CA Unpub Decisions

Appellants Vanessa M. (Mother) and Luis F. (Father) are the parents of J., born in July 2008. Each parent's appeal contests the juvenile court's order terminating parental rights. In addition, Mother challenges the trial court's summary denial of her section 388[1] petition filed on the day of the section 366.26 hearing. We affirm the judgment in its entirety.

A modification decision.

Appellants Antonio Gomez and Francisca Carmona were convicted of dissuading witnesses and other offenses. They challenge the judgments on many grounds, including the existence of sentencing errors. We reject these contentions, with the exception of certain sentencing errors as to both appellants that are properly corrected without a remand for resentencing; in addition, we conclude that the abstract of judgment for Carmona contains omissions. Accordingly, we modify the judgments to remedy the sentencing errors, affirm the judgments so modified, and direct the preparation of corrected abstracts of judgment.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, Alfredo C. admitted he had possessed a short-barreled shotgun in violation of Penal Code section 12020, subdivision (a)(1). Alfredo was declared a ward of the court and ordered home on probation. On appeal, he contends the photographs found on a digital camera recovered from his person following his arrest should have been suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search.[1] We affirm.

A jury convicted Joe (â€

Defendants Daniel Castro (Castro) and David Martinez (Martinez) challenge their convictions for one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))[1] and two counts of deliberate and premeditated attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a), 1192.7 subd. (c)) with true findings on special firearm use enhancement (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d)), and found to have been committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22 subd. (b)(1)(C)). Defendants principally contend that evidence was insufficient to (1) sustain their convictions for attempted murder and support the jury's finding that the attempted murders were premeditated, and (2) impose gang enhancements pursuant to section 186.22. Additionally, they allege that the trial court erred in (3) admitting gang expert testimony, (4) failing to maintain courtroom decorum, and (5) giving instructions to the jury about flight as evidence of consciousness of guilt. We reject all of defendants' claims, and, accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Assignment agreements expressly granted the assignee complete control of litigation not only of assigned claims but also of the grantors' nonassigned claims. When the assignee, in conjunction with the grantors, instituted litigation, the defendants moved to strike the assignee's claims on the ground that the agreements were invalid because they permitted the assignee to practice law without a license. The trial court found the agreements to be void on this basis and dismissed not only the assignee's claims, but also the grantors', without leave to amend. We hold that no ground existed to dismiss any claim. We accordingly reverse the judgments.

Petitioner J.B. (mother) seeks extraordinary writ relief from a juvenile court order terminating reunification services for her two children, D.B. and J.B., and setting the case for a selection and implementation hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 8.452.) She contends: (1) no substantial evidence supported the finding that it would be detrimental to return the children to her custody; (2) she was not provided with reasonable reunification services; (3) the children should have been placed in her care subject to supervision and monitoring as a less drastic alternative; and (4) the court should have granted her request for increased visitation. We deny the petition.

Appellant E.C. (the mother) appeals from the juvenile court's order suspending her visitation with her daughter M.J. (the child) during the reunification period. The mother contends that the juvenile court's order cannot be upheld because there was no evidence that the supervised, therapeutic visits were detrimental to the child's physical safety. She concedes that there was evidence that the visits were detrimental to the child's emotional health, but she maintains that such detriment is insufficient to justify suspending visitation during the reunification period. The mother also contends that the juvenile court erroneously failed to satisfy its duty of inquiry regarding the child's Indian ancestry. We conclude that the juvenile court found, and the evidence supports its finding, that continued visitation jeopardized the child's safety. We also reject the mother's contention regarding the juvenile court's duty of inquiry.

Defendant Jack Leo Ryan was convicted by plea of one count of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant while having a prior conviction of spousal battery within the preceding seven years. (Pen. Code, §§ 273.5, subd. (e)(2), 243, subd. (e).) He was sentenced to prison for four years and ordered to pay, among other things, a criminal justice administration fee to the City of San Jose. On appeal, defendant challenges the order on the ground that it contains no ability-to-pay requirement, an omission defendant contends is a violation of his right to equal protection of the law. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.) He also challenges the calculation of his presentence custody credits. We shall modify the judgment to correct the custody credits and affirm as modified.

Plaintiff Richard Carrigan appeals from two judgments dismissing respondents Goldman, Sachs & Co. (Goldman Sachs), two of Goldman Sachs's employees, and 10 individual defendants originally named as Does. Plaintiff contends that the superior court erred in sustaining the demurrers of both the Goldman Sachs defendants and the Doe defendants. He maintains that he adequately pleaded a cause of action for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty by Solectron Corporation (Solectron) and individuals associated with Solectron. We conclude, however, that the demurrers were properly sustained and must therefore affirm the judgments.

On March 7, 2007, the body of Torrie Matthews was found in the area of Penitencia Creek Road and Dorel Drive in San Jose. Matthews was lying on his back in a pool of blood adjacent to a mailbox; he had visible injuries to his face and neck as well as on his hands. Police recovered a blood stained knife in the shrubs within a few feet of the body.
On July 9, 2009, the Santa Clara County District Attorney charged appellant Daniel Mendoza with murder. (Pen. Code, § 187.) The information contained an allegation that appellant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon in the commission of the crime (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and that appellant had two prior strike convictions within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (b)-(i) and 1170.12, which were also serious felonies within the meaning of Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a).

A modification decision.

A jury convicted defendant Michael David Carter III of seven separate offenses: kidnapping to commit a sex offense (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1) [count 1]);[1] three counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2) [counts 2, 3, and 8]); sodomy by force (§ 286, subd. (c)(2) [count 4]); forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2) [count 5]); and sexual penetration by a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (a)(1) [count 6]). Applying section 667.61 (the â€