CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant, Shaunta Rankin, pled guilty to conspiracy to commit first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 182, subd. (a)(1) & 187, subd. (a))[1] and conspiracy to commit assault with a firearm (§§ 182, subd. (a)(1) & 245, subd. (b)) and admitted that he committed both offenses in association with a criminal street gang. He was sentenced to prison for 12 years. Thereafter, during an ex parte hearing, the trial court vacated defendant's entry of guilty pleas and admissions, entered new pleas and admissions and sentenced defendant to a 12-year term. Defendant's request for a certificate of probable cause was denied by the trial court. Defendant appeals, claiming the judgment must be reversed because the trial court's vacation of his pleas and admissions and entry of new pleas and admissions and its subsequent imposition of sentence was done in his absence. Defendant also asserts that his precustody credits were erroneously calculated. The People counter that defendant's failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause bars his appeal, although they suggest that we remand the matter to allow defendant to enter pleas according to the terms of his plea bargain and that we correct the credit calculation, which they acknowledge is in error. We determine that defendant's failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause is not fatal to his appeal. We vacate the orders that were made in his absence and remand the matter to have him either withdraw his pleas and admissions or enter pleas and admissions according to the terms of his bargain and be sentenced in compliance with them, and to have a correct calculation of his presentence custody credits made.
The facts surrounding defendant's crimes are irrelevant to this appeal.[2]

Defendant and appellant Martin Bradley Coleman contends the trial court erred by awarding Penal Code[1] section 4019 conduct credits at different rates for periods before and after an amendment to that section became effective. We modify the judgment to award additional credits and affirm.

Defendant and appellant Catherine Joan Marie Buss contends she was entitled to have all of her Penal Code[1] section 4019 conduct credits calculated based on the version of that statute that was in effect at the time of her sentencing. We modify the judgment to award the additional credits she requests and affirm.

Kenneth M. appeals the orders entered at the 12-month hearing held under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, he asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held review under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting his custody of a child or his status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny Kenneth's request to review the record for error and to address his Anders issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)
Citing In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, Kenneth's counsel also asks this court to exercise its discretion to provide him the opportunity to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. The request is denied.

Tara R. appeals the orders entered at the termination of parental rights hearing held under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held review under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting his [or her] custody of a child or his [or her] status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny Tara's request to review the record for error and to address her Anders issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)
Citing In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, Tara's counsel also asks this court to exercise its discretion to provide her the opportunity to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. The request is denied.

Tim S. appeals an order terminating his parental rights to his son, Jaden S., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] We affirm.

A jury convicted Charles Edward Bell of second degree murder. (Penal Code,[1] section 187, subd. (a).) It found true an enhancement allegation that Bell personally discharged a firearm, causing death. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) The court sentenced Bell to state prison for 40 years to life as follows: a term of 15 years to life for murder and a consecutive term of 25 years to life on the enhancement allegation.
Bell contends: (1) the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence his involuntary interview statements made to detectives, thus violating his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution; (2) insufficient evidence supported both the murder conviction and the true finding on the enhancement; (3) the trial court erroneously denied his new trial motion; and (4) there was cumulative error. We affirm the judgment.

A jury found in favor of Anice Plikaytis on some of her claims against her alleged former employers, James Roth, Roth Construction Corporation (RCC), Roth Management Corporation (RMC) and Fairmount, LP dba Talmadge Canyon Park (Talmadge Canyon), and two related entities Talmadge East, LLC (Talmadge East) and Roth Montezuma Partners (RMP; collectively defendants). The jury awarded Plikaytis punitive damages against Roth and RCC. The trial court denied Talmadge East's request for specific performance.
Defendants appeal some of the jury's findings, contending they are not supported by sufficient evidence. Specifically, they challenge the jury's verdicts for: (1) breach of employment contract against Talmadge Canyon, RCC and RMC; (2) breach of contract against Talmadge East; (3) breach of contract and fiduciary duty against RMP; (4) intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress against Roth; and (5) punitive damages entered against Roth and RCC. They also challenge the trial court's: (1) order piercing the corporate veil as to RCC and RMC; and (2) finding of joint and several liability between Roth, RCC, RMC and Talmadge Canyon as it applies to the breach of employment contract verdicts. Finally, defendants contend the trial court committed prejudicial error when it denied Talmadge East's request for specific performance.

