CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Noray Robinson appeals a judgment entered upon his plea of no contest to committing a lewd act on a child. (Pen. Code.[1]§ 288, subd. (c)(1).) He contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. We affirm.

Plaintiff Arata Equipment Company (Arata) entered into a distributorship agreement with defendant Lodal, Inc. (Lodal) allowing Arata to sell refuse disposal and collection trucks manufactured by Lodal. The agreement included a clause reserving to Lodal the right to make direct sales to customers (the direct sales clause). Lodal later sold trucks to a customer with which Arata had done business. Arata sued Lodal for breach of contract, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, unfair business practices (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200), and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Lodal moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion, finding as a matter of law that the direct sales clause authorized Lodal to make the sales in question.[1] Arata has appealed the ensuing judgment. We shall affirm.

Appellant Daniel Isidro Nunez appeals from the judgment following a trial by jury in which he was convicted of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))[1] (count 1) and kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)) (count 2). As to count 1, the jury found true the special circumstance that the murder was committed while appellant and his codefendant[2] were engaged in the commission of kidnapping (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). As to both counts, the jury found true the allegations that a principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)). Appellant waived his right to a jury trial regarding allegations that he had suffered a serious or violent felony conviction for assault and a prior prison term for assault. Following a bench trial, the court found appellant had suffered a prior serious felony conviction for assault within the meaning of sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d), and 667, subdivision (a)(1) and (b) through (i). The court struck the prior prison term allegations made pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b), after the prosecution elected not to proceed on these allegations.

In July 2004, plaintiffs and appellants Mark Burkett and Piero Capobianco purchased a residential property in Los Angeles, California from defendant and respondent Dolores Caffaro. In July 2007, appellants sued defendants and respondents Dolores Caffaro and Michael Hockett[1] for fraudulent concealment, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation in connection with the sale of the property. Summary judgment was granted in favor of respondents. Because we agree that appellants failed to establish a triable issue of material fact, we affirm.

R.T. (father) appeals an order denying him visitation with his son, R.T. (the minor). He argues the order denying visits must be reversed because â€

Appellant C.W. was adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court based on her commission of a residential burglary. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602; Pen. Code, §§ 459/460, subd. (a).) The evidence showed that several teenagers, including appellant, entered the home of a vacationing neighbor on different occasions during a one-month period and committed various acts of vandalism and theft. Appellant argues that the juvenile court erred when it entered a direct victim restitution order making her jointly and severally liable for the entire cost of the theft of and damage to items in the victim's home. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6.)
We conclude that while the juvenile court had broad discretion to award direct victim restitution as a condition of probation (In re T.C. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 837, 844-845 (T.C.)), it abused that discretion when it required appellant to pay for economic losses caused by other people during separate, earlier crimes. Here, the evidence showed that appellant entered an already-vandalized home and stole two purses belonging to the victim, but it did not established that she had participated in earlier burglaries and acts of vandalism. On the record presented, the juvenile court erred in making her jointly and severally liable for the full amount of the losses caused by others.

While dining at Amici's East Coast Pizzeria (Amici's), plaintiff Robin E. Foor bit into a whole olive in an antipasto salad and broke a tooth on the olive pit. He sued Amici's for negligence and intentional tort and sought punitive damages. The trial court sustained Amici's demurrer to the operative third amended complaint without leave to amend and entered judgment for Amici's.
Foor appeals. He contends the operative complaint stated claims for negligence and intentional tort. He also seeks leave to amend his complaint to state causes of action for res ipsa loquitur, strict liability, and breach of the implied warranty of fitness for human consumption. We affirm.

Following a jury trial, defendant Donald Anthony Barrett was convicted of communicating with a minor for the purpose of engaging in lewd and lascivious behavior (Pen. Code, § 288.3, subd. (a))[1] and arranging a meeting with a minor for the purpose of engaging in lewd and lascivious behavior (§ 288.4, subd. (b)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on five years of probation subject to numerous conditions, including lifetime sex offender registration. Defendant's sole claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on entrapment. We affirm.

