CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Wilbert Ard appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury on one count of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)) and one count of unlawfully taking a car without the owner's consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). He asks us to conduct an independent review of a Pitchess hearing. (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.) Appellant also challenges the admission of hearsay evidence. Finally, appellant contends that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during closing argument. We conclude that there was no error in the Pitchess proceeding. However, the trial court erred in admitting the challenged hearsay evidence, and the error was not harmless. We therefore reverse his conviction.

Defendants and appellants Martin and Carolyn Griffin appeal from a judgment following a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff and respondent Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowners Association (Tesoro) on its claims that appellants installed a solar energy system at their residence in contravention of conditions, covenants and restrictions governing their property. Unmindful of applicable standards of review, appellants raise a host of issues in an effort to undermine the jury verdict. We affirm. The jury properly determined the disputed issues and substantial evidence supported the determinations; Tesoro properly evaluated appellants' application for their system, brought suit and received a jury trial; and the trial court properly exercised its discretion in the admission and exclusion of expert testimony.

This appeal concerns a dispute that arose between plaintiff City of Los Angeles (the City), and defendant Los Angeles City Controller Wendy Greuel (the Controller). The Controller sought to audit the City Attorney's workers' compensation program to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of the City Attorney's management and oversight of claims. The City Attorney's office, under former City Attorney Rockard Delgadillo, filed suit to prevent the audit based on the argument that the Controller had no authority under the City Charter to audit the office of any elected official.

Plaintiff and appellant Thomas Encinas appeals from a judgment following an order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants and respondents Brent Burton and the County of Los Angeles in this action arising from Encinas's reports of misconduct. Encinas contends: 1) triable issues of fact exist as to his cause of action for a hostile work environment based on widespread favoritism shown to Black employees in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.); 2) triable issues of fact exist as to his claim of retaliation in violation of the FEHA; 3) Burton can be held individually liable for retaliation under the FEHA; 4) the trial court erred by excluding certain evidence; 5) the trial court erred by sustaining a demurrer to his cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 (the whistleblower statute) without leave to amend and subsequently refusing to allow leave to amend based on newly discovered evidence; and 6) the amount of costs awarded was excessive.
We conclude that no triable issues of fact exist as to the causes of action for a hostile work environment or retaliation under the FEHA. However, the allegations of the complaint that Encinas was subject to adverse employment actions as a result of reporting conduct to his employer which violated criminal statutes were sufficient to state a cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5. The demurrer to the cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 should have been overruled. Therefore, we reverse the judgment with directions.

Like many who visit the wineries of Napa County, appellant Sam Youmtoub decided to sample a local vintage. The winery he chose, however, was closed to the public at the time he decided to enter, and the wine he selected was taken without the owner's permission. As he exited the winery, he encountered the owner, who objected to Youmtoub's after-hours self-guided wine tour and pursued Youmtoub as he fled, apprehending him over his forcible objection and detaining him until the police arrived.
A jury convicted Youmtoub of burglary and trespass, as well as assault with a deadly weapon (a rock) and battery upon the owner during the struggle between them. He argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that he had no duty to remain passive when he was detained unless he knew or had reason to know that he had been placed under a citizen's arrest. We conclude the claim of error was forfeited and, in any event, Youmtoub suffered no prejudice. We affirm the judgment.

Javier Delgado appeals from the denial of his motion to vacate the judgment in a 1986 case in which he pleaded guilty to one count of lewd and lascivious conduct on a child under 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)). Delgado brought his motion to vacate pursuant to Penal Code section 1016.5. Delgado contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate because the 1986 trial court failed to adequately warn him of the adverse immigration consequences of his plea prior to accepting that plea.
Delgado filed his notice of appeal in January 2011. Thereafter, in People v. Placencia (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 489, the Second District Court of Appeal held that a certificate of probable cause is required from the trial court in compliance with Penal Code section 1237.5 in order to appeal the denial of a motion to vacate after a guilty plea. The court reasoned that because a Penal Code section 1016.5 motion to vacate based on a claimed failure by the trial court to advise the defendant of the immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or no contest necessarily precedes the entry of the plea and affects the validity of the plea, a certificate of probable cause is required to appeal. (Id. at pp. 492, 494.)
We note that Delgado did not have a certificate of probable cause when he filed his appeal. However, Delgado was given leave to file an amended notice of appeal and request for certificate of probable cause. Subsequently, the trial court denied the request for a certificate of probable cause. On July 28, 2011, this court denied Delgado's petition for writ of mandate, which he had sought to direct the trial court to grant his request.[1]