In November 2003, defendant was charged with second degree robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and misdemeanor resisting arrest.[2] He was found incompetent to stand trial and proceedings were suspended until July 2004. Once proceedings were reinstated, defendant pled no contest to second degree robbery and the remaining counts were dismissed. The San Luis Obispo court sentenced him to a two-year state prison term.
In September 2005, the Board of Prison Hearings[3] determined defendant met the criteria of section 2962 as an MDO and sustained the condition he undergo mental health treatment as a condition of parole. Defendant challenged this determination and at an April 2006 trial on the matter, two psychiatric experts offered conflicting opinions. (§ 2966, subd. (b).) Dr. Mendenhall concluded defendant's mental illness was probably among the reasons he committed the robbery. Dr. Phenix concluded defendant was malingering, did not have a mental disorder, and any such disorder was not a cause or aggravating factor in his offense. Based on the conflicting expert testimony, and the tentative nature of Dr. Mendenhall's opinions, the court[4] found there was a reasonable doubt whether defendant had a substantial mental disorder that was a causative or aggravating factor in the robbery. The standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. (§ 2966, subd. (b).)
In both April 2007 and July 2008, the board certified defendant as an MDO and following a court trial, the court found he did not meet the criteria. The board again determined defendant met the criteria of an MDO in January 2009, but defendant was released from the hospital prior to trial. In July 2009, the district attorney again sought continued involuntary treatment of defendant as an MDO. Defendant refused to come to trial, and in August 2009, the court found he had a severe mental disorder that could not be kept in remission without treatment. Accordingly, his commitment was extended under section 2970.
In May 2010, the district attorney filed another petition for continued involuntary treatment of defendant under 2 section

After a jury deadlocked and the trial court declared a mistrial, defendant Britton Edward McFetridge entered a plea of no contest to committing a battery that inflicted serious bodily injury, in exchange for the dismissal of the other charge, the suspension of imposition of sentence, and a grant of probation. Among the conditions were payment to the victim of restitution. The trial court granted two days of conduct credits for two days of presentence custody, and ordered defendant to report to jail on June 4, 2010.

On June 14, 2010, Los Angeles deputy sheriffs responded to a suicide hotline call from an unknown woman in a campground near Castaic Lake. The woman threatened to commit suicide with a razor blade and, possibly, a shotgun. Sheriff's deputies subsequently found defendant sitting in the cab of her truck at a campsite with the door open, talking on her phone. The officers drew their weapons and kept them drawn during the entire encounter.

A jury found Brian Roy Carner guilty of kidnapping to commit another crime (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1)), second degree robbery (§ 211), and false imprisonment of an elder adult (§ 368, subd. (f)).[1] On appeal, Carner contends his confession should have been excluded as involuntary. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Raul Gilberto Aguilar of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)),[1] finding true that he inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)), and acquitted him of criminal threats (§ 422). The jury deadlocked on two counts, forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)) and kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)), and the court declared a mistrial on those counts. A second jury convicted defendant of those charges, finding in the oral copulation count that he kidnapped the victim (§ 667.61, subds. (a), (b), & (e)) and that the movement substantially increased the risk of harm (§ 667.61, subds. (a) & (d)).[2] Defendant was sentenced to a term of 25 years to life on the oral copulation count, and the terms on the remaining counts were stayed pursuant to section 654. He appeals from the judgment of conviction.

In this appeal, Jose E. Falu-Mendoza challenges his resentencing, contending that the trial court erred in its determination of his presentence credits. We find no error in the court's determination of appellant's presentence credits, though the abstract of judgment should be amended to reflect appellant's time in custody between his original sentencing and resentencing. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.