CA Unpub Decisions

Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6[1] provides that a good faith settlement between a plaintiff and an alleged joint tortfeasor bars claims against the settling tortfeasor for contribution and equitable indemnity. In this action arising out of a single vehicle accident, plaintiff Dennis Jensen sued defendant and cross-complainant Diablo Marine & Trailer (Diablo), the retailer/installer of certain brake parts, alleging negligence and strict products liability. Diablo cross-complained for contribution and indemnity against cross-defendants Tie Down Engineering, Inc. (Tie Down), the manufacturer of the parts, and Fox Marine Company, Inc. (Fox), the distributor. After Tie Down and Fox settled with Jensen, the trial court determined the settlements were made in good faith and dismissed Diablo's cross-complaint.
Diablo appeals, challenging the trial court's determination of good faith, its dismissal of the cross-complaint, and its failure to rule on evidentiary objections. We affirm.

Steven Ray Strebe appeals a judgment following his jury conviction of involuntary manslaughter. On appeal, he contends his conviction must be reversed because the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct while cross-examining him during trial.

Carlos S. Bardmess and his wife, Sandra L. Bardmess (the Bardmesses), entered into an agreement with Bosa Development California II, Inc. (Bosa), to purchase a condominium. The agreement required the Bardmesses to make scheduled deposits toward the condominium's purchase price into an escrow account, and to deposit the balance of the purchase price into the account by the closing date. The agreement contains a liquidated damages provision that would permit Bosa to keep the deposits if the Bardmesses defaulted on their obligations under the agreement prior to closing. The agreement also contains an arbitration provision that states that the Bardmesses and Bosa agree "that the controversy, and the disposition of the funds deposited into the escrow by [the Bardmesses] shall be settled by arbitration . . . ." The arbitration provision also indicates that disputes subject to arbitration under the agreement include "whether a default has occurred," and "the amount of liquidated damages." In addition, a notice directly below the arbitration provision in the agreement states that any dispute "arising out of" matters included in the arbitration provision is also subject to arbitration.
The Bardmesses made two deposits into the escrow account toward the purchase price, but failed to deposit the remainder of the purchase price into the account by the closing date. The escrow holder subsequently remitted the Bardmesses' deposits to Bosa. The Bardmesses then filed this action against Bosa; the Bardmesses' real estate agent, Sharon Tentilucci; and Tentilucci's broker, Austin McBride Corporation, doing business as Re/Max Real Estate Consultants (Re/Max).[1] In their complaint, the Bardmesses claimed that the agreement's liquidated damages provision was invalid, and requested that the court order Bosa to refund their deposits. Bosa filed a motion to compel arbitration, citing the arbitration provision discussed above. The Bardmesses filed an opposition in which they claimed that arbitration under the agreement was subject to a "precondition," namely, that the Buyer have timely sent the escrow holder a written notice objecting to the disbursement of the Buyer's deposits. The Bardmesses further contended that because they had not sent such a notice to the escrow holder, the arbitration clause did not encompass their claims in this action. The trial court denied Bosa's motion to compel arbitration, ruling that the Bardmesses were correct in their assertion that the scope of the arbitration provision did not encompass their claims. Bosa appeals, and we reverse.

This real estate fraud case involves defendant Oralia Hidalgo's attempt to fraudulently acquire, and then sell, real property located at 1329 Mount Vernon Avenue in the City of Colton (the property), in San Bernardino County, by means of forgery, counterfeiting, and other criminal acts. As discussed more fully in the factual background section of this opinion, Hidalgo recorded on the same day two grant deeds containing a total of four forged signatures and two counterfeited notary public seals. The first grant deed (instrument No. 2003-0549141, hereafter referred to as Grant Deed A) purported to convey the property, without the knowledge of the lawful owners, as a gift to a real estate agent with whom Hidalgo was doing business. The second grant deed (instrument No. 2003-0549142, hereafter referred to as Grant Deed B) purported to convey the property from that real estate agent to Hidalgo. Hidalgo forged three signatures on Grant Deed A: the signatures of the owner of the property, her deceased husband, and a notary public. On Grant Deed B, Hidalgo forged a fourth signature, that of the notary public. On both Grant Deed A and Grant Deed B, she also counterfeited the seal of the notary public.

