CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Romualdo Chavarria was convicted of assault and battery on a peace officer, hit and run driving, drunk driving and driving with a suspended license. On appeal, he contends that (1) the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to introduce detailed evidence of his prior arrests and convictions for drunk driving; (2) the officer whom he allegedly assaulted was not engaged in the lawful performance of his duties; (3) the court increased his sentence based on an enhancement not submitted to or found true by the jury; and (4) the court erred in ordering restitution to a victim's insurer. Appellant also seeks review of the court's Pitchess determination.[1] We conclude the court erred in permitting introduction of the details of appellant's prior arrests and convictions, but deem the error harmless. We further conclude that the order of restitution must be modified to direct payment to the victim, rather than her insurer. We find no other merit in appellant's contentions. Accordingly, we modify the judgment and affirm.

Oghenekaro Abrifor appeals from his conviction of sexual battery and misdemeanor simple battery. His only contention on appeal is that the mandatory sexual registration requirement imposed for sexual battery infringes on his right to privacy and therefore violates his constitutional rights to equal protection and substantive due process. Respondent contends the constitutional challenges have been forfeited because they were not raised at trial. Alternatively respondent contends there is no equal protection violation because persons convicted of sexual battery are not similarly situated to persons convicted of simple battery. Respondent also argues there is no due process violation because the registration requirement is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. We find no equal protection or due process violation and affirm.

In this appeal, we consider whether defendant Employment Development Department (Department) must comply with the procedural requirements set forth in Unemployment Insurance Code section 1127.5, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c)[1] before issuing an assessment against employers determined to be unified enterprises under sections 135.1 and 135.2. While this case was pending on appeal, we issued an opinion in Employment Development Department v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (Screaming Eagle, Inc.) (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 178, review denied February 16, 2011, S189314 (Screaming Eagle), holding that the Department need not comply â€

Defendant Charles Smith was accused of five separate crimes as the result of two incidents occurring on the same evening in the same neighborhood within a short time of one another. The first incident involved the attempted robbery of Robert Eady. The second incident involved the carjacking, kidnapping and forcible oral copulation of Jane Doe. At the time of the attempted robbery Eady saw the man who attempted to rob him, an African American, get into a pickup truck at the same place that Jane Doe was carjacked. Eady and Jane Doe were the principle witnesses against defendant.
Defendant, who is African-American, was picked up by the authorities when he was walking down a sidewalk in the area in which the crimes had been committed. When defendant was detained, he matched the only description authorities had of the perpetrator of the Jane Doe incident -- a black male.

David Jerome Henderson appeals his conviction of second degree commercial burglary, a felony violation of Penal Code section 459. He claims the trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting evidence of his three prior convictions of commercial burglary. We affirm the judgment.

Michelle James appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of assault with a deadly weapon. James contends that the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple assault. We affirm.

Defendant Shandon Robert Davis appeals from a judgment of conviction entered upon a plea of nolo contendere. His counsel has asked this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436) and has noted areas in the record that might arguably support the appeal (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738). Counsel has notified defendant he can file a supplemental brief with the court. No supplemental brief has been received. Upon review of the record, we conclude no arguable issues are presented for review and affirm the judgment.

Brandon Lee Frame (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered after he pleaded guilty to first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459[1]). Appellant's counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and requests that we conduct an independent review of the record. Appellant was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief and did not do so. Having independently reviewed the record, we conclude there are no issues that require further briefing, and affirm the judgment.

Carlos S. and Crisanta F. Monzo (appellants) appeal from a judgment entered after the trial court sustained U.S. Bank National Association and Litton Loan Servicing LP's (together respondents) demurrer without leave to amend. They contend the trial court erred in sustaining their demurrer to their second cause of action for wrongful disclosure because the notice of default that respondents recorded before pursuing foreclosure on appellants' real property did not â€

Stephen P. White (Stephen),[1] in pro per, appeals from a restraining order issued against him protecting his sister-in-law, Karen White (Karen), in pro per, her husband (Stephen's brother) John White (John), and Karen's adult son and four-year-old grandson. Stephen contends the trial court: (1) erred in denying him the opportunity to cross-examine John and Karen; (2) erred in denying his request for a continuance; (3) â€

Charged with (1) assault with a deadly weapon (count one), accompanied by a great bodily injury enhancement and (2) making a criminal threat (count two), with further allegations of a prior prison term and a prior strike conviction, a jury found appellant Robert Lee Smyth guilty of making a criminal threat.[1] The court sentenced him to four years in prison. Now appellant challenges the denial of his motion for mistrial based on the jury hearing nonresponsive testimony about his prior jail stint. He claims violation of his federal and state constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. We conclude no due process violation occurred; the state law error was nonprejudicial; and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for mistrial. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

This is an appeal from the juvenile court's jurisdictional order of April 23, 2010 and dispositional order of May 24, 2010. Pursuant to these orders, the juvenile court found minor committed one felony count of sexual battery, continued him as a ward and placed him on probation under home supervision for 120 days. For reasons set forth below, we affirm the challenged orders.

This is a consolidated appeal from a juvenile court order dated April 22, 2010, that imposed on appellant Facebook, Inc. (Facebook), a nonparty to these juvenile criminal proceedings, a monetary sanction in the amount of $100,000 for failing to comply with certain court orders relating to production of Facebook records relevant to the underlying matter.[1] For reasons set forth below, we reverse the order.

In February 2010, appellant Eric Steven Wider entered into a negotiated disposition that resolved multiple criminal cases pending against him in Napa County. In May 2010, the trial court sentenced him to state prison for 15 years. The court later granted appellant's motion to recall the sentence and reduced his sentence to 10 years.
Appellant contends the court erred by failing to recalculate his custody credits when it resentenced him. The People agree. We modify the judgment to award appellant 189 days of credit. We direct the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and to forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.