CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant challenges jurisdictional and dispositional orders entered on a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 (hereafter, section 602) petition. The petition arose from a home invasion robbery. Appellant A.B., now an adult, contends the juvenile court erred in failing to advise him, prior to his admission of two counts of the petition, of his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses as required by Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 243 (Boykin) and of his right to compel the attendance of witnesses as required by California Rules of Court, rule 5.778 (b)(4). He also contends reversal is required because his special educational needs were not considered by the juvenile court when it committed him to the Department of Juvenile Justice. We disagree and affirm.

Defendant Timothy Simpson was convicted by a jury of committing a lewd or lascivious act on a child under 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a), count 1),[1] sexual penetration by force, violence, duress, menace or fear (§ 289, subd. (a)(1), count 2), rape by force, violence, duress, menace or fear (§ 261, subd. (a)(2), count 3) and misdemeanor sexual battery (§§ 242, 243.4, subd. (e)(1), count 4). The jury also found true the allegations in counts 1, 2 and 3 that Simpson committed those offenses against more than one victim within the meaning of section 667.61, subdivision (b) and (e). Simpson admitted having a prior felony strike conviction. (§§ 667, subds. (a), (b)-(i), 1170.12.)

Appellant Otilia Ioan was severely injured when she fell from a horse owned by respondents Daren Ray Young and Sandra Denise Young (the Youngs). She sued the Youngs for negligence and strict liability. The trial court granted the Youngs' summary judgment motion and dismissed the action. Ioan appeals and contends that there were triable issues of fact precluding summary judgment. We reject her contentions and affirm the judgment.

Jose A. challenges the juvenile court's true finding that he committed assault with a deadly weapon. (Jose does not challenge the true finding that he committed vandalism.) The evidence showed Jose, with a sharp object in his hand, willfully made stabbing and swiping motions toward the victim, from a distance of only three feet away. All elements of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon were established. There is substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court's finding, and we therefore affirm.

A jury returned verdicts in favor of defendant, cross-complainant and respondent Cisco Systems, Inc. (Cisco) for breach of contract and fraud against plaintiff, cross-defendant and appellant Advanced Scientific Applications, Inc. (ASA). After denying ASA's motion for new trial, the superior court entered judgment for Cisco.
On appeal, ASA claims the trial court erroneously rejected a proposed jury instruction based on Civil Code section 1584 concerning acceptance of a contract through performance. ASA also contends the evidence fails to support a finding it agreed to the terms of Cisco's standard Internet Commerce Agreement (ICA) through an online â€

Appellant, Felipe Garcia, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled no contest to a charge of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b)) and admitted an allegation that he had suffered a â€

In 2006, appellant/defendant Rowan Crosby Brooks, Jr., was convicted of the first degree murder of his wife. Prior to the sentencing hearing, the victim's adult daughter wrote a letter to the probation department and asked that defendant be ordered to repay $49,937.40, which he withdrew from the victim's financial accounts after the murder. In the probation report, however, the probation officer stated that the victim's daughter was not requesting restitution. At the 2006 sentencing hearing, the court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life, but it did not order direct restitution to the victim's family.
In 2010, the People filed a motion for the court to reconsider the matter and order defendant to make direct restitution to the victim's family of the funds that defendant withdrew from the victim's financial accounts. The court granted the motion and found the victim's daughter was not fully advised of her constitutional and statutory rights to victim restitution, and she did not waive those rights at the time of the 2006 sentencing hearing.
On appeal, defendant contends the court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider his sentence and impose a victim restitution order four years after the original sentencing hearing. We will affirm.

In this matter, we have reviewed and considered the petition and the record. Real party in interest has filed an informal response indicating that it does not oppose issuing the writ. We have determined that resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law, and that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is therefore appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.)
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, a challenge to an â€

Defendant and appellant Barnum Anthony Hornbeak was charged by information with first degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), count 1).[1] It was also alleged that defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm. (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d).) Defendant entered into a plea agreement and pled guilty to second degree murder. He also admitted that he personally used a firearm. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for 15 years to life on the murder count and 10 years on the firearm enhancement, pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal, indicating that the appeal was â€

Elena M. seeks writ review of juvenile court orders terminating reunification services regarding her daughter, Giselle G., and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] She contends substantial evidence does not support the court's finding she was provided with reasonable reunification services. She also requests a stay of the section 366.26 hearing. We deny the petition and the request for a stay.

Bennett Hazzard pled guilty to one count of burglary of an inhabited dwelling (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460),[1] in exchange for an agreed upon concurrent maximum one-year sentence with San Diego Superior Court case No. SCD222643 and formal probation. On January 4, 2011, he was placed on three years probation on various terms and conditions, including that he serve 365 days in jail with the time to run concurrent with that imposed in case No. SCD222643, and was ordered to pay various fines, fees and cost of probation services, including the cost of a presentence investigation report.
On January 6, 2011, Hazzard filed an appeal contending that the trial court erred by denying him a hearing pursuant to section 1203.1b on the reasonable cost of the presentence investigation report, and his ability to make all or part of the payment ordered. A certificate of probable cause was sought, but denied.[2]

In this consolidated appeal and original proceeding seeking a writ of habeas corpus, Thomas Keeler Barry challenges the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b))[1] and two counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)). The jury also found true the allegation that Barry personally used a firearm in the commission of each offense. (§ 12022.5, subds. (a), (d).) The trial court sentenced Barry to an aggregate term of six years in prison.

D.E. entered a negotiated admission to a misdemeanor, bringing a folding knife with a locking blade to school (Pen. Code, §§ 626.10, subd. (a)(1), 17, subd. (b)(4)). The juvenile court adjudged D.E. a ward (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602)[1] and placed him with his mother under the supervision of a probation officer. D.E. appeals, contending the court abused its discretion by adjudging him a ward based on an issue unrelated to this case (his occasional alcohol use) rather than basing its decision on the factors set forth in section 725.5. We affirm.

Pasadena Unified School District (the District) filed this petition for writ of mandate, asking this court to vacate the trial court's order overruling the District's demurrer to the third amended complaint of real party in interest Brycson Gaddis.[1] The District demurred on grounds that Gaddis's third cause of action for dangerous condition on public property, asserted for the first time in the third amended complaint, is barred because there is no claim of dangerous condition asserted in the tort claim Gaddis presented to the District under the Government Claims Act.[2] (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.)[3]
We conclude that the trial court erred in overruling the District's demurrer. Gaddis's third cause of action for dangerous condition on public property is barred because the facts supporting it are not fairly reflected in Gaddis's government tort claim. Thus, Gaddis failed to comply with the claims presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act (§ 900 et seq.) with respect to this cause of action. We grant the District's petition and direct the trial court to vacate the order overruling the demurrer and to issue an order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.