In February 2008, a jury convicted William Norris Allen of possession of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) and falsely identifying himself to a peace officer (Pen. Code,[1] § 148.9, subd. (a)). Allen admitted three prison priors (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668). In May 2008, the court imposed but stayed Allen's five-year sentence and granted him probation. The court awarded Allen a total of 480 days of credit for time served, comprised of 320 days of credit for actual time served and 160 days of conduct credit under the version of section 4019 then in effect.[2]
In October 2008, Allen admitted violating probation and the court reinstated his five-year sentence. Allen appealed, and we affirmed and issued the remittitur in July 2009.
Subsequently, the Legislature amended section 4019, effective January 25, 2010 (hereafter amended section 4019), to provide a different formula for calculating presentence custody credits. Amended section 4019 provides for two days of conduct credit for every two days of presentence custody for certain defendants. (Amended § 4019, subd. (f).)[3]
In April 2010, Allen moved the trial court for additional presentence custody credits under amended section 4019, but the trial court denied the motion.
In June 2010, we denied Allen's petition for writ of habeas corpus brought on grounds he was not awarded section 4019 credits under the amended statute.
Allen's only contention on appeal is that the trial court violated his federal and state rights to equal protection of the laws by denying him 160 additional days of conduct credits under amended section 4019. We affirm.

Defendant Thomas Edward Kolasz appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of drug and weapons related offenses. On appeal, Kolasz asserts that the trial court erroneously allowed the prosecution to present evidence of two 1995 convictions that Kolasz suffered for possession of methamphetamine for sale. Kolasz also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting his motion to sever one of the charges against him (a simple possession charge arising out of an incident in which he admitted to possessing methamphetamine for personal use), from the other more serious drug and weapons possession charges that arose from a search of his residence on a different date. According to Kolasz, the evidence from the two cases would not have been cross-admissible in separate trials, and the simple possession case was much stronger than the other case, thereby causing a prejudicial spill-over effect that affected the result in the weaker case.
We conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of two of Kolasz's prior convictions for possession of methamphetamine for sale. We further conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kolasz's motion to sever one of the charges from the other four, since the evidence of the offenses would have been cross-admissible in separate trials, thereby dispelling any inference of prejudice. In addition, the difference in the relative strength or weakness of the two cases was not so significant as to create a prejudicial spill-over effect. We therefore affirm the judgment.

Jamal Davis appeals from a judgment convicting him of conspiracy to commit murder. He argues (1) there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, (2) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, and (3) his sentence of 25 years to life constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We reject his contentions and affirm the judgment.

On November 8, 2010, defendant James R. Artis, Jr., entered a Marysville market, placed three food items in his pockets, and left the store without paying. The items had a total value of $10.07. He was detained and arrested outside the store.
Defendant pleaded no contest to second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459). The trial court imposed a stipulated three-year prison sentence and imposed various fines and fees. No presentence credits were awarded because defendant was incarcerated for a parole violation based on absconding and the instant offense.

Appointed counsel for defendant Gary Bernard Elliott, Sr., asked this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) We conclude defendant is entitled to additional conduct credits, but we find no other arguable errors. We will affirm the judgment as modified.
I

Defendant entered a negotiated plea of no contest to one count of forgery (Pen. Code, § 470, subd. (a)) and was sentenced to the upper term of three years in state prison. Execution of sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on five years formal probation on the condition, among others, that she complete a substance abuse treatment program approved by the probation department.
Defendant failed to enter the required substance abuse program and was charged with a probation violation. The trial court revoked probation and reinstated the three-year sentence.
Defendant appeals, contending the trial court abused its discretion in revoking probation because the condition in question was unconstitutionally vague. We conclude defendant forfeited this challenge by failing to object to the probation condition at the time it was imposed and failing to appeal following her initial sentencing. We further conclude substantial evidence supports the finding of a probation violation and affirm the judgment.
Facts and Proceedings

An information alleged the 24-year-old defendant Maciej Wieslaw Lata had contacted and arranged meetings, by way of the so-called â€

Defendant Robert Michael Rodeski molested the five-year-old daughter of his live-in girlfriend, and a jury found him guilty of committing a forcible lewd act on her. Based on this conviction, the court revoked his probation in an earlier drug case and sentenced him to prison for a total of 14 years.
Defendant appeals, contending the court erred in: (1) admitting evidence of his prior sexual misconduct; and (2) imposing a full, consecutive sentence on the sex offense. We conclude the trial court erred in failing to impose one-third the midterm on the subordinate offense and remand for resentencing.

In this long-simmering dispute between Central San Joaquin Water Conservation District (Central), which supplies surface water to agricultural customers, and Stockton East Water District (Stockton East), which operates the conveyance system through which the water flows, the trial court granted Central a preliminary injunction limiting the amount Stockton East could charge for transporting (wheeling) Central's water. At issue in the underlying declaratory relief action brought by Central is the question of what â€

A jury convicted defendant Alejandro Alfonso Sanchez of one count of rape by force or threat (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)),[1] with an enhancement for kidnapping (§ 667.61, subds. (b) & (e)(1)). Defendant was also convicted of one count of kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)), and one count of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). He was sentenced to 15 years to life in state prison.
On appeal, defendant complains of ineffective assistance of counsel, inadequate voir dire of the jury panel, and sentencing error. We shall correct the sentence but in all other respects affirm the judgment.