CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Gittel Gordon arbitrated a fee dispute with her former client, plaintiff Marine Avetisyan. Gordon appeals from a judgment (1) granting Avetisyan's petition to confirm arbitration award; (2) denying her petition to vacate arbitration award; and (3) denying her motion for a continuance of the hearings on the petitions. We affirm.

Luis Enrique Quiroz appeals from the judgments in six different criminal cases, which have been consolidated for purposes of appeal. In four of those cases, Quiroz pled no contest,[1] and in two of them, a jury found him guilty.[2] The trial court held a combined sentencing hearing at which it imposed concurrent sentences, placing Quiroz on formal probation for three years with several conditions, including that he serve 364 days in jail.
Quiroz argues that in case No. JCF23524, the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting evidence suggesting that he had victimized other people, and that the trial court should have granted a mistrial based on the admission of that evidence. In all six of the cases, Quiroz challenges the trial court's calculation of the presentence conduct credits that he was entitled to pursuant to section 4019. We conclude that (1) there is no merit to Quiroz's arguments concerning case No. JCF23524; and (2) Quiroz is entitled to additional presentence conduct credits in all six cases.

Defendant Brian Robert Bergstrom appeals from a sentence of six years in prison, imposed after a jury found him guilty of assault with a firearm and found true the allegation that he personally used the firearm in the commission of the assault. Bergstrom contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to sentence him to probation. Specifically, Bergstrom argues that a statement the trial court made indicated that the court erroneously believed that it had no choice but to sentence him to prison, and that as a result, the court failed to exercise its discretion in imposing sentence. Bergstrom also maintains that if the court had properly exercised its discretion, it would have determined that his was precisely the "unusual" case for which probation, and not a prison term, was warranted.
We disagree with Bergstrom's contentions. The record demonstrates that the trial court exercised its discretion in deciding that a prison term was warranted in this case. In addition, the record discloses no abuse of discretion in the court's choosing to sentence Bergstrom to prison rather than grant him probation. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Having reviewed the record as required by Wende, we affirm the judgment. We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)
A few days after Joseph Corso discovered his Chevrolet Corsica missing from his home in Cupertino, defendant was seen by Amador County Sheriff Deputy Nathan Woods driving it in Jackson around 4:00 a.m. Woods ran a records check and learned the vehicle might be stolen. He followed the car for about a mile and saw it roll through a stop sign, turn right off the road and stop. When defendant exited the car, Woods took him into custody. Defendant told Woods he had gotten the car from a friend and forgotten to return it. The ignition key was a plastic valet key. Corso generally left a plastic valet key in the car in the glove compartment box.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, defendant Steven Cosovich pled no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court placed him on three years' probation.
Defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress because the deputies who searched his home: (1) violated the Fourth Amendment when they entered his house; (2) were not justified in performing a protective sweep; and (3) were not justified in asking for and obtaining his key to a locked bedroom because it was the fruit of an unlawful arrest. Holding that the deputies were not reasonably justified in performing the protective sweep, we reverse the trial court's denial of the suppression motion.

Convicted of murdering his stepfather, Paul Bonomo, with a baseball bat and sentenced to 26 years to life in prison, defendant David Harrison Buzzetta appeals, contending the trial court violated his federal constitutional rights by excluding evidence that his mother, Eileen Bonomo,[1] and the man with whom she was having an extramarital affair, Brian Stafford, might have been the real killers.
We find no error. While there was evidence Eileen and Stafford might have had a motive to kill the victim, our Supreme Court has made clear that â€

After a jury found that defendant Norman Yartz is a sexually violent predator (SVP), the court recommitted him to the custody of the state Department of Mental Health for an indefinite term.
Defendant appeals, raising eight constitutional challenges to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) and eight other challenges to his recommitment. Finding his constitutional challenges forfeited and his other challenges meritless, we affirm the recommitment order.

Nahid and Mohammad Saberi died after Nahid Saberi lost control of their car on an icy portion of the highway and slid into a tow truck parked on the shoulder of the road. Their daughter, plaintiff Mahnaz Saberi, along with plaintiff Estate of Mohammad Saberi, sued defendant Cal-Nevada Towing for wrongful death, contending that its employee, tow truck driver Douglas Casler, negligently parked his tow truck where it was foreseeable that another car would slide into it. Following a court trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Cal-Nevada Towing.
Plaintiffs contend on appeal that the trial court erred (1) in its application of the duty of care to the facts of this case, and (2) in allowing police officers to give expert testimony without foundation.
We conclude that the tow truck driver had a duty to use reasonable care in choosing whether, when and where to stop on the side of the highway. (Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 783 (Cabral).) Nonetheless, on these particular facts, the tow truck driver did not breach his duty of care as a matter of law. As a result, we need not address plaintiffs' additional claim regarding police officer expert testimony. We will affirm the judgment.