Petitioner Sergio Gonzalez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction for second degree murder. He contends he was denied his state and federal constitutional rights to the effective assistance of appellate counsel. His claim is based on defense counsel's failure to argue on appeal that the instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion was erroneous. With his petition he filed a declaration from the lawyer who represented him in the earlier appeal wherein she stated she had not taken the issue into account when preparing the appeal but â€

This appeal is from a postjudgment order entered in a consolidated probate matter and civil action that awarded petitioner Lewis P. Brown and his brother John J. Brown (collectively respondents) recovery of their attorney fees and prejudgment interest against objector Douglas A. Brown (appellant). The case is related to another pending appeal brought by appellant from the judgment in the underlying case, Estate of Brown, G043282.
Appellant attacks the postjudgment order, arguing respondents failed to timely seek recovery of their attorney fees and interest. He also claims there is no statutory basis for the fee award, and a request for prejudgment interest cannot be awarded in this type of postjudgment proceeding.
We agree with appellant's latter two grounds and reverse the postjudgment order in its entirety. But since we are reversing the judgment in the related appeal, respondents will be entitled to again attempt to establish a right to recover prejudgment interest upon remand to the superior court.

This appeal is from a postjudgment order entered in a consolidated probate matter and civil action that awarded petitioner Lewis P. Brown and his brother John J. Brown (collectively respondents) recovery of their attorney fees and prejudgment interest against objector Douglas A. Brown (appellant). The case is related to another pending appeal brought by appellant from the judgment in the underlying case, Estate of Brown, G043282.
Appellant attacks the postjudgment order, arguing respondents failed to timely seek recovery of their attorney fees and interest. He also claims there is no statutory basis for the fee award, and a request for prejudgment interest cannot be awarded in this type of postjudgment proceeding.
We agree with appellant's latter two grounds and reverse the postjudgment order in its entirety. But since we are reversing the judgment in the related appeal, respondents will be entitled to again attempt to establish a right to recover prejudgment interest upon remand to the superior court.

Petitioner in propria persona seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court's orders issued at an uncontested six-month review hearing terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] hearing as to his eight-month-old daughter Serenity. We will deny the petition.

Frank J., Sr. (father) appealed following a May 2011 juvenile court 12-month status review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (f)) regarding his three dependent children, then 8-year-old Joshua, 6-year-old Frank, and 3-year-old Alexander.[1] Father challenged a finding that he received reasonable reunification services between the 6- and 12-month status review hearings as well as an order continuing supervised, once-a-month visits between him and the children. On motion of father's appellate counsel, this court deemed the appeal to be a cause for mandamus relief in order to expedite review before the juvenile court's next status review hearing, October 11, 2011. Having conducted our review, we conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's reasonable services finding and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by continuing its once-a-month visitation order.

In this marital dissolution case, a judgment was entered by the trial court incorporating the parties' agreement settling all issues (the agreement). The terms of the agreement included a division of the community property in which Gregory Ferreira (Husband) received sole ownership of an insurance business while Lari Dawn Ferreira (Wife) received sole ownership of the family house. Additionally, monthly payments in the amount of $1,667, referred to as â€

Defendant and appellant Jose Carlos Raygoza appeals from the revocation of his probation in case. We affirm.

Defendant, Savion James Hughes, appeals from his conviction and prison sentence of six years and eight months. These resulted from three separate store robberies and a police vehicle pursuit. As discussed below, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the Vehicle Code conviction and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Hughes to prison for the middle term.