CA Unpub Decisions

Petitioner, in propria persona, seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) (rule 8.452) from the juvenile court's orders issued at a contested six-month review hearing setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] hearing as to six‑month-old Joshua. We conclude the petition fails to comport with the procedural requirements of rule 8.452. Accordingly, we will dismiss the petition as facially inadequate.

Brandon M., father, appeals from the juvenile court's order at the conclusion of a disposition hearing removing his three children from his home pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 360 and 361.[1] Father asserts the juvenile court failed to follow the strict standard for removal of the children pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c) and the court's disposition orders removing the children must be reversed. We reject this contention and affirm the juvenile court's orders removing the children from father's home.

Appellant Juan R. (father) appeals from the trial court's order terminating his parental rights pursuant to Family Code section 7822.[1] He argues that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel to his prejudice.
We affirm the court's order.

Defendant Esther Annie Gutierrez pleaded no contest to assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1))[1] and admitted to causing great bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a). The trial court denied probation and sentenced Gutierrez to six years in prison.
Gutierrez contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied probation. She says that, under the circumstances, the court was compelled to find her case â€

Appellant, Luis Gonzalez Ramirez, appeals from a judgment entered after he pled guilty in case No. VCF230603 to driving with a blood alcohol content of .08 percent or greater with prior convictions (count 2/Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (b), 23550, & 23550.5) and admitted violating his probation in case No. VCF188479. Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441 (Wende), we will modify Ramirez's award of presentence custody credit and affirm.

In 2007, Amandeep Singh (Singh) and Kulwinder Sandhu (Sandhu) sued Inova Enterprises, LLC (Inova) for breach of contract and fraud on a promissory note. In 2008, Inova filed a separate action against Singh and Sandhu for breach of contract under the promissory note, seeking to recover under the promissory note's acceleration clause. After the two cases were consolidated for trial, the jury returned a special verdict finding all parties had failed to perform their obligations under the promissory note. Accordingly, no one recovered. In 2010, Inova sued Singh and Sandu for damages arising from nonpayment on the same promissory note, again invoking the acceleration clause. Singh demurred under the principles of res judicata. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. We affirm.

On May 4, 2010, appellant, David Leroy Long, was charged in a second amended information with assault with a deadly weapon by means likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1), count one)[1] and corporal injury of a cohabitant resulting in traumatic injury (§ 273.5, subd. (a), count two). Counts one and two alleged great bodily injury enhancements pursuant, respectively, to sections 12022.7, subdivision (a) and 12022.7, subdivision (e). At the conclusion of a jury trial on May 7, 2010, Long was found guilty of both counts and enhancements.
On June 7, 2010, the court sentenced Long to the midterm of three years on count two plus the midterm of four years for the great bodily injury enhancement made as to that count for a total prison term of seven years. The court stayed Long's sentence on count one. The court awarded actual custody credits of 32 days plus conduct credits of 5 days.[2] Long contends the trial court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry of a challenge Long made during a hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). We disagree and will affirm the judgment.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorney General, for Real Party in Interest.
The court has read and considered the petition for writ of mandate, the informal response filed by the Attorney General, and petitioner's reply. The Attorney General concedes petitioner is entitled to 85 days additional credit as he alleges. Petitioner's entitlement to relief is clear and undisputed and, thus, this court may grant relief without issuance of an alternative writ of mandate or an order to show cause. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.) Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandate is granted.
Although conceding petitioner's entitlement to additional credit, the Attorney General notes that petitioner's release date lies sometime in the future because he is serving a concurrent term of three years for a probation violation. Petitioner responds that the record does not reveal the amount of credits to which he is entitled in the probation violation matter (case no. SWF019595). We agree and conclude that the Superior Court of Riverside County will have to determine this when the matter is remanded.

The minor, I.R., appeals from a March 23, 2011 dispositional order, following the finding by the juvenile court that he committed attempted robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 664). The court continued the minor as a ward of the court in the custody of his mother, with various terms and conditions. The court set the minor's maximum term of confinement at five years six months. On appeal, the minor's appointed counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.
The record on appeal reflects that in May 2010, a dispositional hearing was held after the juvenile court â€

Defendant and appellant Ismael Serrano was charged by information with entering a building with the intent to commit theft (Pen. Code, § 459, count 1),[1] fraudulently making and delivering a check for $3,000, knowing that he had insufficient funds, with the intent to cheat and defraud (§ 476a, count 2), and unlawfully taking personal property of a value exceeding $400 (a truck) (§ 487, subd. (a), count 3). Count 3 was subsequently amended orally to read that defendant did â€

Appellant J.S. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court's orders terminating her parental rights as to her children, J.W., K.M.H., K.L.H., and S.C. She argues that the orders should be reversed because: 1) the beneficial parental relationship exception applied (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i));[1] 2) the juvenile court erred in finding J.W. and K.M.H. adoptable; 3) the court failed to consider the wishes of J.W. and K.M.H. regarding adoption (§ 366.26, subd. (h)(1)); and 4) the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) failed to comply with the requirements under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA).
Appellant J.C., who is the presumed father of S.C. only, appeals the termination of his parental rights; he joins mother's appeal, with regard to the ICWA issue and the beneficial parental relationship issue, to the extent it inures to his benefit. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant David Lopez was charged by information with failing to update his sex offender registration within five working days of his birthday (Pen. Code, § 290.012, subd. (a)(1), count 1),[1] and failing to inform the law enforcement agency where he was last registered that he had moved to a new address, within five working days of his move (§ 290.013, subd. (a), count 2). The information also alleged that he had two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A))--a 1985 conviction for attempted lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under 14 years old (§§ 664, 288, subd. (a)) and a 1994 conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under 14 years old (§ 288, subd. (a)). Defendant stipulated that he had been â€

A jury found defendant and appellant Marlon Cameron Carl Harris guilty of making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422)[1] and misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(2)(A)).[2] In a bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted that he had suffered three prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). Defendant was sentenced to a total term of six years in state prison with credit for time served. Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during closing argument. We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Steven Andrew Gonzalez appeals from a jury conviction for possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) and transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)). He argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, § 1385).[1] Defendant also argues there was a clerical error in the calculation of his presentence custody credits under Penal Code section 4019.