CA Unpub Decisions

Petitioner seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court's orders issued at a contested dispositional hearing denying him reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] hearing as to his one-year-old daughter, R. He contends the juvenile court erred in denying him reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5) which he argues requires this court to vacate the section 366.26 hearing and direct the juvenile court to order services. Under the circumstances, however, even if we concluded that the juvenile court erred in denying petitioner reunification services pursuant to subdivision (b)(5) of section 361.5, it would have no practical effect because the court also denied petitioner services pursuant to subdivision (b)(6) of section 361.5 which petitioner does not challenge. Consequently, we will dismiss the petition.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant, Enrique Careaga, on September 28, 2010, pled no contest to single counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b);[1] count 2) and infliction of cruel or inhuman corporal punishment resulting in a traumatic condition on a child (§ 273d, subd. (a); count 5) and two counts of child endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (a); counts 3, 4), and admitted allegations that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) in committing the assault and the two section 273d, subdivision (a) violations. One of the terms of the plea agreement was that appellant would receive a prison sentence of 16 years 8 months.
On November 2, 2010, the court, following a hearing, denied appellant's motion for the appointment of substitute counsel. Later that same day, the court imposed the agreed-upon sentence of 16 years 8 months, consisting of six years on count 2, four years on the count 2 firearm use enhancement, one year four months on each of counts 3 and 4, one year four months on each of the firearm use enhancements accompanying counts 3 and 4, and one year four months on count 5.
On December 21, 2010, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal in which he indicated the appeal was based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea. There is no indication in the record that appellant requested, or that the court issued, a certificate of probable cause (§ 1237.5).
Appellant's appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.)
Appellant has filed three supplemental briefs in which he argues, as best we can determine, that his plea was involuntary due to duress, he is not guilty of the instant offenses and he was denied his right to a fair trial. We will affirm.

On March 26, 2009, Agent Bradlee Dorr of the Madera County Narcotics Enforcement Team (MADNET) and Agent Kevin Mayer of the United States Forest Service conducted a pre-season surveillance of the Sierra National Forest. Dorr had been a peace officer for 20 years and primarily focused on the investigation of major marijuana cases. Through those cases he had been involved in the seizure and eradication of more than a quarter million marijuana plants. Dorr had taken multiple narcotic detection and interdiction courses and had investigated more than 100 outdoor marijuana growing sites and between 20 and 50 indoor cultivation sites. Dorr testified in the â€

J.J. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court's orders made at her six-month status review hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21.)[1] Mother contends the juvenile court erred because (1) the order for mother to address anger management issues is improper; and (2) the anger management order is not authorized by section 362. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Freddie Nelson Williams contends the trial court erred by calculating some of his Penal Code[1] section 4019 conduct credits under a version of section 4019 that was no longer in effect. We modify the judgment to award additional credits and affirm.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, and Barry Carlton, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted defendant and appellant Chauncey Cordell Labrie of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and battery (Pen. Code, § 242). Defendant admitted a prior conviction that constituted a strike (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1)); the trial court subsequently struck the prior conviction and stated its reasons for doing so in a written minute order. The trial court imposed the low term of two years for the assault and imposed, but stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654, a six month term for the battery. Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence that his assault was done with force likely to produce great bodily injury. We affirm.

Proceedings in mandate after superior court denied a peremptory challenge. Roderick W. Shelton, Judge. Petition granted.

Defendant Sean Cory Sogoian pleaded guilty to vehicle theft, evading an officer, and second degree commercial burglary. He was sentenced to 13 years 4 months in prison.
Defendant contends the matter must be remanded for determination of presentence credit, because the trial court incorrectly indicated that â€

In this appeal, Lisa Fletcher challenges the trial court's order dismissing her claim for breach of contract against her automobile insurance carrier, Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (Progressive). Fletcher sued to recover the value of her 2003 Land Rover, which had been found burned. Progressive considered the circumstances of the vehicle's loss to be suspicious and denied Fletcher's claim after she refused to produce financial documents.

Defendant and appellant F.P. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court's jurisdiction and disposition orders regarding his children F.P. and B.P. He contends there was insufficient evidence to support jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b).[1] He further contends that the juvenile court erred in failing to make findings under section 361.2, subdivision (a), to determine whether the children should have been placed with him as a noncustodial parent.
We affirm. Substantial evidence supported jurisdiction and any error in failing to reference the applicable statute at disposition was harmless in light of the evidence and the juvenile court's other findings.

The juvenile court sustained a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 after finding defendant and appellant J.E. committed second degree robbery, in violation of Penal Code section 211. Defendant was committed to the Camp Community Placement Program, with a five-year maximum period of confinement. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
This court appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. On July 18, 2011, appointed counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, raising no issues and requesting this court to conduct an independent review of the record. Defendant was notified by letter of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days, but no brief has been received.

Abra M. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court's disposition order made on October 18, 2010 regarding her oldest daughter, Abrama M. (age 7).[1] Mother contends the juvenile court applied the wrong statute to determine whether Abrama should have been placed with her as a noncustodial parent, and erred in failing to make findings under the applicable statute, Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2, subdivision (a).[2] We affirm. The juvenile court's error in failing to reference the applicable statute at disposition was harmless in light of the evidence.

Eugene Jones appeals the judgment entered following his plea of guilty to possession of a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a). Jones admitted a prior conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd.(b)-(i), 1170.12 subd.(a)-(d).)[1] However, the trial court struck the prior conviction pursuant to section 1385 and sentenced Jones to 16 months in state prison.
Jones contends the order striking his prior conviction for purposes of the Three Strikes law rendered him eligible for one-for-one conduct credits under former section 4019. Alternatively, he contends former section 4019 violated equal protection to the extent it precluded him from obtaining one-for-one conduct credits. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff and appellant Aldo Cardone appeals from a judgment entered following a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant and respondent Accredited Surety & Casualty Co., Inc. (Accredited). Appellant, a general contractor, brought an action against Accredited stemming from a payment of $10,000 on a surety bond to a claimant who contended that appellant had abandoned a construction job. He alleged that Accredited should not have paid the claimant because she filed and dismissed an action against him concerning the abandoned project. Accredited cross-claimed, seeking reimbursement of the $10,000 amount in accordance with an indemnity agreement appellant executed at the time he received the bond. The trial court granted summary judgment as to the complaint and cross-complaint on the basis of undisputed evidence that Accredited paid the claim in good faith, thereby incurring no liability to appellant and entitling it to reimbursement from appellant.
We affirm. The trial court properly granted summary judgment on all claims raised in the second amended complaint, even though the pleading was filed while the summary judgment motion was pending. It likewise properly granted summary judgment on the cross-complaint, as the undisputed evidence showed that Accredited had the contractual right to dispose of the claim, and it did so in good faith and in compliance with the applicable statutory and regulatory scheme.