CA Unpub Decisions

Clarence Baytop (appellant) appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after he pleaded no contest to possessing a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)). He contends the trial court: (1) erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence; and (2) should have awarded him additional sentencing credits under Penal Code section 4019.[1] We reject the contentions and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Joshua Bryan Cooley appeals after he was found to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA). (Welf. & Inst. Code,[1] § 6600 et seq.) He contends the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's findings, that the trial court committed evidentiary and instructional error, that the prosecutor committed misconduct, that the SVPA violates his rights to due process and equal protection, that it acts as an ex post facto law, and that it is unconstitutionally vague. We reject each of these contentions except the equal protection claim, which is the subject of pending litigation. (People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172 (McKee).) We shall therefore remand this case to the trial court to await final resolution of McKee and, when McKee is final, to consider defendant's equal protection claim. In all other respects, we shall affirm the judgment.

Following entry of judgment in favor of Rental Housing Owners Association of Southern Alameda County, Inc. (RHOA) on its petition for writ of mandate, the trial court issued a peremptory writ of mandate enjoining the City of Hayward (City) from enforcing the Mandatory Inspection Program (MIP) incorporated in its Residential Rental Inspection Ordinance (ordinance). The trial court concluded the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face because it forced landlords to grant City inspectors access to occupied units without the consent of the tenant, in violation of California Civil Code section 1954 and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Accordingly, the trial court enjoined enforcement of Hayward Municipal Code sections 9‑5.306 (Entry) and 9‑5.401 (Fees/Penalty Charges), and commanded the City to repeal or cure the constitutional and statutory defects in these sections.
In response to the writ, the City amended the ordinance and filed a Return to Writ of Mandate.[1] RHOA filed Objections to City's Return to Writ of Mandate, asserting that the amended ordinance failed to cure the constitutional defects identified by the trial court in its earlier judgment. The trial court sustained two of the five objections raised by RHOA. The court found that the amended ordinance was unconstitutional on its face because landlords continued to be responsible for obtaining tenants' consent and could incur fines or penalties when tenants refused to permit entry to officials for inspection.
The City appeals the trial court's order sustaining RHOA's objections to its return to writ of mandate. Having considered the arguments presented, including those of amicus curiae for RHOA, California Apartment Association (CAA),[2] we vacate the trial court's order and remand with instructions that the trial court enter a new and different order consistent with this opinion.

Defendant Terry Ray Hawes sexually assaulted Jane Doe while she was camping near Stinson Beach. A jury found him guilty of multiple offenses in a first trial. Following a mistrial on one count, a second jury found defendant guilty of penetration by a foreign object and with the infliction of great bodily injury. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erroneously revoked his self-representation status; abused its discretion by denying a continuance and refusing to order a new competency hearing; and misinstructed the jury. He also argues that retrial of a great bodily injury allegation attached to count 1 was barred by collateral estoppel and double jeopardy. Finally, he contends that the trial court committed various sentencing errors, and that the abstract of judgment must be amended. We agree with the last two contentions in part, but reject the others. We will, therefore, order the abstract of judgment corrected. We will also reverse the judgment and remand the matter for resentencing.

A modification decision.

Defendant and appellant, Felipe Ramirez, appeals the judgment entered following his conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a minor, rape (2 counts) and lewd acts on a child (2 counts). (Pen. Code §§ 288.5, 261, subd. (a)(2), 288, subd. (c)(1).)[1] He was sentenced to state prison for a term of 34 years.
The judgment is affirmed.

In separate trials, juries convicted appellants Ramelle Kamack[1] and Calvin Phipps[2] of the first degree murder of Joshua Davis and the attempted murder of Adriel Deayon. The juries found that the attempted murder was willful, premeditated and deliberate. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664, 187, subd. (a).)[3] With respect to both appellants, the juries found that the offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).) In Kamack's case, the jury found that a principal personally discharged a firearm in commission of the murder and attempted murder. (§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (d), (e)(1).) In Phipps's case, the jury found that he personally discharged a firearm in commission of the murder and attempted murder. (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c ), (d), (e)(1).)

