CA Unpub Decisions

In this dependency proceeding, appellant Ismael F., the presumed father of Isaac F., seeks review of the juvenile court's initial jurisdiction and disposition orders. In light of our determination that the orders are supported by substantial evidence, the orders are affirmed.

R.B., (father) appeals appeal the orders of the juvenile court denying his modification petition and terminating parental rights to his daughter, H.B. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 388, 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)[1] Mother is not a party to this appeal. We affirm.

Kathryn M. Stanton and the Law Offices of Selvin & Weiner appeal from an order partially denying their petition to compel arbitration of an action against them and three other defendants for legal malpractice and related claims. We conclude that the trial court erred in denying the petition in part and reverse and remand the matter for the entry of a new order granting the petition.

David H. appeals from the jurisdictional orders and dispositional orders in the dependency proceedings concerning his son Aaron and his daughter Maya. We affirm, as we explain:
This family came to the attention of DCFS and the courts on May 13, 2010, after 7-year-old Maya reported to her mother, then to police, that Father had sexually abused her. The Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 300 petition was filed on May 20, 2010, and was sustained on September 23, 2010, under section 300, subdivisions (b), (d), and (j), after a contested hearing. The sustained allegations were that Father had sexually abused Maya, thus endangering both Maya and her 8-year-old brother, Aaron.

In this trust administration proceeding, two opposing parties petitioned for relief and then each moved to strike all or part of the other's petition under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute.[1] The probate court denied both motions on the ground that they were filed without leave beyond the 60-day period of section 425.16, subdivision (f). It also denied both motions on the merits.
Only one party has appealed from the order of denial. Finding no error, we affirm.

Plaintiff XTC Investments, LLC (XTC or plaintiff) made a series of loans to Fortuna Investment, Inc. (Fortuna), which defendant Sanford Gaum (Gaum) personally guaranteed. The loans were not repaid, and XTC obtained a default judgment in federal district court against Gaum and Fortuna. XTC then initiated the present action against Gaum and defendant Bluenose Trading, Inc. (Bluenose), asserting that Gaum created and used Bluenose to conceal his assets from creditors. After a three-day bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for XTC.
Defendants Gaum and Bluenose (collectively, defendants) contend on appeal that (1) they were prejudiced by posttrial amendments to the complaint, (2) substantial evidence does not support the verdict and the verdict is against the law, (3) the damages are excessive, and (4) the trial court erred in denying their motion to abate. We affirm.

Elham Kostandy appeals from the judgment on reserved issues after the dissolution of her marriage to Gamal Kostandy.[1] She argues that the trial court miscalculated charges and credits, erred in its ruling that Gamal did not violate his fiduciary duty, and should have granted her requests for attorney fees and costs. We reverse and remand for retrial with directions.

The trial court entered summary judgment against a sales manager who was fired for harassing his subordinates, ending his lawsuit for breach of contract and unpaid wages. We affirm the judgment. Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he made the offensive statements detailed by his subordinates. Even without plaintiff's admissions, no triable issue exists as to the employer's good faith in making the decision to terminate, based on an appropriate investigation that provided reasonable grounds for believing that plaintiff engaged in misconduct. The employer paid plaintiff all of the wages he was due at the time of termination.

Appellant Amir Dawood Faquir was charged with attempted murder and assault with a semiautomatic firearm. In connection with the attempted murder charges, the jury received an instruction on the â€

Hui Zhao, on behalf of himself and other public stockholders of defendant International Rectifier Corporation (IRC), appeals judgment after the trial court sustained defendants' demurrer to plaintiffs' amended complaint in this consolidated class action. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants breached their fiduciary duty to IRC's stockholders by failing to accept a buyout offer of $23 per share for IRC. The trial court concluded that plaintiffs' claims were derivative, rather than direct and were barred by judicial estoppel.
We conclude that while plaintiffs' claims are properly derivative claims, their claims are not barred by judicial estoppel, and plaintiffs should be permitted to amend their complaint to state a derivative claim.

An expert accounting firm's employee and a client entered a house belonging to the client's husband, and retrieved business documents that were potentially relevant to community property claims. The Chinese government discovered the entry and taking of documents and then cancelled the husband's lucrative business arrangement for the supply of holographic laminate material, which had been used in Chinese national identity cards. The husband and his various companies sued the wife and the accounting firm for trespass and conversion, among other claims, and a jury awarded the plaintiffs $3.4 million in lost profit damages.
On appeal, the accounting firm argues that its conduct was protected by the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)(2)), and that the jury's verdict was not supported by substantial evidence. We find that the litigation privilege did not apply, as the gravamen of plaintiffs' action was noncommunicative conduct. With respect to appellants' substantial evidence argument, we are guided by the long-held rule that we may not substitute our discretion for that of the jurors'. Since the verdict was supported by substantial evidence, we do not reverse.
In a cross-appeal, respondents argue that prejudgment interest on the damages should have been awarded. Respondents' position is incorrect. The trial court's denial of prejudgment interest was proper, as the claimed damages were uncertain and not reasonably capable of being made certain.
Accordingly, we affirm.

Appellant Robert Earl Reed appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered on the basis of a jury verdict, of assault with a deadly weapon by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)).[1] His court appointed attorney has filed a brief raising no legal issues and requesting that this court independently review the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Our review discloses no arguable issue and we shall therefore affirm the judgment.

Appellant Karl B. Nicholas sued his former attorney, David J. Millstein (Millstein) and his law firm, Millstein & Associates (collectively respondents) for legal malpractice and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Nicholas proceeded to trial in propria persona.[1] The trial court granted nonsuit (Code Civ. Proc., § 581c) in favor of respondents at the close of Nicholas's evidence on the ground that he could not prevail on his claims without expert testimony on the applicable standard of care. Nicholas contends that the court erred because no expert testimony was required. Since Nicholas fails to present a record adequate to permit our review of the issue, we must affirm.

In November 2002, Paul Bishop, a most experienced business executive, began employment at World Savings, Inc. (World) as a loan consultant, in connection with which he signed an agreement to arbitrate. Bishop was terminated in May 2006, following which he filed a demand for arbitration, selected an arbitrator, and vigorously participated in the arbitration process for almost a year. In May 2008, Bishop announced that he would participate no longer, and that he would file a lawsuit--which he did.
World filed a petition to compel arbitration, which Bishop opposed on the fundamental basis that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. In a comprehensive, detailed order, the trial court found first that Bishop had waived the right to assert any such claim, further finding that the arbitration agreement would be enforceable in any event, and ordered Bishop to resume the arbitration. Following seven days of testimony, the arbitrator found for World, and World's petition to confirm the award and enter judgment was granted. Bishop appeals. We affirm, concluding that the trial court's finding of waiver is supported by the record. We thus need not reach the issue of unconscionability.