CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted Marque Ammons of second degree robbery, with findings that he personally used a firearm and that a principal was armed with a firearm. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 12022.53, subd. (b), 12022, subd. (a)(1).)[1] In a bifurcated phase, the trial court found that Ammons had a prior strike conviction. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) The trial court sentenced Ammons to an aggregate term of 16 years in state prison. We affirm.

A modification decision.

Appellants, Delia Cabrera and Brench Monroy Ambriz, appeal from an order setting aside a default and default judgment in their action for unpaid wages. The trial court granted respondent Alicia Villa relief from default on extrinsic mistake grounds. It found that respondent reasonably believed that her ex-husband, who owned and managed the restaurant where appellants worked, would provide a defense. We affirm. (Weitz v. Yankosky (1966) 63 Cal.2d 849, 854-855.)

Waukeen Q. McCoy filed a lawsuit against Ken Page, Buena Vista Park, LLC (Buena Vista), and Chicago Title Company (Chicago Title) for, among other things, injunctive relief to stop a non-judicial foreclosure. Subsequently, he filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The court granted his request for a preliminary injunction and imposed various conditions. McCoy objects to the condition that during the pendency of this action he must pay Page and Buena Vista $4,971.76 per month, which is the monthly interest due on his loan. We conclude that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in imposing this condition, and affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) in connection with an attack on his girlfriend of almost three years. Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in giving a flight instruction (CALCRIM No. 372), (2) the court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecution to present evidence of four prior acts of domestic violence by defendant against the victim, and (3) the verdict was not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm.

Appellant David Douglas Fennell formerly worked as a volunteer for the Republican Party in California, and he claims to have uncovered various problems within that organization, including incompetence, fraud, and corruption. Fennell contends his efforts to raise these problems internally were met with wrongful acts directed at him and his supporters. As a result, Fennell sued the California Republican Party and various affiliated entities and individuals, alleging various torts and statutory causes of action. Two groups of defendants filed motions to dismiss under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (section 425.16), commonly referred to as the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court granted the motions, and Fennell appealed. We affirm.

Hector Jose Sanchez was sentenced to a 15-year prison term for multiple offenses related to several bank robberies that were committed in Contra Costa County between December 2004 and June 2006. The sole issue in this appeal from the judgment is whether the trial court erred by denying Sanchez's motion to suppress evidence. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5.) Finding no such error, we affirm.

In this appeal, appellant Mario Avalos challenges the imposition of a Penal Code section 1202.5 fine and a criminal justice administration fee or booking fee, both of which were imposed after he pleaded no contest to one count of second degree burglary and one count of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. For reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment.
Appellant has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which this court ordered considered with the appeal. In the petition, appellant contends that his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and his state law rights under Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, were violated when the court misadvised him about the maximum length of time he could receive as a result of his no contest pleas. We have disposed of the petition by separate order filed this day. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.387(b)(2)(B).)

Plaintiff Joseph Rotenberg sued defendants for false advertising, among other claims, in a proposed class action lawsuit relating to a product sold by defendants. During the course of litigation, Rotenberg's attorney and putative class counsel Thomas H. Clarke, Jr., made a number of public statements about defendants' product, and defendants sued for defamation. Defendants argue the pending defamation action creates a conflict of interest and that he and his firm should therefore be disqualified. The trial court denied the motion, and defendants now appeal. Because we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion, we affirm.

In this matter, we have reviewed and considered the petition and the record. Real party in interest has filed an informal response indicating that it does not oppose issuing the writ. We have determined that resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law, and that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is therefore appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.)
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, a challenge to an â€

R.S. appeals following the dispositional hearing in the juvenile dependency case of her daughter N.S. R.S. contends the court erred by denying her reunification services. We affirm.

Minors M.A. and C.A. (the minors) appeal a juvenile court order granting the de facto parent application of their foster parents, Michelle F. and Tony F. (the F.'s). The minors contend the F.'s did not qualify as de facto parents; equity and policy considerations require reversal of the order; and the court erred by ordering the F.'s would have access to documents relating to the dependencies. We affirm the order.

Anthony P. appeals a judgment terminating his parental rights to his daughter, Makayla P., on the basis of abandonment. (Fam. Code, § 7822.)[1] He contends there was insufficient evidence to show he intended to abandon Makayla. He also asserts the court reversibly erred by not complying with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We hold substantial evidence supports the court's findings that Anthony abandoned Makayla within the meaning of section 7822. We reverse the judgment for the limited purpose of allowing compliance with ICWA. If after proper inquiry and notice, the juvenile court determines ICWA does not apply, it must reinstate its order terminating Anthony's parental rights.

Defendant Mohammed Rouhi pleaded guilty to multiple charges of burglary (Pen. Code, § 459),[1] grand theft (§ 487, subds. (a) & (d)), passing a bad check (§ 476a, subd. (a)), and misappropriation of public funds (§ 424, subd. (a)). The court granted Rouhi probation and ordered him to pay $95,639 victim restitution to Adesa Auto Auction (ADESA) and $232,671.13 victim restitution to Manheim San Diego Auto Auction (Manheim) under section 1202.4, subdivision (f).