Nahid and Mohammad Saberi died after Nahid Saberi lost control of their car on an icy portion of the highway and slid into a tow truck parked on the shoulder of the road. Their daughter, plaintiff Mahnaz Saberi, along with plaintiff Estate of Mohammad Saberi, sued defendant Cal-Nevada Towing for wrongful death, contending that its employee, tow truck driver Douglas Casler, negligently parked his tow truck where it was foreseeable that another car would slide into it. Following a court trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Cal-Nevada Towing.
Plaintiffs contend on appeal that the trial court erred (1) in its application of the duty of care to the facts of this case, and (2) in allowing police officers to give expert testimony without foundation.
We conclude that the tow truck driver had a duty to use reasonable care in choosing whether, when and where to stop on the side of the highway. (Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 783 (Cabral).) Nonetheless, on these particular facts, the tow truck driver did not breach his duty of care as a matter of law. As a result, we need not address plaintiffs' additional claim regarding police officer expert testimony. We will affirm the judgment.

Plaintiffs James and Millie Ruffalo sued their homeowners' association and two of its managers for damage to their property caused by water intrusion from an adjacent golf course. The case settled in mediation, but later the Ruffalos opposed defendants' motion for summary judgment based on the written settlement agreement on the ground the agreement was confidential and therefore inadmissible. The trial court rejected the Ruffalos' claim of confidentiality and granted the motion.
On appeal from the resulting judgment, the Ruffalos contend the trial court erred in overruling their objection to admission of the settlement agreement. They also contend that even if the agreement was admissible, defendants failed to perform their obligations under the agreement, excusing the Ruffalos' performance, including dismissal of the action.
Finding no merit in the Ruffalos' arguments, we will affirm.

Appellant Eric Moberg, a self-represented litigant, was hired in 2009 by respondent Monterey Peninsula Unified School District (the District) as a special education teacher for young adult students with severe handicaps. In 2010, the District dismissed Moberg from his position as a probationary certified employee. Moberg filed a complaint against the District and District personnel in which he asserted causes of action for violation of civil rights, retaliation in contravention of public policy, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. After defendants' demurrers were sustained without leave to amend, except as to the third cause of action for defamation to which the demurrer was sustained with leave to amend, Moberg filed an amended complaint.
The amended complaint was filed without leave of court and included, not only a revised third cause of action, but five new causes of action (causes of action five through nine) and four new defendants. On December 13, 2010, the trial court issued its order (1) granting defendants' special motions to strike the third, fifth and sixth causes of action under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16[1]; (2) granting defendants' motion to strike new causes of action five through nine and the allegations against the new defendants; (3) denying Moberg's oral motion for leave to amend the third cause of action; (4) determining that as a result of the court's rulings, defendants' demurrers and Moberg's discovery motion were moot; and (5) dismissing the entire action with prejudice.

The Orange County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition against J.S. (minor) alleging he carried a dirk or dagger. (Pen. Code, § 12020, subds. (a)(4), (c)(24); all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated.) A second petition alleged minor committed grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)), three counts of tampering with a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10852), and petty theft (§§ 484, subd. (a), 488). After the court reduced the section 12020 charge in the first petition to a misdemeanor, minor admitted all counts in both petitions and was placed on probation pursuant to his plea agreement.
A third wardship petition alleged minor disobeyed a gang injunction by wearing gang clothing. (§ 166, subd. (a)(4)). The court sustained the petition and continued minor's probation.
Minor contends the evidence was insufficient to establish the injunction he was found to have violated was a lawfully issued order or that he was a member or active participant in the gang. Finding no error, we affirm.

Delecia Ann Holt appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted her of seven counts of writing a check with insufficient funds, defrauding an innkeeper, and grand theft. Holt argues the trial court erroneously instructed the jury and her trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. None of her contentions have merit, and we affirm the judgment.

Lexington National Insurance Corporation (Lexington) was the surety on a bail bond issued to secure Noe Gaona Gomez's release pending trial. The bond was ordered forfeited when Gomez failed to appear at his sentencing hearing. Lexington assigned investigators to attempt to locate Gomez. Although progress was made in locating Gomez, he was not apprehended during the initial 180-day exoneration period. (Pen. Code, § 1305, subd. (c).)[1] Lexington moved for an extension of the exoneration period pursuant to section 1305.4. The trial court denied the motion and judgment was entered on the bond.
Lexington argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying its motion for an extension of the exoneration period. We agree and will reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to enter an order granting the motion.