation of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12920 et seq. (FEHA)). The superior court granted Inland's petition to compel arbitration and stayed the civil proceedings. Petitioner challenged that ruling by way of a petition for writ of mandate. We temporarily stayed the arbitration and issued an order to show cause why relief should not be granted. We now grant the petition and issue the writ.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant Gabriel Renteria Alarcon pleaded no contest to one count of intercourse with a child 10 years of age or younger. (Pen. Code, § 288.7.)[1] The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for 25 years to life. We appointed counsel to represent defendant in this court. Appointed counsel filed an opening brief which states the case and the facts but raises no specific issues. We notified defendant of his right to submit written argument in his own behalf within 30 days. Defendant has submitted two letters, which we have read and considered.

Defendant Ted Egbemhonkhaye submitted his case to the trial court, pursuant to Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592 (Bunnell), on the condition that, if he were convicted, his offenses would be reduced to misdemeanors if he paid restitution by the date of sentencing. The court found defendant guilty of two felony counts of violating Penal Code section 550, subdivision (b)(1).[1] As defendant paid the restitution ordered in full before the date of sentencing, the court reduced the offenses to misdemeanors pursuant to section 17, suspended imposition of sentence, and placed defendant on court probation for two years with various terms and conditions.
On appeal, defendant contends that his conviction must be reversed because he was not properly informed of the constitutional rights he was waiving by agreeing to the Bunnell submission. As we find that, under the totality of the circumstances presented here, defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived his constitutional rights, we will affirm the judgment.

Following a jury trial, appellant Juan Samaniego was found guilty of one count of carjacking (Pen. Code § 215, count one), and one count of second degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (b), count two).[1] Subsequently, the court found true six prior strike allegations (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i) and 1170.12), three prior serious felony allegations (§ 667, subd. (a)) and one prior prison term allegation (§ 667.5, subdivision (b)).
On April 30, 2010, the court declined to strike any of appellant's prior strike convictions, but exercised its discretion under section 17 to reduce count two to a misdemeanor. Thereafter, the court sentenced appellant to 25 years to life for count one, consecutive to 15 years for the prior serious felony convictions pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a). Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Appellant raises nine issues on appeal, which we shall outline later. For reasons that follow we disagree with all appellant's contentions and affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Misael Quintana of aggravated sexual assault on a child under 14 years old (oral copulation by means of duress) and four counts of lewd conduct upon a child by means of duress. The trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life, plus 24 years. On appeal, defendant contends that no substantial evidence supports the element of duress. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Petitioner S.N. (mother) seeks writ review of orders that removed her two oldest sons from her custody in response to a supplemental dependency petition, and set a hearing to select and implement a permanent plan for the two boys.
Mother claims insufficient evidence supports the orders. She asserts no substantial evidence showed that the previous disposition was ineffective at protecting the boys from her physical abuse, that returning them to her custody placed them in substantial danger, or that her previous reunification services were reasonable. But the record sufficiently showed mother backslid into physical abuse despite receiving ample reunification services. The petition is denied.

Substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict defendant entered a residence with the intention of committing the crime of stalking. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to strike a prior conviction for sentencing purposes. We affirm.
I

Robert C. (father) appeals from an order terminating parental rights to his daughter Meghan. Father joins in arguments made by Meghan's mother in her appeal, In re Meghan C. (case No. F061671). The mother claimed respondent Kings County Human Services Agency (agency) failed to conduct any investigation into her claim of Native American heritage for purposes of giving notice pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). She also argued that the juvenile court erroneously rejected her argument that termination would be detrimental to Meghan based on her relationship with mother.
On review, we disagreed and affirmed. We concluded mother forfeited her ICWA argument and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting her detriment claim. Because father, in this appeal, raised no independent claim of error, we conclude the juvenile court properly terminated his parental rights.

Janelle C. (mother) appeals from a 2011 order terminating parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to her five-year-old daughter, Meghan.[1] Mother contends respondent Kings County Human Services Agency (agency) failed to conduct any investigation into her claim of Native American heritage for purposes of giving notice pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). Mother also argues the juvenile court erroneously rejected her argument that termination would be detrimental to Meghan based on her relationship with mother. On review, we affirm, having concluded mother forfeited her ICWA argument and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting her detriment claim.

Appellant, Diane Reimers, filed a complaint for personal injury and medical malpractice against respondents, Dr. Jagdev Singh and Dr. Joselito Syfu, and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Appellant alleged causes of action for general negligence, intentional tort, and medical malpractice. Singh and Syfu demurred to the complaint on the grounds that appellant had not stated causes of action for general negligence and intentional tort and that the medical malpractice cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the complaint as to Singh and Syfu.
Appellant challenges the dismissal of her complaint claiming that she filed her medical malpractice claim within one year of discovery of the injury. Appellant further argues that CDCR deliberately delayed medical treatment and demonstrated deliberate indifference in violation of her Eighth Amendment right to medically necessary treatment.
As discussed below, the allegations in the complaint demonstrate that appellant did not file the action against Singh and Syfu within one year of discovering her injury. Thus, appellant's medical malpractice cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5.) Appellant's arguments regarding the CDCR's actions are irrelevant because the order appealed from did not dismiss the CDCR from the complaint. Accordingly, the order will be affirmed.

In the underlying action, respondent, Marvin R. Salwasser, administrator with will annexed of the Estate of Walter Salwasser, filed a complaint against appellants, George Salwasser and Charlotte Salwasser, to enforce a promissory note. Appellants admitted that they had executed the note and that payment had been demanded. Nevertheless, appellants vigorously defended the action. According to appellants, no amount was presently due. Eventually, respondent prevailed on a summary judgment motion and judgment was entered in his favor for the balance due on the note. Thereafter, respondent was awarded $106,480 in attorney fees.
Appellants do not contest respondent's right to contractual attorney fees. Rather, this appeal challenges the amount of the award. Appellants argue that an award of over $106,000 on a simple case to collect $115,000 is grossly disproportionate and unreasonable.
As discussed below, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making this award. Appellants litigated tenaciously and, by doing so, required respondent's counsel to spend additional time prosecuting the action. Therefore, the order will be affirmed.

Appellant Randy Williams contends that the trial court (1) abused its discretion when it declined to dismiss one of his prior strike convictions, and (2) the 25 years to life prison sentence under the three strikes law is sufficiently disproportionate to the crime committed so as to be in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We disagree and affirm.

Appellant, Adegbenga Adesokan, filed a complaint challenging the foreclosure on his residence. According to appellant, his lender, respondent, US Bank National Association, as trustee for the Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-BCI (US Bank), and its mortgage servicer, respondent, America's Servicing Company (ASC), breached a contract to modify the loan and falsely represented that a loan modification analysis would be completed within 60 days. Appellant requested the court to set aside the trustee's sale and demanded declaratory relief and damages.
Respondents demurred to the first amended complaint. Finding specific pleading deficiencies, the trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend. When appellant's second amended complaint did not cure those defects, the court sustained respondents' demurrer to the second amended complaint without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal.