CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff and appellant Juan Villanueva[1] appeals from a judgment entered in favor of defendant and respondent Edward M. Clifford on plaintiff's complaint for personal injuries based on negligence. In 2002, when he was 12 years old, plaintiff was playing paintball with several other boys in the backyard of a single-family home that defendant owned in Mira Loma. Plaintiff's right eye was injured when it was struck with a paintball one of the other boys fired from a paintball gun. Though defendant owned the home where the injury occurred, he did not live there at the time plaintiff was injured, nor did he have the right to control the activities of its occupants. Instead, defendant's estranged wife lived in the home with her daughter and grandchildren, none of whom were related to defendant.
Plaintiff appeals, claiming that by virtue of his ownership of the home, defendant had a duty to ensure that the type of injury plaintiff sustained did not occur. Plaintiff also claims the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his evidentiary objections to defendant's declaration, which defendant submitted in support of his motion. We affirm. We conclude the motion was properly granted, and the trial court properly overruled plaintiff's evidentiary objections to defendant's declaration.

Defendant and appellant Austin James Gardner appeals following a guilty plea. He claims the sentence imposed pursuant to his plea agreement violates the prohibition against multiple punishments in Penal Code section 654 (hereinafter â€

A jury found defendant Jose Heriberto Romero guilty as charged of having unlawful sexual intercourse with a person under age 16 while he was over age 21 (Pen. Code, § 261.5, subd. (d); count 1) and committing a lewd act on a person under age 16 and more than 10 years his junior (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. ( c)(1); count 2). The trial court sentenced defendant to three years eight months in prison,[1] but suspended the prison sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years. Defendant was also ordered to serve 180 days in jail. Defendant appeals.

Defendant and appellant M.H., the maternal grandmother of L.E. and P.A., contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it (1) failed to rule on her motion for standing, and (2) denied her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petitions.[1] We will affirm.

A jury convicted defendant, Michael Thirkill, of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b)),[1] during which he used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subds. (a) & (b)).[2] He was granted probation and appeals, claiming the trial court erred in giving standard jury instructions on concealment of evidence and flight and either separately or cumulatively, this requires reversal of his convictions. We reject his contentions and affirm.

A jury convicted defendant, Clarence Balltezegar, Jr., of inflicting corporal injury on his spouse, having previously been convicted of the same offense (Pen. Code, § 273.5).[1] In bifurcated proceedings, defendant admitted having suffered a prior conviction for which he served a prison term. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) He was sentenced to prison for five years and appeals, claiming the jury was improperly instructed. We reject his contention and affirm.

Defendant and respondent Jesus Salvador Vargas pled guilty to drug charges and was granted probation. Vargas later claimed his counsel was ineffective for affirmatively misinforming him of the immigration consequences of his plea. Vargas eventually sought a writ of habeas corpus, after first having sought a writ of error coram nobis.[1] At the hearing held on July 21, 2010, on his latest petition for writ of habeas corpus, the trial court ruled that habeas corpus was not the procedurally correct vehicle for addressing this claim. Instead, the court granted a writ of error coram nobis setting aside Vargas's guilty plea. The People appeal this order, contending (1) the trial court erred when it addressed Vargas's claim by granting the writ of error coram nobis, and (2) the remedy here is to reverse the trial court's order granting the writ of error coram nobis and allow Vargas to file a properly verified petition for writ of habeas corpus. In response, Vargas (1) agrees that the trial court should have addressed his claim by ruling on his petition for writ of habeas corpus, but (2) contends the remedy is to let stand the trial court's order setting aside the guilty plea, but direct the trial court to correct the minute order to reflect that the trial court granted his petition for writ of habeas corpus, rather than his petition for writ of error coram nobis. As discussed below, we agree with both parties that the proper vehicle for this claim was a petition for writ of habeas corpus. As for the remedy, because neither the petition nor the procedure followed below were adequate to establish that Vargas's constructive custody was illegal, we remand the matter to allow Vargas to file a new petition for habeas corpus that complies with the statutory requirements.

A jury convicted defendant of two counts of committing lewd and lascivious acts on a minor (Pen Code, § 288, subd. (a))[1] and one count of aggravated sexual assault with a minor who is 10 years younger than the defendant (§ 269, subd. (a)). He was sentenced to prison for 15 years to life, plus 8 years. He appeals, claiming evidence was erroneously admitted and his conviction for aggravated sexual assault cannot stand because the jury was misinstructed as to it and not reversing it violates the prohibition on ex post facto laws. We reject his contentions and affirm. The facts relevant to the issues raised will be discussed in relation to those issues.

Miguel Angel Albarran (defendant) challenges, as unsupported by the evidence, his conviction for sexual penetration of a child under the age of 10. (§ 288.7, subd. (b).)[1] We will affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Khorshid Eshaghian sued defendant and respondent Marriott International, Inc. (Marriott), after she slipped and sustained injury at a Marriott hotel. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Marriott on the theory that plaintiff could not show that Marriott had notice of a dangerous condition at the hotel. Plaintiff appeals the judgment following the trial court's granting of Marriott's summary judgment motion. We reverse.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Rudy Jay Ferrer of felony possession of methamphetamine (count 1; Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd (a)) and being under the influence of methamphetamine (count 2; id., § 11550, subd. (a)).[1] During trial, the People introduced a report from a forensic crime laboratory stating that a white crystalline substance found near defendant was methamphetamine. The person who performed the analysis and came to that conclusion did not testify at trial. Instead, the report was admitted into evidence based on the testimony of a supervisor who did not observe the analyst perform the tests on the substance. The supervisor also testified that, based on his review of the analyst's notes (as well as his own training, education, and knowledge of the crime laboratory's procedures), he would have come to the same conclusion as the analyst.

A jury convicted defendant, Darryl Watkins, of possessing cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) and resisting/delaying an officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)). In bifurcated proceedings, he admitted having suffered four prior convictions for which he served prison sentences (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) and five strike priors (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (c) & (e)). He was sentenced to prison for 25 years to life and appeals, claiming the pleadings were constructively amended, which was improper, the jury was incorrectly instructed, his motion to dismiss his strikes should have been granted and his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We reject his contentions and affirm.

C.H., Sr. (C.H.) and Rachel B. appeal juvenile court judgments terminating their parental rights to their son, C.H., Jr., (C.H.Jr.) and their daughter, F.H., and choosing adoption as the preferred permanent plan. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)[1] The parents contend the court erred by denying their petition for modification under section 388, and insufficient evidence supports the court's finding that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to the adoption preference (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) is inapplicable. We affirm the judgments.

Jennifer S. appeals the judgment terminating her parental rights to her son, Erick M. Jennifer contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by summarily denying her modification petition (Welf. & Inst. Code,[1] § 388) and erred by declining to apply the beneficial relationship exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) to termination of parental rights. We affirm.