Defendant Dwayne Robertson Burrell pleaded guilty to first degree burglary (inhabited dwelling house). He then admitted having suffered two prior convictions for purposes of the Three Strikes law (two first degree, serious-felony burglaries--No. CC763261 and No. CC634735), one prior serious-felony conviction for purposes of a five-year enhancement (one of the strike priors--No. CC634735), and one prior prison term served (marijuana sales) for purposes of a one-year sentence enhancement. He submitted for court trial (1) a violent-felony allegation (whether a person who was not an accomplice was present in the residence at the time of the burglary for purposes of a three-year enhancement for each prior-separate-prison-violent felony (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c)(21))),[1] and (2) a prior serious-felony allegation (whether strike prior No. CC763261, as a serious felony, qualified for a second five-year enhancement because it was brought and tried separately from No. CC634735). The trial court found the violent-felony allegation true and the serious-felony allegation not true. It later denied defendant's Romero motion to strike one of the strike priors.[2] It then sentenced defendant to 25 years to life for the burglary conviction consecutive to five years for the serious-felony prior.[3] On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) finding the violent-felony allegation true, and (2) denying his Romero motion. In a separate petition for writ of habeas corpus, which we ordered to be considered with the appeal, defendant raises a claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to present evidence of his character and prospects in support of the Romero motion. We disagree with defendant's appellate contentions. We will modify the judgment as to sentencing and affirm the judgment as modified. And we will deny the habeas corpus petition.

Following the denial of motions to discover information relating to a confidential informant, to quash a search warrant, and to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5,[1] defendant Daniel Plancarte pleaded no contest to manufacturing methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.6, subd. (a)), possessing methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), possessing cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351), and endangering the health of a child (§ 273a, subd. (a)); defendant Daniel Charles Martinez pleaded no contest to conspiracy (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)) and possessing methamphetamine for sale; and defendant Gabriela Toscano pleaded no contest to endangering the health of a child and making space available for manufacturing controlled substances (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366.5). The trial court sentenced Plancarte to prison for five years and Martinez to prison for three years eight months. As to Toscano, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed her on probation for four years.
On appeal, defendants contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions. For the reasons we state below, we will affirm all three judgments.

Defendant Jose Luisgarcia Reyes was convicted after jury trial of manufacturing a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.6, subd. (a)), possessing methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), and possessing controlled substances while armed with a loaded firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1). The jury also found true allegations as to the first two offenses that defendant was personally armed with a firearm during the commission of the offenses. (Pen. Code, §§ 12022, subds. (a)(1) & (c).)[1] The jury found defendant not guilty of possessing cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351). The trial court sentenced defendant to nine years in prison.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions to discover information relating to a confidential informant, to quash a search warrant, and to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5. For the reasons we state below, we will affirm the judgment.

Lisa G. (mother) appeals from a judgment terminating her parental rights over her eight-year-old daughter C.B. (the child). Mother claims the juvenile court erred by ruling the parent-child relationship exception did not apply in this case. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); all further statutory references are to this code.) Because the record supports the juvenile court's decision, we affirm the judgment.

In a previous opinion we affirmed the conviction of defendant Raymond D. Graham and two co-defendants on multiple counts arising out of a home invasion robbery (People v. Graham (Jan. 30, 2009, G037997 [nonpub. opn.] pp. 2-3.), but we remanded for resentencing. After resentencing defendant and his co-defendants appealed again. We again remanded for sentencing, specifically ordering that the sentence for the street terrorism count (count 13) should be stayed under Penal Code section 654. (People v. Graham (Aug. 27, 2010, G042419) [nonpub. opn.] p. 3.) On remand the court stayed the sentence on count 13. Defendant received two consecutive 15 year to life sentences.
After he filed this appeal we appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel filed a brief that set forth the facts of the case and the disposition. She did not argue against defendant but advised the court she had not found any issues to present on his behalf. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was given 30 days to file written argument on his own behalf. That period has passed and we have received no communication from him. We examined the entire record to determine if any arguable issues were present and found none. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441- 442; People v. Johnson (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 106, 111-112.)
The judgment is affirmed.

Appellant, Jose Fernando Cardenas, appeals from a judgment entered after he pled no contest to kidnapping (Pen. Code. § 207, subd. (a))[1] and admitted a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (a)). Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.