The San Francisco Taxi Commission (Commission) revoked the taxi medallion and â€

Plaintiff Wells Fargo Advisors (Wells Fargo) as successor in interest to Wachovia Securities, LLC (Wachovia) and A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. (A.G. Edwards) appeals from a judgment denying its petition to vacate and confirming an arbitration award in favor of defendants Stifel Nicolaus, LLC (Stifel) and Michael Chris Nielsen. We find no ground to vacate and therefore shall affirm the judgment.

ResMex Partners, LLC (ResMex) appeals from an order awarding attorney fees to Rose Garden Associates, LLC (Rose Garden). After ResMex repeatedly failed to pay rent due under a lease from Rose Garden, the parties negotiated an agreement under which ResMex would vacate the premises, pay the back rent, and transfer certain items to Rose Garden. ResMex vacated by the date specified but failed to pay the rent due or to immediately transfer many of the items it had agreed to transfer. Rose Garden sued ResMex for breach of contract, seeking the unpaid rent and specific performance, and obtained writs of attachment with which it successfully attached several ResMex bank accounts. Eventually the parties stipulated to a release of the bulk of the funds that were being held by the sheriff to Rose Garden and agreed that this amount represented the full amount owed under the lease. Rose Garden then moved for attorney fees as provided in the settlement agreement, as did ResMex. The trial court found that Rose Garden was the prevailing party and awarded $83,153 in attorney fees. ResMex appeals from that order. Although its arguments are not entirely coherent, its main contentions are that the attorney fee motion was premature and that the trial court erred in determining that Rose Garden was the prevailing party. We find no merit to these contentions and therefore shall affirm.

Defendants/cross-complainants Leebove and Steinberg (Homeowners) hired plaintiff/cross-defendant JP Builders, Inc., a general contractor (Contractor) to remodel their home. A dispute arose over alleged construction defects and unpaid bills. Contractor sued Homeowners, who countersued Contractor for defects. Contractor invoked the Anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16)[1]. The primary issues on appeal involve the trial court's resolution of a procedural morass under that statute in favor of Homeowners. We reject Contractor's appellate contentions and affirm.

Richard Heyer was employed as vice-principal at Northgate High School for almost 12 years. In February 2010, he received notice from the Mount Diablo Unified School District (District) of possible reassignment to a classroom teaching position for the following school year. On April 14, 2010, the District gave Heyer notice that he would be reassigned to classroom duties effective July 1, 2010. He challenged the reassignment by petition for a writ of mandate, arguing that he was entitled to a hearing under the provisions of the Education Code and the Government Code prior to the personnel action, and that his due process rights had been violated. Heyer subsequently argued that the true reasons for his reassignment were age discrimination and retaliation for his complaints about such discrimination. The trial court denied the petition. We affirm. School administrators may have tenure in their teaching positions, but they do not have tenure or due process rights with respect to their administrative assignments. The District was free to reassign Heyer to teaching duties with or without cause and without a hearing. His age discrimination claim is forfeited because it was not properly raised in the writ application.

Reliable Tree Experts (Reliable ) contracted with the Department of Transportation (Caltrans), a contract which called for tree pruning and removal of diseased trees along state highways. The question presented is whether Reliable was required to pay employees according to California's Prevailing Wage Law (Lab. Code, §§ 1720-1861[1]). Caltrans and the Director of the Department of Industrial Relations (Director) decided that Reliable did have to pay the prevailing wage because the work performed was â€

After a joint jury trial, defendants Stanley Phillips Jacks, Jr. and Eric Barnes were convicted of three counts of vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(1)).[1] Each defendant was sentenced to state prison for an aggregate term of eight years and eight months, consisting of the upper term of six years on count one and consecutive terms of one year and four months (one-third the middle term) on counts two and three. (§§ 193, subd. (c)(1), 669 & 1170.1, subd. (a).) On appeal, defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support their convictions, the trial court's excusal of a prospective juror for cause, and the trial court's denial of probation and the imposition of maximum prison sentences. We affirm.