CA Unpub Decisions

Fairmont Specialty (Fairmont), the surety on a bail bond posted on behalf of Ariana Galvan, appeals from the judgment entered on the bail bond after Galvan failed to appear for a pretrial hearing. Fairmont argues that the trial court lost jurisdiction to order the bond forfeited when it failed to do so at the first hearing from which Galvan was absent. We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in finding there was a rational basis to conclude that Galvan had a sufficient excuse to justify her absence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Fairmont Specialty (Fairmont) appeals from the judgment entered against its bail bond issued to secure the release of Guillermo Espino Moreno. Fairmont argues that the trial court lost jurisdiction to declare the bond forfeited because it failed to do so upon Moreno's first failure to appear. It also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Fairmont's motion for an extension of the exoneration period pursuant to Penal Code section 1305.4.[1] We affirm the judgment.

Appellant, Fabian Gonzalez, appeals from a judgment entered after he pled no contest to assault with a firearm (count 1/Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2))[1] and making criminal threats (count 2/§ 422) and admitted a prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441, we affirm.

Defendant and appellant James Carroll Williams contends equal protection requires that he receive additional presentence custody credits under the amendment to Penal Code section 4019, which became effective January 25, 2010. (See Stats. 2009, 3d Ex. Sess. 2009-2010, ch. 28, § 62),[1] and that the applicable standard of review is strict scrutiny. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Steven Dale Tans appeals after he pled guilty to second degree commercial burglary (Pen. Code, § 459, count 1),[1] pursuant to a plea agreement. He was placed on supervised probation for a period of three years, under certain terms and conditions. He subsequently admitted violating his probation. The trial court revoked his probation and sentenced him to the midterm of two years in state prison.
On appeal, defendant raises the sole contention that he is entitled to additional presentence custody credits under interim section 4019, effective January 25, 2010.[2] (Sen. Bill No. 3X 18 (2009-2010 3d Ex. Sess.).) While this court has held in other cases that the January 25, 2010 amendment to the conduct credit provision is not retroactive, defendant here was not sentenced until after the effective date of the amendment and, thus, the case does not involve retroactivity as such. The amended statute was in effect at the time of defendant's sentence; therefore, he should have received credits under the amendment. We modify and affirm the judgment.

In December 2010, Dwight L. Vanzandt pleaded guilty to four counts of residential burglary (counts 1-4), two counts each of robbery (counts 5-6) and kidnapping for robbery (counts 7-8), and one count of kidnapping a victim under fourteen years of age (count 9). Vanzandt admitted allegations that he: (1) committed counts 5 through 9 while released on bail; (2) used a deadly weapon (a screwdriver) while committing the robbery in counts 5 and 6; (3) had a prior serious felony conviction; and (4) had a strike prior conviction in 1984.
The court denied Vanzandt's motion to dismiss the strike pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) and sentenced him to life with the possibility of parole plus 28 years. Vanzandt contends the court abused its discretion by denying his Romero motion to dismiss the strike. He also asserted that the trial court erroneously imposed multiple separate prior offense enhancements notwithstanding that only one was charged and admitted. He withdrew this argument in his reply brief in light of this court's decision in People v. Misa (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 837. Based on this concession, we do not address this argument. We affirm the judgment.

Adam Francisco Cappello appeals an order suspending imposition of sentence and granting him probation following his conviction of criminal offenses. Since that order has been superseded by a later judgment revoking probation and imposing sentence which has become final, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

Simmering tension between neighbors living in upstairs and downstairs apartments erupted into physical confrontations on three occasions. The third altercation occurred on the evening of May 30, 2009, when defendant Albert Joshua Hatch punched Dan Lopez in the head and chest. Lopez fell backward and hit his head on the ground, thereby suffering injuries that included a temporal bone skull fracture. Defendant also scuffled with others associated with the upstairs apartment.
Defendant claimed he acted in self defense, but a jury convicted him of battery with serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d))[1] and misdemeanor assault (§ 240). Defendant admitted a prior serious felony conviction. The trial court sentenced him to 11 years in state prison for the battery and prior strike conviction. The court denied probation on the misdemeanor conviction but imposed no additional jail time.
On appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the fight that occurred between the upstairs and downstairs occupants a few hours prior to defendant's altercation with the victim, (2) the trial court should have instructed the jury on defense of another based on defendant's intent to protect his girlfriend's son, and (3) cumulative prejudice resulting from the claimed errors requires reversal.
We conclude that evidence of the earlier confrontation between the two sets of neighbors should have been admitted, but we find the error to be harmless. We also conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct on defense of another for lack of imminent danger to the person that defendant purported to protect. Finding only a single nonprejudicial error, we reject defendant's cumulative prejudice argument. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

This case involves a dispute over a boundary line and other matters between the owners of two adjacent parcels of forested land in the town of Clipper Mills in Butte County. After many issues were resolved by a successful motion for summary adjudication, a jury found that plaintiff Ormiston Family
Association (OFA) owned the disputed property by deed or adverse possession.
Prater, representing himself on appeal as he did in the trial court, appeals. He contends no substantial evidence supports the judgment for adverse possession. He also contends the trial court made several errors: granting OFA summary adjudication on the claims in Prater's cross-complaint for breach of contract and interference with easement; denying Prater a continuance on the motion for summary judgment/ adjudication and his request to amend the cross-complaint; granting OFA a jury trial after OFA had waived jury; and denying Prater's motion to prohibit reference to the disputed land as â€

A.H. (father) appeals from the judgment of April 12, 2011, declaring his daughter, Angelica H., and son, Bryan H., dependents of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.[1] He contends substantial evidence does not support the assertion of jurisdiction over Bryan. We hold substantial evidence supports the findings, and affirm the judgment.

In a personal injury action, a cross-complaint was filed by the City of Los Angeles (the city), which is not a party to this appeal, and two other parties, APM Terminals Pacific Ltd. and Maersk, Inc. (cross-complainants). Eventually, on January 23, 2009, the default of Globe-Con Freight Systems Inc. (cross-defendant) was entered. On several occasions, the trial court refused to set aside cross-defendant's default. Thereafter, on October 21, 2010 cross-complainants secured a default judgment of $2,886,468 against cross-defendant. On December 2, 2010, the trial court refused to set aside the default and default judgment. Cross-defendant appeals from the trial court's refusal to vacate the January 23, 2009 default and the October 21, 2010 default judgment. Cross-defendant argues it was not provided legally sufficient notice of the damages amount sought by cross-complainants. We agree and reverse the default judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 580, subd. (a) [1].)

Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of assault on a child causing death (Pen. Code,[1] § 273ab) and child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a)). In connection with the child abuse offense, the jury found appellant caused the child to suffer unjustifiable pain or injury resulting in death. (§ 12022.95.) The jury was declared hopelessly deadlocked on a charge of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and that charge was dismissed. The trial court imposed a sentenced of 25 years to life for assault causing the death of a child. Appellant was sentenced to concurrent terms of four years for the child abuse conviction and four years for the related enhancement.
Appellant raises three contentions: (1) there was insufficient evidence the child's death was a homicide and, even assuming such evidence was presented, there was insufficient evidence appellant was the perpetrator; (2) the trial court did not understand it had the discretion to grant probation on the condition that appellant serve time in county jail; and (3) the trial court should have imposed and stayed the four-year terms related to the child abuse offense and its enhancement.
Although there were differing scientific opinions regarding the cause and timing of death, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, and reject appellant's claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. A rational trier of fact could have accepted the prosecution evidence and concluded appellant assaulted the child thereby causing his death. We reject appellant's claim regarding the court's misunderstanding of its sentencing discretion because it is not supported by the record. Respondent's concession that the trial court should have imposed and stayed terms related to the remaining offense is accepted. The judgment is therefore modified such that the terms related to child abuse are stayed pursuant to section 654 but, in all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, appellant was found guilty of second degree robbery (Pen. Code,[1] § 211). In addition, the trial court found he was previously convicted of a felony within the meaning of the â€

Defendants, Fountain Valley Regional Hospital (the hospital), Deborah Keel, Tenet Healthcare Corp., Cotkin & Collins (the law firm), Kevin A. Duffis, Dr. Veeraiah Chundu, OC Neonatal Group, Inc. and Dr. Shahid Nazir, appeal from the October 25, 2010 order denying their renewed petition to compel arbitration. Dr. Chundu, OC Neonatal Group and Dr. Nazir are not signatories to a written arbitration agreement. But, defendants argue equitable estoppel principles require arbitration of the claims asserted by plaintiffs, Dr. Jacob Sweidan and Pediatrics & Neonatology Medical Group of Orange County, Inc. We disagree and affirm the trial court's denial of defendants' renewed petition to compel arbitration.